Jennifer Lackey
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3866104 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jennifer Lackey |
| PRENOMES | Jennifer |
| SOBRENOME | Lackey |
| ASSINATURA | LACKEY J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Northern Illinois University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7754-248X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 153 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1999 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Epistemic Agency and the American Criminal Legal System
Tommie Shelby
Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency
Eyewitness testimony is a powerful form of evidence, and this is especially true in the United States criminal legal system. At the same time, eyewitness misidentification is the greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing. In this paper, I offer a close examination of this tension between the enormous epistemic weight that eyewitness testimony is afforded in the United States criminal legal system and the fact that…
False Confessions and Subverted Agency
In the criminal legal system, confessions have long been considered the ‘gold standard’ in evidence. An immediate problem arises for this gold standard, however, when the prevalence of false confessions is taken into account. In this paper, I take a close look at false confessions in connection with the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. I show that false confessions provide a unique and compelling challenge to the current conceptual tools used…
Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert
What kind of reasons for belief are provided by the testimony of experts? In a world where we are often inundated with fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories, this question is more pressing than ever. A prominent view in the philosophical literature maintains that the reasons provided by experts are preemptive in that they normatively screen off, or defeat, other relevant reasons. In this paper, I raise problems for this conception of…
The Duty to Object
We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise‐keeping. In particular, I argue that…
What Is Justified Group Belief
This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an alt…
Essays in Collective Epistemology
We often talk about groups believing, knowing, and testifying. For instance, we ask whether the Bush Administration had good reasons for believing that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, or whether BP knew that its equipment was faulty before the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Epistemic claims of this sort often have enormously significant consequences, given the ways they bear on the moral and legal responsibilities of collective …
Assertion and Expertise
Acting on Knowledge
Learning from Words
Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hear…
Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source
Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
The Epistemology of Testimony
How do we acquire knowledge from either the spoken or written word of others? This is the question at the center of The Epistemology of Testimony, a collection of essays devoted to the epistemological issues that arise from an examination of testimonial knowledge. Despite its historical neglect, recent years have seen an explosion of interesting and innovative philosophical work on this topic. This book builds on and further develops this work by…
Epistemology of Testimony
Learning from Words
There is a widely accepted family of views in the epistemology of testimony centering around the claim that belief is the central item involved in a testimonial exchange.1 For instance, in describing the process of learning via testimony, Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: language-user has a belief, which gives rise to an utterance by him; as a result of observing this utterance another user of the same language, his audience, comes to sh…
Pritchard's Epistemic Luck
Journal Article Pritchard's Epistemic Luck Get access Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. vii + 290. Price £30.00.) Jennifer Lackey Jennifer Lackey Northern Illinois University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 223, April 2006, Pages 284–289, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00443.x Published: 14 March 2006
Knowing from Testimony
Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. Were we to refrain from accepting the testimony of others, our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways. Despite the vital role that testimony occupies in our epistemic lives, traditional epistemological theories have focused primarily on other sources, such as sense perception, memory, and reason, with relatively little attention devoted specifically to testimony. In …
Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality wi…
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial …
Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial …
What Is Justified Group Belief
This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an alt…
Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality wi…
The Duty to Object
We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise‐keeping. In particular, I argue that…
Acting on Knowledge
Knowing from Testimony
Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. Were we to refrain from accepting the testimony of others, our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways. Despite the vital role that testimony occupies in our epistemic lives, traditional epistemological theories have focused primarily on other sources, such as sense perception, memory, and reason, with relatively little attention devoted specifically to testimony. In …
Pritchard's Epistemic Luck
Journal Article Pritchard's Epistemic Luck Get access Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. vii + 290. Price £30.00.) Jennifer Lackey Jennifer Lackey Northern Illinois University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 223, April 2006, Pages 284–289, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00443.x Published: 14 March 2006
Assertion and Expertise
Learning from Words
There is a widely accepted family of views in the epistemology of testimony centering around the claim that belief is the central item involved in a testimonial exchange.1 For instance, in describing the process of learning via testimony, Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: language-user has a belief, which gives rise to an utterance by him; as a result of observing this utterance another user of the same language, his audience, comes to sh…
Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial …
Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality wi…
The Epistemology of Testimony
How do we acquire knowledge from either the spoken or written word of others? This is the question at the center of The Epistemology of Testimony, a collection of essays devoted to the epistemological issues that arise from an examination of testimonial knowledge. Despite its historical neglect, recent years have seen an explosion of interesting and innovative philosophical work on this topic. This book builds on and further develops this work by…
Epistemology of Testimony
Learning from Words
There is a widely accepted family of views in the epistemology of testimony centering around the claim that belief is the central item involved in a testimonial exchange.1 For instance, in describing the process of learning via testimony, Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: language-user has a belief, which gives rise to an utterance by him; as a result of observing this utterance another user of the same language, his audience, comes to sh…
Pritchard's Epistemic Luck
Journal Article Pritchard's Epistemic Luck Get access Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. vii + 290. Price £30.00.) Jennifer Lackey Jennifer Lackey Northern Illinois University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 223, April 2006, Pages 284–289, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00443.x Published: 14 March 2006
Knowing from Testimony
Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. Were we to refrain from accepting the testimony of others, our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways. Despite the vital role that testimony occupies in our epistemic lives, traditional epistemological theories have focused primarily on other sources, such as sense perception, memory, and reason, with relatively little attention devoted specifically to testimony. In …
Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source
Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
Learning from Words
Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hear…
Acting on Knowledge
Essays in Collective Epistemology
We often talk about groups believing, knowing, and testifying. For instance, we ask whether the Bush Administration had good reasons for believing that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, or whether BP knew that its equipment was faulty before the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Epistemic claims of this sort often have enormously significant consequences, given the ways they bear on the moral and legal responsibilities of collective …
Assertion and Expertise
What Is Justified Group Belief
This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an alt…
The Duty to Object
We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise‐keeping. In particular, I argue that…
False Confessions and Subverted Agency
In the criminal legal system, confessions have long been considered the ‘gold standard’ in evidence. An immediate problem arises for this gold standard, however, when the prevalence of false confessions is taken into account. In this paper, I take a close look at false confessions in connection with the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. I show that false confessions provide a unique and compelling challenge to the current conceptual tools used…
Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert
What kind of reasons for belief are provided by the testimony of experts? In a world where we are often inundated with fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories, this question is more pressing than ever. A prominent view in the philosophical literature maintains that the reasons provided by experts are preemptive in that they normatively screen off, or defeat, other relevant reasons. In this paper, I raise problems for this conception of…
Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency
Eyewitness testimony is a powerful form of evidence, and this is especially true in the United States criminal legal system. At the same time, eyewitness misidentification is the greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing. In this paper, I offer a close examination of this tension between the enormous epistemic weight that eyewitness testimony is afforded in the United States criminal legal system and the fact that…
Tommie Shelby
Epistemic Agency and the American Criminal Legal System
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (18 obras) · Philosophy (17 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Psychology (11 obras) · Sociology (8 obras) · Testimonial (7 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras)