Colin Marshall
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866242 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Colin Marshall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Colin |
| FAMILY NAME | Marshall |
| SIGNATURE | MARSHALL C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Washington |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6506-1491 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Arguments as Unexpected Puppies
This article identifies a tension between two forms of respect: respect for others’ agency and respect for their rationality. This tension emerges, the article argues, when one person presents another with a nuanced argument on an important topic, thereby complimenting their rationality, but draining their agential resources by demanding their attention. Giving someone an argument can therefore generate a structurally similar double bind to givin…
Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of that reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distincti…
Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism
Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons…
Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect
According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant accepts noumenal substances and causes. Against such readings, Markus Kohl has recently argued that, for Kant, (a) an intuitive intellect is a decisive measure for reality, but (b) an intuitive intellect would not represent noumena as substances or causes. Against Kohl, I argue that the intuitive intellect might indirectly represent noumenal substances and causes, which is enough to save the…
Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction
Kant's transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant's acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the 'two-world' interpretation of his idealism
Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua-Objects
The one‐world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua‐object.’ Understanding …
Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason 1
Parole Decisions and Justice
This paper is based on a presentation made by the author to the National Conference of the AASW in Brisbane, August, 1981. It reviews some aspects of the decision making process of the Parole Board of New South Wales. After considering the information used by the Board and its relationship to the selection of suitable candidates for release it proposes changes to the system. It is suggested that the decisions could be made more open to those whos…
Field Education
In the March 1980 issue of Australian Social Work Yaro Starak (“The Waves of Change: Field Education in the 80s and Beyond”) discusses important questions about the nature of, and future of, social work field education in Australia. Amongst a number of suggestions put forward by Starak is one to remove the field component from social work education
Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason 1
Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction
Kant's transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant's acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the 'two-world' interpretation of his idealism
Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua-Objects
The one‐world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua‐object.’ Understanding …
Field Education
In the March 1980 issue of Australian Social Work Yaro Starak (“The Waves of Change: Field Education in the 80s and Beyond”) discusses important questions about the nature of, and future of, social work field education in Australia. Amongst a number of suggestions put forward by Starak is one to remove the field component from social work education
Parole Decisions and Justice
This paper is based on a presentation made by the author to the National Conference of the AASW in Brisbane, August, 1981. It reviews some aspects of the decision making process of the Parole Board of New South Wales. After considering the information used by the Board and its relationship to the selection of suitable candidates for release it proposes changes to the system. It is suggested that the decisions could be made more open to those whos…
Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason 1
Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction
Kant's transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant's acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the 'two-world' interpretation of his idealism
Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua-Objects
The one‐world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua‐object.’ Understanding …
Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect
According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant accepts noumenal substances and causes. Against such readings, Markus Kohl has recently argued that, for Kant, (a) an intuitive intellect is a decisive measure for reality, but (b) an intuitive intellect would not represent noumena as substances or causes. Against Kohl, I argue that the intuitive intellect might indirectly represent noumenal substances and causes, which is enough to save the…
Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism
Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons…
Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of that reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distincti…
Arguments as Unexpected Puppies
This article identifies a tension between two forms of respect: respect for others’ agency and respect for their rationality. This tension emerges, the article argues, when one person presents another with a nuanced argument on an important topic, thereby complimenting their rationality, but draining their agential resources by demanding their attention. Giving someone an argument can therefore generate a structurally similar double bind to givin…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Idealism (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Interpretation (philosophy (2 works)