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Nathanael Stein

Biographic Data

ID3866230
NAMENathanael Stein
GIVEN NAMESNathanael
FAMILY NAMEStein
SIGNATURESTEIN N
AFFILIATIONSFlorida State University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS3
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX1
  • Imagination, expectation, and “thoughts entangled in metaphors”

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•References: 25

  • The Supposed Material Cause in Posterior Analytics 2.11

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2020•References: 1

    Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo . 94a20-34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about…

  • The Puzzle of False Judgement in the Theaetetus

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2016

    A puzzle about false judgement is raised in the Theaetetus (187d-200c), but not successfully answered there. On the proposed account, the confusion that explicitly vitiates Theaetetus’ final attempt to define knowledge is already at work implicitly in this puzzle. Theaetetus shares popular assumptions about knowledge ( epistēmē ), but also accepts that there are cognitive constraints on judgement ( doxa ): the puzzle arises because he fails to di…

  • Philosophy, Hellenistic

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•CHAPTER•The Encyclopedia of Ancient History•2012

    By convention, the Hellenistic period begins with the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE ) and ends with the battle of Actium in 31 BCE .

  • Causal Necessity in Aristotle

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•British Journal for the History…•2012

    Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understo…

  • Aristotle's Causal Pluralism

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2011

    Central to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology is the claim that ‘aitia’ – ‘cause’ – is “said in many ways”, i.e., multivocal. Though the importance of the four causes in Aristotle's system cannot be overstated, the nature of his pluralism about aitiai has not been addressed. It is not at all obvious how these modes of causation are related to one another, or why they all deserve a common term. Nor is it clear, in particular, whether the cau…

  • Causation and Explanation in Aristotle

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise…

  • Causation and Explanation in Aristotle

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise…

  • Aristotle's Causal Pluralism

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2011

    Central to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology is the claim that ‘aitia’ – ‘cause’ – is “said in many ways”, i.e., multivocal. Though the importance of the four causes in Aristotle's system cannot be overstated, the nature of his pluralism about aitiai has not been addressed. It is not at all obvious how these modes of causation are related to one another, or why they all deserve a common term. Nor is it clear, in particular, whether the cau…

  • Causation and Explanation in Aristotle

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise…

  • Philosophy, Hellenistic

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•CHAPTER•The Encyclopedia of Ancient History•2012

    By convention, the Hellenistic period begins with the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE ) and ends with the battle of Actium in 31 BCE .

  • Causal Necessity in Aristotle

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•British Journal for the History…•2012

    Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understo…

  • The Puzzle of False Judgement in the Theaetetus

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2016

    A puzzle about false judgement is raised in the Theaetetus (187d-200c), but not successfully answered there. On the proposed account, the confusion that explicitly vitiates Theaetetus’ final attempt to define knowledge is already at work implicitly in this puzzle. Theaetetus shares popular assumptions about knowledge ( epistēmē ), but also accepts that there are cognitive constraints on judgement ( doxa ): the puzzle arises because he fails to di…

  • The Supposed Material Cause in Posterior Analytics 2.11

    Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2020•References: 1

    Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo . 94a20-34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about…

  • Imagination, expectation, and “thoughts entangled in metaphors”

    Open Access•Nathanael Stein•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•References: 25

Philosophy (7 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Ancient philosophy (2 works) · Causation (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae