Moritz Schulz
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866175 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Moritz Schulz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Moritz |
| FAMILY NAME | Schulz |
| SIGNATURE | SCHULZ M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Technische Universität Dresden |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9962-2074 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Learning conditionals
Justin Khoo [2022. The Meaning of If . Oxford: Oxford University Press.] presents a novel theory of conditionals designed to solve two prominent puzzles for conditionals, the so-called ‘bounding puzzles’. One component of Khoo's solution is to propose a new update rule for learning conditionals that allows for violations of classical conditionalization. In this paper, I will defend classical conditionalization. My proposal is that one can achieve…
Parity versus Ignorance
Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation—parity—in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in …
Degrees of Doxastic Justification
This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mech…
Knowledge and decision
Partial Reliance
According to a prominent thought, in one’s practical reasoning one should rely only on what one knows (Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Williamson 2000, 2005a, 2017). Yet for many choices, the relevant information is uncertain. This has led Schiffer (2007, 189) to the following objection: oftentimes, we are fully rational in reasoning from uncertain premises which we do not know. For example, we may decide to take an umbrella b…
Strong knowledge, weak belief
According to the knowledge norm of belief (Williamson in Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 47, 2000), one should believe p only if one knows p . However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown (Hawthorne et al. in Philos Stud 173:1393–1404, 2016; McGlynn in Noûs 47:385–407, 2013, Whit…
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
According to a suggestion by Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 99), outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degree…
Uncertain preferences in rational decision
Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections
Grounding mental causation
Themes From Early Analytic Philosophy
Foreword Wolfgang Kunne: Bibliography Truth and Assertion Ian Rumfitt: Truth and the Determination of Content: Variations on Themes from Frege's Logische Untersuchungen Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: Truth-Bearers and Modesty Edgar Morscher: Logical Truth and Logical Form Mark Siebel: It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision. Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity Concepts and Propositions Hans-Johann Glock: A Cognitivist Approach to Concepts…
Themes from early analytic philosophy
Chance and Actuality
Journal Article Chance and Actuality Get access Moritz Schulz Moritz Schulz Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 242, January 2011, Pages 105–129, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.668.x Published: 14 December 2010
Epistemic modals and informational consequence
Diameter of the human internal acoustic meatus and sex determination
We report the results of testing the diameter of the internal opening of the acoustic canal in the petrous part of the temporal bone for sex determination of skeletal remains. The method involves measuring the diameter using a suite of ordinary drills. The method is very simple and has the great advantage of utilising one of the sturdiest bone elements of the human skeleton. The method may be especially useful for the analyses of very fragmented …
Grounding mental causation
Epistemic modals and informational consequence
Diameter of the human internal acoustic meatus and sex determination
We report the results of testing the diameter of the internal opening of the acoustic canal in the petrous part of the temporal bone for sex determination of skeletal remains. The method involves measuring the diameter using a suite of ordinary drills. The method is very simple and has the great advantage of utilising one of the sturdiest bone elements of the human skeleton. The method may be especially useful for the analyses of very fragmented …
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
According to a suggestion by Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 99), outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degree…
Strong knowledge, weak belief
According to the knowledge norm of belief (Williamson in Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 47, 2000), one should believe p only if one knows p . However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown (Hawthorne et al. in Philos Stud 173:1393–1404, 2016; McGlynn in Noûs 47:385–407, 2013, Whit…
Diameter of the human internal acoustic meatus and sex determination
We report the results of testing the diameter of the internal opening of the acoustic canal in the petrous part of the temporal bone for sex determination of skeletal remains. The method involves measuring the diameter using a suite of ordinary drills. The method is very simple and has the great advantage of utilising one of the sturdiest bone elements of the human skeleton. The method may be especially useful for the analyses of very fragmented …
Epistemic modals and informational consequence
Themes From Early Analytic Philosophy
Foreword Wolfgang Kunne: Bibliography Truth and Assertion Ian Rumfitt: Truth and the Determination of Content: Variations on Themes from Frege's Logische Untersuchungen Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: Truth-Bearers and Modesty Edgar Morscher: Logical Truth and Logical Form Mark Siebel: It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision. Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity Concepts and Propositions Hans-Johann Glock: A Cognitivist Approach to Concepts…
Themes from early analytic philosophy
Chance and Actuality
Journal Article Chance and Actuality Get access Moritz Schulz Moritz Schulz Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 242, January 2011, Pages 105–129, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.668.x Published: 14 December 2010
Grounding mental causation
Uncertain preferences in rational decision
Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections
Partial Reliance
According to a prominent thought, in one’s practical reasoning one should rely only on what one knows (Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Williamson 2000, 2005a, 2017). Yet for many choices, the relevant information is uncertain. This has led Schiffer (2007, 189) to the following objection: oftentimes, we are fully rational in reasoning from uncertain premises which we do not know. For example, we may decide to take an umbrella b…
Strong knowledge, weak belief
According to the knowledge norm of belief (Williamson in Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 47, 2000), one should believe p only if one knows p . However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown (Hawthorne et al. in Philos Stud 173:1393–1404, 2016; McGlynn in Noûs 47:385–407, 2013, Whit…
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
According to a suggestion by Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 99), outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degree…
Degrees of Doxastic Justification
This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mech…
Knowledge and decision
Parity versus Ignorance
Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation—parity—in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in …
Learning conditionals
Justin Khoo [2022. The Meaning of If . Oxford: Oxford University Press.] presents a novel theory of conditionals designed to solve two prominent puzzles for conditionals, the so-called ‘bounding puzzles’. One component of Khoo's solution is to propose a new update rule for learning conditionals that allows for violations of classical conditionalization. In this paper, I will defend classical conditionalization. My proposal is that one can achieve…
Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works)