Cory Juhl
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866101 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Cory Juhl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Cory |
| FAMILY NAME | Juhl |
| SIGNATURE | JUHL C |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6615-3518 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning
Pure and Impure Stipulata
Analyticity
Transcendental Deductions and Universal Architectures for Inductive Inferences
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Objectively reliable subjective probabilities
The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction
In his Theory of Probability, Hans Reichenbach made a bold and original attempt to ‘vindicate’ induction. He proposed a rule, the ‘straight rule’ of induction, which would guarantee inductive success if any rule of induction would. A central problem facing his attempt to vindicate the straight rule is that too many other rules are just as good as the straight rule if our only constraint on what counts as ‘success’ for an inductive rule is that it…
Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry
The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianis…
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Objectively reliable subjective probabilities
Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry
The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianis…
The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction
In his Theory of Probability, Hans Reichenbach made a bold and original attempt to ‘vindicate’ induction. He proposed a rule, the ‘straight rule’ of induction, which would guarantee inductive success if any rule of induction would. A central problem facing his attempt to vindicate the straight rule is that too many other rules are just as good as the straight rule if our only constraint on what counts as ‘success’ for an inductive rule is that it…
Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry
The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianis…
The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction
In his Theory of Probability, Hans Reichenbach made a bold and original attempt to ‘vindicate’ induction. He proposed a rule, the ‘straight rule’ of induction, which would guarantee inductive success if any rule of induction would. A central problem facing his attempt to vindicate the straight rule is that too many other rules are just as good as the straight rule if our only constraint on what counts as ‘success’ for an inductive rule is that it…
Objectively reliable subjective probabilities
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Transcendental Deductions and Universal Architectures for Inductive Inferences
Pure and Impure Stipulata
Analyticity
On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning
Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (3 works)