Barry Maguire
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866312 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Barry Maguire |
| GIVEN NAMES | Barry |
| FAMILY NAME | Maguire |
| SIGNATURE | MAGUIRE B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5184-5669 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 33 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Rescuing Socialism from Equality
Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’s defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For th…
Exchange and solidarity
According to the model of exchange as mutual assistance, an exchange can be perceived as a joint activity for mutual benefit – and needn’t involve any self-directed motives at all. This essay pushes back against this new defence of market motives. The essay develops an alternative ideal of production as caring solidarity, in which production is a joint activity of caring about one another. Points of overlap and difference are developed in some de…
The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism
An ethical theory is alienating if accepting the theory inhibits the agent from fitting participation in some normative ideal, such as some ideal of integrity, friendship, or community. Many normative ideals involve nonconsequentialist behavior of some form or another. If such ideals are normatively authoritative, they constitute counterexamples to consequentialism unless their authority can be explained or explained away. We address a range of a…
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
Normative metaphysics for accountants
We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the se…
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reason…
The Autonomy of Ethics
An autonomy thesis maintains that facts or propositions in some domain are isolated in some respect from those in some other domain, or perhaps all other domains. This chapter explores the general question of the autonomy of the ethical domain from the non-ethical domain. It discusses three types of ethical autonomy thesis, distinguished by the types of relation maintained not to obtain between the antecedents and consequents in arguments such as…
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
Weighing Reasons
There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. i argue that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of…
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. i argue that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of…
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
Normative metaphysics for accountants
We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the se…
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
Weighing Reasons
There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. i argue that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of…
The Autonomy of Ethics
An autonomy thesis maintains that facts or propositions in some domain are isolated in some respect from those in some other domain, or perhaps all other domains. This chapter explores the general question of the autonomy of the ethical domain from the non-ethical domain. It discusses three types of ethical autonomy thesis, distinguished by the types of relation maintained not to obtain between the antecedents and consequents in arguments such as…
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can't get an 'ought' from an 'is' just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer's and Gillian Ru…
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reason…
The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism
An ethical theory is alienating if accepting the theory inhibits the agent from fitting participation in some normative ideal, such as some ideal of integrity, friendship, or community. Many normative ideals involve nonconsequentialist behavior of some form or another. If such ideals are normatively authoritative, they constitute counterexamples to consequentialism unless their authority can be explained or explained away. We address a range of a…
The Game of Belief
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normat…
Normative metaphysics for accountants
We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the se…
Exchange and solidarity
According to the model of exchange as mutual assistance, an exchange can be perceived as a joint activity for mutual benefit – and needn’t involve any self-directed motives at all. This essay pushes back against this new defence of market motives. The essay develops an alternative ideal of production as caring solidarity, in which production is a joint activity of caring about one another. Points of overlap and difference are developed in some de…
Rescuing Socialism from Equality
Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’s defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For th…
Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Normative (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works)