John Divers
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866327 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John Divers |
| GIVEN NAMES | John |
| FAMILY NAME | Divers |
| SIGNATURE | DIVERS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Mere Possibilities
Journal Article Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics Get access Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. By Robert Stalnaker. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Pp. xii+ 167. Price £30.95.) John Divers John Divers University of Leeds, UK E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issu…
Modal Reality and (Modal) Logical Space
Belief in Absolute Necessity
We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher‐order attitudes in…
Possible Worlds
Agnosticism About Other Worlds
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world‐talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not enta…
Possible Worlds (The Problems of Philosophy)
Supervenience for operators
Realism and Truth
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Realism and Truth (2nd edn). By Michael Devitt. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xii + 327. Price not given.) John Divers John Divers University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 180, July 1995, Pages 387–389, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219662 Published: 01 July 1995
Abstract Entities
Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism
John Divers, Alexander Miller; Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, 1 April 199
Modal supereminence and modal realism
Agnosticism About Other Worlds
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world‐talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not enta…
Belief in Absolute Necessity
We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher‐order attitudes in…
Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism
John Divers, Alexander Miller; Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, 1 April 199
Modal supereminence and modal realism
Abstract Entities
Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism
John Divers, Alexander Miller; Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, 1 April 199
Realism and Truth
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Realism and Truth (2nd edn). By Michael Devitt. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xii + 327. Price not given.) John Divers John Divers University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 180, July 1995, Pages 387–389, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219662 Published: 01 July 1995
Supervenience for operators
Possible Worlds (The Problems of Philosophy)
Agnosticism About Other Worlds
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world‐talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not enta…
Possible Worlds
Belief in Absolute Necessity
We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher‐order attitudes in…
Mere Possibilities
Journal Article Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics Get access Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. By Robert Stalnaker. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Pp. xii+ 167. Price £30.95.) John Divers John Divers University of Leeds, UK E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issu…
Modal Reality and (Modal) Logical Space
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Modal (5 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Classics (2 works)