Isaac Wilhelm
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866288 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Isaac Wilhelm |
| GIVEN NAMES | Isaac |
| FAMILY NAME | Wilhelm |
| SIGNATURE | WILHELM I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Disregard: Attitudes about Male Survivors
In this article, I discuss some ways in which my experience, as a sexual assault survivor, has often been disregarded. It was disregarded when it occurred, by a crowd of people who watched. It has also been disregarded, however, in certain sorts of conversations—that occur within feminist communities—about sexual violence. The latter forms of disregard stem from the fact that I am male, and so do not fit many peoples’ preconceptions about survivo…
Typicality First
Instances of the law of large numbers are used to model many different physical systems. In this paper, I argue for a particular interpretation, of those instances of that law, which appeals to typicality. As I argue, the content of that law, when used to model physical systems, is that the probability of an event typically—rather than probably—approximates the frequency with which that event occurs
Wavefunction Mereology
I propose and defend an analysis of the parthood relation among quantum wavefunctions. Roughly put, according to the analysis, one wavefunction is part of another just in case the latter can be projected onto the former. This analysis brings mereology into closer contact with contemporary physics, implies many standard mereological principles, challenges some traditional mereological presuppositions, and supports compelling answers to long-standi…
The Typical Principle
If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here.In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality-call it the 'Typical Principle'-which links rational belief to facts about what is typical.As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face.And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts o…
The Propositional Account of Effective Theories
I propose the “Propositional Account” of effective quantum field theories. According to the Propositional Account, each effective quantum field theory expresses propositions about various physical items: fields, interactions, and more. In addition, two effective quantum field theories are physically equivalent just in case they express the same propositions. As I explain, the Propositional Account is scientifically naturalistic, since it invokes …
Comparing Mathematical Explanations
10.1086/714800
Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation
Typicality is routinely invoked in everyday contexts: bobcats are typically short-tailed; people are typically less than seven feet tall. Typicality is invoked in scientific contexts as well: typical gases expand; typical quantum systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour. And typicality facts like these support many explanations, both quotidian and scientific. But what is it for something to be typical? And how do typicality facts explain? In this …
Centering the Everett Interpretation
I propose an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the account, probabilities are objective chances of centered propositions. As I show, the account solves a number of problems concerning the role of probability in the Everett interpretation. It also challenges an implicit assumption, concerning the aim and scope of fundamental physical theories, that is made throughout the philosophy of physics l…
The Stage Theory of Groups
I propose a ‘stage theory’ of groups: a group is a fusion of group-stages, where a group-stage is a plurality of individuals at a world and a time. The stage theory consists of existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for groups
Celestial chaos: The new logics of theory-testing in orbital dynamics
Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation
Typicality is routinely invoked in everyday contexts: bobcats are typically short-tailed; people are typically less than seven feet tall. Typicality is invoked in scientific contexts as well: typical gases expand; typical quantum systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour. And typicality facts like these support many explanations, both quotidian and scientific. But what is it for something to be typical? And how do typicality facts explain? In this …
Centering the Everett Interpretation
I propose an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the account, probabilities are objective chances of centered propositions. As I show, the account solves a number of problems concerning the role of probability in the Everett interpretation. It also challenges an implicit assumption, concerning the aim and scope of fundamental physical theories, that is made throughout the philosophy of physics l…
Celestial chaos: The new logics of theory-testing in orbital dynamics
The Stage Theory of Groups
I propose a ‘stage theory’ of groups: a group is a fusion of group-stages, where a group-stage is a plurality of individuals at a world and a time. The stage theory consists of existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for groups
Typical: A Theory of Typicality and Typicality Explanation
Typicality is routinely invoked in everyday contexts: bobcats are typically short-tailed; people are typically less than seven feet tall. Typicality is invoked in scientific contexts as well: typical gases expand; typical quantum systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour. And typicality facts like these support many explanations, both quotidian and scientific. But what is it for something to be typical? And how do typicality facts explain? In this …
Centering the Everett Interpretation
I propose an account of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the account, probabilities are objective chances of centered propositions. As I show, the account solves a number of problems concerning the role of probability in the Everett interpretation. It also challenges an implicit assumption, concerning the aim and scope of fundamental physical theories, that is made throughout the philosophy of physics l…
Comparing Mathematical Explanations
10.1086/714800
The Propositional Account of Effective Theories
I propose the “Propositional Account” of effective quantum field theories. According to the Propositional Account, each effective quantum field theory expresses propositions about various physical items: fields, interactions, and more. In addition, two effective quantum field theories are physically equivalent just in case they express the same propositions. As I explain, the Propositional Account is scientifically naturalistic, since it invokes …
Disregard: Attitudes about Male Survivors
In this article, I discuss some ways in which my experience, as a sexual assault survivor, has often been disregarded. It was disregarded when it occurred, by a crowd of people who watched. It has also been disregarded, however, in certain sorts of conversations—that occur within feminist communities—about sexual violence. The latter forms of disregard stem from the fact that I am male, and so do not fit many peoples’ preconceptions about survivo…
Typicality First
Instances of the law of large numbers are used to model many different physical systems. In this paper, I argue for a particular interpretation, of those instances of that law, which appeals to typicality. As I argue, the content of that law, when used to model physical systems, is that the probability of an event typically—rather than probably—approximates the frequency with which that event occurs
Wavefunction Mereology
I propose and defend an analysis of the parthood relation among quantum wavefunctions. Roughly put, according to the analysis, one wavefunction is part of another just in case the latter can be projected onto the former. This analysis brings mereology into closer contact with contemporary physics, implies many standard mereological principles, challenges some traditional mereological presuppositions, and supports compelling answers to long-standi…
The Typical Principle
If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here.In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality-call it the 'Typical Principle'-which links rational belief to facts about what is typical.As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face.And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts o…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Physics (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (4 works) · Theoretical physics (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)