Arnon Levy
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866231 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arnon Levy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arnon |
| FAMILY NAME | Levy |
| SIGNATURE | LEVY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3375-9289 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 127 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
The New Chimera for Values in Science
Approximating Bayes? On the role of approximations in Bayesian cognitive science
Approximations have come to occupy a central role within Bayesian cognitive science. Many cognitive scientists view current approximation-based models as showing that the mind approximates Bayesian inference. In this paper I interrogate this idea, asking what it means to claim that the mind approximates one computation by executing another. I look at three possible interpretations of such claims, finding problems with each. I argue that this pose…
A (Consequence-Oriented) critique of the argument from inductive risk
The argument from inductive risk (AIR) states that scientists should consider the consequences of hypotheses and methodological choices in the course of ongoing research. It has played a central role in the widespread retreat from the ideal of value-free science. The argument is motivated, to a significant extent, by the laudable concern to use science to better society. I argue that this concern, when taken seriously, tells against the idea that…
Bringing thought experiments back into the philosophy of science
What, If Anything, Is Biological Altruism
The study of biological altruism is a cornerstone of modern evolutionary biology. Associated with foundational issues about natural selection, it is often supposed that explaining altruism is key to understanding social behaviour more generally. Typically, ‘biological’ altruism is defined in purely effects-based, behavioural terms—as an interaction in which one organism contributes fitness to another, at its own expense. Crucially, such a definit…
Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism
Can Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Epistemically) Rational
“According to [Bayesian] models” in cognitive neuroscience, says a recent textbook, “the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist.” Do they? That is, do such models show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, don’t and indeed can’t show that we are Bayes-rational. The key reason is that they appeal to approximations, a fact that carries significant implications. After outlining the argument, I cr…
The epistemic imagination revisited
Recently, various philosophers have argued that we can obtain knowledge via the imagination. In particular, it has been suggested that we can come to know concrete, empirical matters of everyday significance by appropriately imagining relevant scenarios. Arguments for this thesis come in two main varieties: black box reliability arguments and constraints‐based arguments. We suggest that both strategies are unsuccessful. Against black‐box argument…
Idealization and abstraction
Models and Fictions
A number of philosophers draw a close analogy between scientific modeling and fiction, often appealing to Kendall Walton’s make-believe view. I assess the models-fictions analogy from a cognitive angle, suggesting that from this perspective it appears relatively weak. More specifically, I argue that, on the one hand, the appeal to Walton is appropriate inasmuch as his view fits well with how modelers employ the imagination. On the other hand, wha…
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science
Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put for…
The Debunking Challenge to Moral Realism
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in metaethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation—ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is su…
The unity of neuroscience
Model Organisms are Not (Theoretical) Models
Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred to as ‘model organisms’, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms ‘model’ and ‘modelling’ also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka–Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. What is the relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We of…
What was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement
The Hodgkin–Huxley (HH) model of the action potential is a theoretical pillar of modern neurobiology. In a number of recent publications, Carl Craver ([2006], [2007], [2008]) has argued that the model is explanatorily deficient because it does not reveal enough about underlying molecular mechanisms. I offer an alternative picture of the HH model, according to which it deliberately abstracts from molecular specifics. By doing so, the model explain…
Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms
Proponents of mechanistic explanation all acknowledge the importance of organization. But they have also tended to emphasize specificity with respect to parts and operations in mechanisms. We argue that in understanding one important mode of organization—patterns of causal connectivity—a successful explanatory strategy abstracts from the specifics of the mechanism and invokes tools such as those of graph theory to explain how mechanisms with a pa…
Models, Fictions, and Realism
Some philosophers of science—myself included—appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fiction making is essentially nontruth regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the essay is to describe these two packages. I co…
Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms
Proponents of mechanistic explanation all acknowledge the importance of organization. But they have also tended to emphasize specificity with respect to parts and operations in mechanisms. We argue that in understanding one important mode of organization—patterns of causal connectivity—a successful explanatory strategy abstracts from the specifics of the mechanism and invokes tools such as those of graph theory to explain how mechanisms with a pa…
What was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement
The Hodgkin–Huxley (HH) model of the action potential is a theoretical pillar of modern neurobiology. In a number of recent publications, Carl Craver ([2006], [2007], [2008]) has argued that the model is explanatorily deficient because it does not reveal enough about underlying molecular mechanisms. I offer an alternative picture of the HH model, according to which it deliberately abstracts from molecular specifics. By doing so, the model explain…
Idealization and abstraction
Model Organisms are Not (Theoretical) Models
Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred to as ‘model organisms’, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms ‘model’ and ‘modelling’ also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka–Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. What is the relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We of…
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science
Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put for…
Models, Fictions, and Realism
Some philosophers of science—myself included—appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fiction making is essentially nontruth regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the essay is to describe these two packages. I co…
The epistemic imagination revisited
Recently, various philosophers have argued that we can obtain knowledge via the imagination. In particular, it has been suggested that we can come to know concrete, empirical matters of everyday significance by appropriately imagining relevant scenarios. Arguments for this thesis come in two main varieties: black box reliability arguments and constraints‐based arguments. We suggest that both strategies are unsuccessful. Against black‐box argument…
Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism
The unity of neuroscience
A (Consequence-Oriented) critique of the argument from inductive risk
The argument from inductive risk (AIR) states that scientists should consider the consequences of hypotheses and methodological choices in the course of ongoing research. It has played a central role in the widespread retreat from the ideal of value-free science. The argument is motivated, to a significant extent, by the laudable concern to use science to better society. I argue that this concern, when taken seriously, tells against the idea that…
Models and Fictions
A number of philosophers draw a close analogy between scientific modeling and fiction, often appealing to Kendall Walton’s make-believe view. I assess the models-fictions analogy from a cognitive angle, suggesting that from this perspective it appears relatively weak. More specifically, I argue that, on the one hand, the appeal to Walton is appropriate inasmuch as his view fits well with how modelers employ the imagination. On the other hand, wha…
Models, Fictions, and Realism
Some philosophers of science—myself included—appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fiction making is essentially nontruth regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the essay is to describe these two packages. I co…
Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms
Proponents of mechanistic explanation all acknowledge the importance of organization. But they have also tended to emphasize specificity with respect to parts and operations in mechanisms. We argue that in understanding one important mode of organization—patterns of causal connectivity—a successful explanatory strategy abstracts from the specifics of the mechanism and invokes tools such as those of graph theory to explain how mechanisms with a pa…
What was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement
The Hodgkin–Huxley (HH) model of the action potential is a theoretical pillar of modern neurobiology. In a number of recent publications, Carl Craver ([2006], [2007], [2008]) has argued that the model is explanatorily deficient because it does not reveal enough about underlying molecular mechanisms. I offer an alternative picture of the HH model, according to which it deliberately abstracts from molecular specifics. By doing so, the model explain…
Model Organisms are Not (Theoretical) Models
Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred to as ‘model organisms’, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms ‘model’ and ‘modelling’ also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka–Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. What is the relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We of…
The Debunking Challenge to Moral Realism
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in metaethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation—ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is su…
The unity of neuroscience
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science
Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put for…
Models and Fictions
A number of philosophers draw a close analogy between scientific modeling and fiction, often appealing to Kendall Walton’s make-believe view. I assess the models-fictions analogy from a cognitive angle, suggesting that from this perspective it appears relatively weak. More specifically, I argue that, on the one hand, the appeal to Walton is appropriate inasmuch as his view fits well with how modelers employ the imagination. On the other hand, wha…
Idealization and abstraction
The epistemic imagination revisited
Recently, various philosophers have argued that we can obtain knowledge via the imagination. In particular, it has been suggested that we can come to know concrete, empirical matters of everyday significance by appropriately imagining relevant scenarios. Arguments for this thesis come in two main varieties: black box reliability arguments and constraints‐based arguments. We suggest that both strategies are unsuccessful. Against black‐box argument…
Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism
Can Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Epistemically) Rational
“According to [Bayesian] models” in cognitive neuroscience, says a recent textbook, “the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist.” Do they? That is, do such models show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, don’t and indeed can’t show that we are Bayes-rational. The key reason is that they appeal to approximations, a fact that carries significant implications. After outlining the argument, I cr…
Bringing thought experiments back into the philosophy of science
What, If Anything, Is Biological Altruism
The study of biological altruism is a cornerstone of modern evolutionary biology. Associated with foundational issues about natural selection, it is often supposed that explaining altruism is key to understanding social behaviour more generally. Typically, ‘biological’ altruism is defined in purely effects-based, behavioural terms—as an interaction in which one organism contributes fitness to another, at its own expense. Crucially, such a definit…
Approximating Bayes? On the role of approximations in Bayesian cognitive science
Approximations have come to occupy a central role within Bayesian cognitive science. Many cognitive scientists view current approximation-based models as showing that the mind approximates Bayesian inference. In this paper I interrogate this idea, asking what it means to claim that the mind approximates one computation by executing another. I look at three possible interpretations of such claims, finding problems with each. I argue that this pose…
A (Consequence-Oriented) critique of the argument from inductive risk
The argument from inductive risk (AIR) states that scientists should consider the consequences of hypotheses and methodological choices in the course of ongoing research. It has played a central role in the widespread retreat from the ideal of value-free science. The argument is motivated, to a significant extent, by the laudable concern to use science to better society. I argue that this concern, when taken seriously, tells against the idea that…
The New Chimera for Values in Science
Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Appeal (4 works)