Alison Hills
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866185 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alison Hills |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alison |
| FAMILY NAME | Hills |
| SIGNATURE | HILLS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Expert Assertion and Knowledge
Jennifer Lackey argues that knowing that p is not sufficient for being epistemically properly positioned to assert that p. Where that knowledge is entirely second-hand and the subject is an expert, the subject is not properly positioned to make such an assertion—since experts are held to higher epistemic standards. We reject Lackey’s argument. In particular, we argue that the division of labour in science makes isolated, second-hand assertions by…
Trustworthiness, Responsibility and Virtue
In the current philosophical literature on trustworthiness, two claims are very widely accepted, first that trustworthiness is a kind of reliability and secondly, that trustworthiness is not a virtue. Both claims are made, for instance, in Hawley's recent highly influential account of trustworthiness. I argue that both are mistaken. I develop and defend a new account of trustworthiness as responsibility, contrasting it with reliability and obliga…
Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue
Though much of what we learn about the world comes from trusting testimony, the status of aesthetic testimony – testimony about aesthetic value – is equivocal. We do listen to art critics but our trust in them is typically only provisional, until we are in a position to make up our own mind. I argue that provisional trust (but not full trust) in testimony typically allows us to develop and use aesthetic understanding (understanding why a work of …
Stillbirths
Moral Testimony
Testimony is an important source of our knowledge about the world. But to some, there seems something odd, perhaps even wrong, about trusting testimony about specifically moral matters. In this paper, I discuss several different explanations of what might be wrong with trusting moral testimony. These include the possibility that there is no moral knowledge; that moral knowledge cannot be transmitted by moral testimony; that there are reasons not …
Comment on Karen Jones and François Schroeter
In this comment I defend my account of moral understanding and its role in morally worthy action and claim that a fully virtuous person would have moral understanding. This means that deference to moral experts is not always appropriate. But there is still room for a social moral epistemology, whereby moral experts pass on moral understanding.
Moral Understanding and Morally Worthy Action
What is it to understand why a moral proposition is true? Moral understanding, in this sense, differs from moral knowledge (both knowledge that p is true and knowledge why it is true). Moral understanding involves a number of related abilities and is more similar to ‘knowledge how’. Moral understanding is important, moreover, because it is a vital component of morally worthy action: doing the right thing on the basis of moral knowledge (even on t…
Modest Vindication
A modest vindication of morality is a valid argument based on premises that an Egoist would not accept (but that a defender of common sense morality would): that Egoism is false. Initially it seems straightforward to give modest arguments defending morality, but on reflection these arguments face strong objections. This chapter sets out three such problems. Modest vindications of morality are compared to similar arguments from G. E. Moore defendi…
Disagreement
This chapter sets out in detail another serious problem for modest vindications of morality: the problem of disagreement. When there is disagreement of a certain type over whether a proposition is true, it is epistemically rational to suspend judgement about its truth. There is disagreement of this type over the first premises of modest vindications of morality, so it is not rational for anyone to accept that premise, and no one can use the argum…
Moral Testimony and Moral Disagreement
If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were t…
The Holy Grail of Moral Philosophy
Many of us believe everyone has reasons to be moral. But not everyone agrees, in particular, the ‘sensible knave’ – the Egoist – claims that everyone has reasons to do what is in their self-interest, whether or not doing so is morally right. The holy grail of moral philosophy is an argument persuading the Egoist that she really does have reasons to be moral. Many philosophers – including Plato, Kant, and Hume – have been intrigued by Egoism, but …
Virtue Egoism
One response to the challenge of Egoism is to deny that there is a distinction between reasons of self-interest and moral reasons. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that the good life, the life of eudaimonia, was also a life of virtue. A tradition of virtue ethics following Aristotle, recently exemplified by Foot and Hursthouse, agrees. This chapter sets out the distinctive claims of virtue ethics, which depends on a conception of the good life th…
Ambitious Vindication
An ambitious vindication of morality – an argument beginning from premises that an Egoist will accept that Egoism is false – is the Holy Grail of moral philosophy. This chapter discusses some recent attempts to give this kind of vindication. The first strategy considered is an argument that no adequate theory of practical reason can include only Egoist reasons. Nagel, Korsgaard, and Allison all offer different versions of this argument. Nagel cla…
Kantian Egoism
Kant believes that moral reasons for action are catEgorical imperatives which override all other reasons for action, including reasons based on happiness. In the first half of the chapter, some interesting variations on standard Egoism are set out, and it is explained why Kant thought that Egoism could not be a genuine rival to the moral law. The second half of the chapter takes a different approach, however, developing an entirely new, distincti…
Epistemic Rationality
There are some striking differences between the way in which we form beliefs about moral matters and the way we form beliefs about non-moral matters of fact. We do not suspend judgements about moral disagreements as we do in response to disagreements about non-moral matters. We do not trust moral testimony as we do testimony about non-moral matters. And there are no moral experts, as there are experts on non-moral matters. Is this treatment of mo…
Standard Egoism
There are many challenges to the authority of morality, the claim that everyone has reasons to be moral. This chapter distinguishes the challenge from Egoism from a recent, widely discussed claim by Williams, that there are no ‘external’ reasons. It introduces standard Egoism, the theory that everyone has reason to maximize their happiness (and no other reasons for action). It is the most common form of Egoism. It has obvious parallels with ratio…
Against Egoism
Since it is typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements, someone who accepts common sense morality and therefore the premises of a modest vindication of morality is entitled to use that argument against Egoism, despite the disagreement of Egoists (and disputes about the form that premise should take). But whilst Egoists can devise modest vindications of Egoism, it is not open to most of them to acc…
Conclusion
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral k…
The Beloved Self
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Eg…
Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness
One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. …
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
Kantian Value Realism
Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethic…
The Principle of Right
Rational Nature as the Source of Value
The most prominent recent interpretations of Kantian ethics place rational nature at the centre of the theory: I must respect rational nature, whether in myself or in others, because rational nature has a special status as the source of all other values. It is not obvious what it is for something to be the source of value, nor whether rational nature could play this role, but until these issues are settled the coherence of Kantian ethics is in qu…
The Beloved Self
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Eg…
Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness
One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. …
Moral Testimony
Testimony is an important source of our knowledge about the world. But to some, there seems something odd, perhaps even wrong, about trusting testimony about specifically moral matters. In this paper, I discuss several different explanations of what might be wrong with trusting moral testimony. These include the possibility that there is no moral knowledge; that moral knowledge cannot be transmitted by moral testimony; that there are reasons not …
Kantian Value Realism
Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethic…
Trustworthiness, Responsibility and Virtue
In the current philosophical literature on trustworthiness, two claims are very widely accepted, first that trustworthiness is a kind of reliability and secondly, that trustworthiness is not a virtue. Both claims are made, for instance, in Hawley's recent highly influential account of trustworthiness. I argue that both are mistaken. I develop and defend a new account of trustworthiness as responsibility, contrasting it with reliability and obliga…
Rational Nature as the Source of Value
The most prominent recent interpretations of Kantian ethics place rational nature at the centre of the theory: I must respect rational nature, whether in myself or in others, because rational nature has a special status as the source of all other values. It is not obvious what it is for something to be the source of value, nor whether rational nature could play this role, but until these issues are settled the coherence of Kantian ethics is in qu…
The Principle of Right
Kantian Value Realism
Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethic…
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
Moral Understanding and Morally Worthy Action
What is it to understand why a moral proposition is true? Moral understanding, in this sense, differs from moral knowledge (both knowledge that p is true and knowledge why it is true). Moral understanding involves a number of related abilities and is more similar to ‘knowledge how’. Moral understanding is important, moreover, because it is a vital component of morally worthy action: doing the right thing on the basis of moral knowledge (even on t…
Modest Vindication
A modest vindication of morality is a valid argument based on premises that an Egoist would not accept (but that a defender of common sense morality would): that Egoism is false. Initially it seems straightforward to give modest arguments defending morality, but on reflection these arguments face strong objections. This chapter sets out three such problems. Modest vindications of morality are compared to similar arguments from G. E. Moore defendi…
Disagreement
This chapter sets out in detail another serious problem for modest vindications of morality: the problem of disagreement. When there is disagreement of a certain type over whether a proposition is true, it is epistemically rational to suspend judgement about its truth. There is disagreement of this type over the first premises of modest vindications of morality, so it is not rational for anyone to accept that premise, and no one can use the argum…
Moral Testimony and Moral Disagreement
If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were t…
The Holy Grail of Moral Philosophy
Many of us believe everyone has reasons to be moral. But not everyone agrees, in particular, the ‘sensible knave’ – the Egoist – claims that everyone has reasons to do what is in their self-interest, whether or not doing so is morally right. The holy grail of moral philosophy is an argument persuading the Egoist that she really does have reasons to be moral. Many philosophers – including Plato, Kant, and Hume – have been intrigued by Egoism, but …
Virtue Egoism
One response to the challenge of Egoism is to deny that there is a distinction between reasons of self-interest and moral reasons. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that the good life, the life of eudaimonia, was also a life of virtue. A tradition of virtue ethics following Aristotle, recently exemplified by Foot and Hursthouse, agrees. This chapter sets out the distinctive claims of virtue ethics, which depends on a conception of the good life th…
Ambitious Vindication
An ambitious vindication of morality – an argument beginning from premises that an Egoist will accept that Egoism is false – is the Holy Grail of moral philosophy. This chapter discusses some recent attempts to give this kind of vindication. The first strategy considered is an argument that no adequate theory of practical reason can include only Egoist reasons. Nagel, Korsgaard, and Allison all offer different versions of this argument. Nagel cla…
Kantian Egoism
Kant believes that moral reasons for action are catEgorical imperatives which override all other reasons for action, including reasons based on happiness. In the first half of the chapter, some interesting variations on standard Egoism are set out, and it is explained why Kant thought that Egoism could not be a genuine rival to the moral law. The second half of the chapter takes a different approach, however, developing an entirely new, distincti…
Epistemic Rationality
There are some striking differences between the way in which we form beliefs about moral matters and the way we form beliefs about non-moral matters of fact. We do not suspend judgements about moral disagreements as we do in response to disagreements about non-moral matters. We do not trust moral testimony as we do testimony about non-moral matters. And there are no moral experts, as there are experts on non-moral matters. Is this treatment of mo…
Standard Egoism
There are many challenges to the authority of morality, the claim that everyone has reasons to be moral. This chapter distinguishes the challenge from Egoism from a recent, widely discussed claim by Williams, that there are no ‘external’ reasons. It introduces standard Egoism, the theory that everyone has reason to maximize their happiness (and no other reasons for action). It is the most common form of Egoism. It has obvious parallels with ratio…
Against Egoism
Since it is typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements, someone who accepts common sense morality and therefore the premises of a modest vindication of morality is entitled to use that argument against Egoism, despite the disagreement of Egoists (and disputes about the form that premise should take). But whilst Egoists can devise modest vindications of Egoism, it is not open to most of them to acc…
Conclusion
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral k…
The Beloved Self
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Eg…
Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness
One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. …
Comment on Karen Jones and François Schroeter
In this comment I defend my account of moral understanding and its role in morally worthy action and claim that a fully virtuous person would have moral understanding. This means that deference to moral experts is not always appropriate. But there is still room for a social moral epistemology, whereby moral experts pass on moral understanding.
Moral Testimony
Testimony is an important source of our knowledge about the world. But to some, there seems something odd, perhaps even wrong, about trusting testimony about specifically moral matters. In this paper, I discuss several different explanations of what might be wrong with trusting moral testimony. These include the possibility that there is no moral knowledge; that moral knowledge cannot be transmitted by moral testimony; that there are reasons not …
Stillbirths
Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue
Though much of what we learn about the world comes from trusting testimony, the status of aesthetic testimony – testimony about aesthetic value – is equivocal. We do listen to art critics but our trust in them is typically only provisional, until we are in a position to make up our own mind. I argue that provisional trust (but not full trust) in testimony typically allows us to develop and use aesthetic understanding (understanding why a work of …
Trustworthiness, Responsibility and Virtue
In the current philosophical literature on trustworthiness, two claims are very widely accepted, first that trustworthiness is a kind of reliability and secondly, that trustworthiness is not a virtue. Both claims are made, for instance, in Hawley's recent highly influential account of trustworthiness. I argue that both are mistaken. I develop and defend a new account of trustworthiness as responsibility, contrasting it with reliability and obliga…
Expert Assertion and Knowledge
Jennifer Lackey argues that knowing that p is not sufficient for being epistemically properly positioned to assert that p. Where that knowledge is entirely second-hand and the subject is an expert, the subject is not properly positioned to make such an assertion—since experts are held to higher epistemic standards. We reject Lackey’s argument. In particular, we argue that the division of labour in science makes isolated, second-hand assertions by…
Epistemology (22 works) · Philosophy (20 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (19 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (15 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Ethical egoism (10 works) · Ethics in medical practice (10 works) · Free Will and Agency (9 works) · Moral psychology (9 works) · Social Psychology (9 works)