Wayne Wu
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866135 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wayne Wu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wayne |
| FAMILY NAME | Wu |
| SIGNATURE | WU W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Carnegie Mellon University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6216-5917 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Being Biased and Knowing How to Reason
This essay explains how reasoning is action and not reflex. It then uses that theory to explain one form of knowing how to reason. Reasoning is thinking biased by knowledge. Drawing on Louise Antony's emphasis on bias as critical for dealing with underdetermination in induction, I show that underdetermination confronts all forms of reasoning, including deduction. Reasoning must be biased if it is to emerge from action underdetermination. The bias…
Memory, intention, and movements of the mind
This is a response to a discussion of two chapters of my recent book, Movements of the mind , that focus on the relation between intention and working memory. I argue that intention is a type of practical memory for action and that its properties are illuminated by drawing on empirical research on working memory. In what follows, I respond to critical replies by Mikayla Kelley and Juan Pablo Bermúdez
Attention and cognitive penetration
Dustin Stokes book Thinking and Perceiving is a substantial achievement. In this comment, I discuss issues related to cognitive penetration. While I agree with Stokes’ criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s discussion of cognitive penetration with respect to the role of attention, I provide a supporting, but different argument against how they understand attention. I also emphasize that the common appeal to behavioural data in arguing for cognitive p…
Attention as selection for action defended
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection…
Movements of the Mind
Is Vision for Action Unconscious
Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is wrongly assumed that in…
Experts and Deviants
This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention‐attention nexus , we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so…
Attention
Attention is a fundamental feature of the mind yet has languished in the backwaters of philosophy. Recent years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of philosophical interest in attention, driven by recognition that it is closely connected to consciousness, perception, agency, thought, justification and introspection. As is becoming clear, attention has a rich philosophical significance. This is the first book to provide a systematic overview an…
What is Conscious Attention
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. William James Principles of Psychology
Experts and Deviants
This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention‐attention nexus , we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so…
What is Conscious Attention
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. William James Principles of Psychology
What is Conscious Attention
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. William James Principles of Psychology
Attention
Attention is a fundamental feature of the mind yet has languished in the backwaters of philosophy. Recent years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of philosophical interest in attention, driven by recognition that it is closely connected to consciousness, perception, agency, thought, justification and introspection. As is becoming clear, attention has a rich philosophical significance. This is the first book to provide a systematic overview an…
Experts and Deviants
This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention‐attention nexus , we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so…
Is Vision for Action Unconscious
Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is wrongly assumed that in…
Movements of the Mind
Attention and cognitive penetration
Dustin Stokes book Thinking and Perceiving is a substantial achievement. In this comment, I discuss issues related to cognitive penetration. While I agree with Stokes’ criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s discussion of cognitive penetration with respect to the role of attention, I provide a supporting, but different argument against how they understand attention. I also emphasize that the common appeal to behavioural data in arguing for cognitive p…
Attention as selection for action defended
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection…
Being Biased and Knowing How to Reason
This essay explains how reasoning is action and not reflex. It then uses that theory to explain one form of knowing how to reason. Reasoning is thinking biased by knowledge. Drawing on Louise Antony's emphasis on bias as critical for dealing with underdetermination in induction, I show that underdetermination confronts all forms of reasoning, including deduction. Reasoning must be biased if it is to emerge from action underdetermination. The bias…
Memory, intention, and movements of the mind
This is a response to a discussion of two chapters of my recent book, Movements of the mind , that focus on the relation between intention and working memory. I argue that intention is a type of practical memory for action and that its properties are illuminated by drawing on empirical research on working memory. In what follows, I respond to critical replies by Mikayla Kelley and Juan Pablo Bermúdez
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (4 works) · Consciousness (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works)