Richard Feldman
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866151 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Feldman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard |
| FAMILY NAME | Feldman |
| SIGNATURE | FELDMAN R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 31 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 158 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 30 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1977 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Smithies on higher‐order evidence
Part 2: The development of an active pedagogy
This section discusses how the changing students’ experiences necessitated a rethinking of the educational programme and the development of an active pedagogy. The reform used two powerful instruments: an adaptation of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, which allows the language coordinator to evaluate the linguistic needs of students upon arrival (and the students to recognise their own strengths and weaknesses) and to des…
Part 5: Organisational changes required by the reform of the Casa-Sevilla study abroad programme
The action research process initiated in 2015 to make a thorough reform of the CASA-Sevilla study-abroad programme not only produced significant pedagogical developments but also brought about a profound change in the way of working and relating within the programme work organisation itself and with Cornell University colleagues. This section focuses on organisational changes in each of the units involved, and reflects a path full of transitions,…
Disagreement
Modest deontologism in epistemology
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
A few years ago I co-taught a course called “Rationality, Relativism, and Religion” to undergraduates majoring in either philosophy or religion. Many of the students, especially the religion majors, displayed a pleasantly tolerant attitude. Although a wide variety of different religious views were represented in the class, and the students disagreed with one another about many religious issues, almost all the students had a great deal of respect …
Knowledge and Lotteries
Respecting the Evidence
Some Virtues of Evidentialism
O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O ev…
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology
Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge the essence of which is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. The authors defend this theory, arguing evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started to refuting skepticism.
Freedom and Contextualism
Plantinga on Exclusivism
Exclusivists contend that specific doctrines, such as Christian doctrines, are true and those incompatible with them are false. In "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism" Alvin Plantinga defends religious exclusivism from a variety of objections. In this paper I discuss one of those objections. Plantinga agrees, at least for the sake of argument, that those in other religious traditions have evidence for their beliefs comparable to his ev…
Epistemological Duties
In "Epistemological Duties," Richard Feldman uses three main questions to illuminate the topic of epistemological duties. (1) What are our epistemological duties? After suggesting that epistemological duties pertain to the development of appropriate cognitive attitudes, Feldman asks (2) What makes a duty epistemological? and (3) How do epistemological duties interact with other kinds of duties? His pursuit of (3) contributes to his response to (2…
Typing Problems
Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
Normalization of violence among inner-city youth: A formulation for research
A causal model is formulated for the thesis that in inner-city youth exposed to high levels of violence, cognitions that normalize violence mitigate affective effects of exposure while increasing risk for violent behavior, thus perpetuating violence in the very process of adapting to it psychologically. Gender differences in the cognitive normalization of violence may explain gender differences in affective and behavioral effects of exposure. Emp…
The Ethics of Belief
In this paper I will address a few of many questions that fall under general heading of the ethics of belief. In section I I will discuss adequacy of what has come to be known as deontological conception of epistemic justification in light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I'll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss apparent conflicts betwe…
A Model Program for the Treatment of Mentally Ill Offenders in the Community
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism
In Defence of Closure
Journal Article In Defence of Closure Get access Richard Feldman Richard Feldman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 487–494, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220312 Published: 01 October 1995
Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning
Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action th…
Foley's Subjective Foundationalism
Epistemic Obligations
Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of thi…
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
The Ethics of Belief
In this paper I will address a few of many questions that fall under general heading of the ethics of belief. In section I I will discuss adequacy of what has come to be known as deontological conception of epistemic justification in light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I'll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss apparent conflicts betwe…
Respecting the Evidence
In Defence of Closure
Journal Article In Defence of Closure Get access Richard Feldman Richard Feldman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 487–494, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220312 Published: 01 October 1995
Epistemic Obligations
Fallibilism and Knowing that One Knows
U T nder what conditions do people who know a certain proposition know that they know it? Widely divergent answers to this question have been given. Some philosophers have defended arguments that suggest that people never know that they know. Others have said that whenever people know a proposition, they know that they know it. In this paper I will criticize these extreme views and defend a more moderate position. I am especially interested in di…
Modest deontologism in epistemology
Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of thi…
Plantinga on Exclusivism
Exclusivists contend that specific doctrines, such as Christian doctrines, are true and those incompatible with them are false. In "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism" Alvin Plantinga defends religious exclusivism from a variety of objections. In this paper I discuss one of those objections. Plantinga agrees, at least for the sake of argument, that those in other religious traditions have evidence for their beliefs comparable to his ev…
Knowledge and Lotteries
Typing Problems
Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
Some Virtues of Evidentialism
O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O ev…
Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective
Foley's Subjective Foundationalism
Belief and inscriptions
Fallibilism and Knowing that One Knows
U T nder what conditions do people who know a certain proposition know that they know it? Widely divergent answers to this question have been given. Some philosophers have defended arguments that suggest that people never know that they know. Others have said that whenever people know a proposition, they know that they know it. In this paper I will criticize these extreme views and defend a more moderate position. I am especially interested in di…
Nicholas Griffin on Relative Identity
Relative Identity contains a sustained attack on the classical or absolute theory of identity and a defense of a non-classical or relative theory of identity. According to the absolute theory of identity each thing is identical with itself and with nothing other than itself. The fundamental principle of this theory is Leibniz' Law: From (LL) a variety of characteristic principles about identity can be derived, including The Indiscernibility of Id…
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation
1 An Argument for the Explanatory Foundational Theory and Against Skepticism.- I: Skepticism and the Foundations of Justification.- 2 Skepticism and a Foundation of Certainty.- 3 Skepticism and Acceptability without Certainty.- 4 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (I): On Sufficient Conditions for Absolute Probabilities.- 5 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (II): On Sufficient Conditions for Conditional Prob…
Evidentialism
Reliability and Justification
Journal Article Reliability and Justification Get access Richard Feldman Richard Feldman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 68, Issue 2, 1 April 1985, Pages 159–174, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568226 Published: 17 December 2014
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
Epistemic Obligations
Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of thi…
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning
Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action th…
Foley's Subjective Foundationalism
Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective
In Defence of Closure
Journal Article In Defence of Closure Get access Richard Feldman Richard Feldman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 487–494, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220312 Published: 01 October 1995
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism
A Model Program for the Treatment of Mentally Ill Offenders in the Community
The Ethics of Belief
In this paper I will address a few of many questions that fall under general heading of the ethics of belief. In section I I will discuss adequacy of what has come to be known as deontological conception of epistemic justification in light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I'll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss apparent conflicts betwe…
Epistemological Duties
In "Epistemological Duties," Richard Feldman uses three main questions to illuminate the topic of epistemological duties. (1) What are our epistemological duties? After suggesting that epistemological duties pertain to the development of appropriate cognitive attitudes, Feldman asks (2) What makes a duty epistemological? and (3) How do epistemological duties interact with other kinds of duties? His pursuit of (3) contributes to his response to (2…
Typing Problems
Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
Normalization of violence among inner-city youth: A formulation for research
A causal model is formulated for the thesis that in inner-city youth exposed to high levels of violence, cognitions that normalize violence mitigate affective effects of exposure while increasing risk for violent behavior, thus perpetuating violence in the very process of adapting to it psychologically. Gender differences in the cognitive normalization of violence may explain gender differences in affective and behavioral effects of exposure. Emp…
Plantinga on Exclusivism
Exclusivists contend that specific doctrines, such as Christian doctrines, are true and those incompatible with them are false. In "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism" Alvin Plantinga defends religious exclusivism from a variety of objections. In this paper I discuss one of those objections. Plantinga agrees, at least for the sake of argument, that those in other religious traditions have evidence for their beliefs comparable to his ev…
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology
Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge the essence of which is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. The authors defend this theory, arguing evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started to refuting skepticism.
Freedom and Contextualism
Respecting the Evidence
Some Virtues of Evidentialism
O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O ev…
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
A few years ago I co-taught a course called “Rationality, Relativism, and Religion” to undergraduates majoring in either philosophy or religion. Many of the students, especially the religion majors, displayed a pleasantly tolerant attitude. Although a wide variety of different religious views were represented in the class, and the students disagreed with one another about many religious issues, almost all the students had a great deal of respect …
Epistemology (24 works) · Philosophy (24 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (18 works) · Psychology (14 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Philosophy of mind (5 works)