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Fiona Macpherson

Biographic Data

ID3866234
NAMEFiona Macpherson
GIVEN NAMESFiona
FAMILY NAMEMacpherson
SIGNATUREMACPHERSON F
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Glasgow
ORCID0000-0002-4950-3309
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS11
TOTAL CITATIONS49
WORKS AS AUTHOR9
WORKS AS EDITOR2
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2005
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX3
  • Plural Imagination

    Matthew Mackisack, Susan Aldworth et al.•ARTICLE•Art Journal•2022

    The experience of visual mental imagery—seeing in the mind’s eye—varies widely between individuals, but perhaps because we tend to assume our own way of thinking to be everyone’s, how this crucial variation impacts art practice, and indeed art history, has barely been addressed. We seek to correct this omission by pursuing the implications of how artists with aphantasia (the absence of mental imagery) and hyperphantasia (imagery of extreme vividn…

  • After the Storm

    Open Access•Craig Stephenson, Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Frontiers in Sociology•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    This paper is a critical evaluation of a unique approach to working with disadvantaged communities, which involves inter-disciplinary collaboration between an Applied Theater (AT) director and a sociologist. The application of the approach, in a community disadvantaged by the loss of industry, provides the case study basis for the evaluation. Between 2014 and 2017 community participants from Eyemouth, southeast Scotland, worked with an artistic t…

  • Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour

    Derek Brown, Fiona Macpherson•BOOK•Routledge Handbook of Philosophy…•2020

  • Phenomenal Presence

    Fabian Dorsch, Fiona Macpherson•EDITOR•BOOK•Visual Awareness and Visual…•2018

    Many different features figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features range from colours and shapes to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects to the relationality and wakefulness of our perceptual awareness of them. The topic of this collection of essays …

  • Sensing art and artifacts

    D Howes, Eric Clarke et al.•ARTICLE•The Senses and Society•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 8

    This article proposes a sensory studies methodology for the interpretation of museum objects. The proposed method unfolds in two phases: virtual encounter via an on-line catalog and actual exposure in the context of a handling workshop. In addition to exploring the écart between image and object, the “Sensing Art and Artifacts” exercise articulates a framework for arriving at a multisensory, cross-cultural, interactive understanding of aesthetic …

  • The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive coding

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2017

    The claim that predictive coding entails cognitive penetration is too simplistic. • There are different forms of predictive coding and cognitive penetration. • There are different relationships between those forms. • The truth of some form of predictive coding does not entail cognitive penetration exists. • Researchers should specify which form of predictive coding & cognitive penetration they refer to. If beliefs and desires affect perception—at…

  • The structure of experience, the nature of the visual, and type 2 blindsight

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2015

    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural-necessary-features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I inve…

  • The Admissible Contents of Experience

    Open Access•Katherine Hawley, Fiona Macpherson•EDITOR•BOOK•Admissible Contents of Experience•2011

    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael…

  • Admissible Contents of Experience

    Fiona Macpherson, Katherine Dr Hawley et al.•BOOK•Admissible Contents of Experience•2011

  • Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011•Cited by: 39

    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cogniti…

  • Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about…

  • Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011•Cited by: 39

    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cogniti…

  • Sensing art and artifacts

    D Howes, Eric Clarke et al.•ARTICLE•The Senses and Society•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 8

    This article proposes a sensory studies methodology for the interpretation of museum objects. The proposed method unfolds in two phases: virtual encounter via an on-line catalog and actual exposure in the context of a handling workshop. In addition to exploring the écart between image and object, the “Sensing Art and Artifacts” exercise articulates a framework for arriving at a multisensory, cross-cultural, interactive understanding of aesthetic …

  • Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about…

  • After the Storm

    Open Access•Craig Stephenson, Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Frontiers in Sociology•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    This paper is a critical evaluation of a unique approach to working with disadvantaged communities, which involves inter-disciplinary collaboration between an Applied Theater (AT) director and a sociologist. The application of the approach, in a community disadvantaged by the loss of industry, provides the case study basis for the evaluation. Between 2014 and 2017 community participants from Eyemouth, southeast Scotland, worked with an artistic t…

  • Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about…

  • The Admissible Contents of Experience

    Open Access•Katherine Hawley, Fiona Macpherson•EDITOR•BOOK•Admissible Contents of Experience•2011

    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael…

  • Admissible Contents of Experience

    Fiona Macpherson, Katherine Dr Hawley et al.•BOOK•Admissible Contents of Experience•2011

  • Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011•Cited by: 39

    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cogniti…

  • The structure of experience, the nature of the visual, and type 2 blindsight

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2015

    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural-necessary-features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I inve…

  • The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive coding

    Open Access•Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•2017

    The claim that predictive coding entails cognitive penetration is too simplistic. • There are different forms of predictive coding and cognitive penetration. • There are different relationships between those forms. • The truth of some form of predictive coding does not entail cognitive penetration exists. • Researchers should specify which form of predictive coding & cognitive penetration they refer to. If beliefs and desires affect perception—at…

  • Phenomenal Presence

    Fabian Dorsch, Fiona Macpherson•EDITOR•BOOK•Visual Awareness and Visual…•2018

    Many different features figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features range from colours and shapes to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects to the relationality and wakefulness of our perceptual awareness of them. The topic of this collection of essays …

  • Sensing art and artifacts

    D Howes, Eric Clarke et al.•ARTICLE•The Senses and Society•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 8

    This article proposes a sensory studies methodology for the interpretation of museum objects. The proposed method unfolds in two phases: virtual encounter via an on-line catalog and actual exposure in the context of a handling workshop. In addition to exploring the écart between image and object, the “Sensing Art and Artifacts” exercise articulates a framework for arriving at a multisensory, cross-cultural, interactive understanding of aesthetic …

  • After the Storm

    Open Access•Craig Stephenson, Fiona Macpherson•ARTICLE•Frontiers in Sociology•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    This paper is a critical evaluation of a unique approach to working with disadvantaged communities, which involves inter-disciplinary collaboration between an Applied Theater (AT) director and a sociologist. The application of the approach, in a community disadvantaged by the loss of industry, provides the case study basis for the evaluation. Between 2014 and 2017 community participants from Eyemouth, southeast Scotland, worked with an artistic t…

  • Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour

    Derek Brown, Fiona Macpherson•BOOK•Routledge Handbook of Philosophy…•2020

  • Plural Imagination

    Matthew Mackisack, Susan Aldworth et al.•ARTICLE•Art Journal•2022

    The experience of visual mental imagery—seeing in the mind’s eye—varies widely between individuals, but perhaps because we tend to assume our own way of thinking to be everyone’s, how this crucial variation impacts art practice, and indeed art history, has barely been addressed. We seek to correct this omission by pursuing the implications of how artists with aphantasia (the absence of mental imagery) and hyperphantasia (imagery of extreme vividn…

Psychology (7 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Perception (5 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (4 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works)

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