Hong Yu Wong
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866345 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hong Yu Wong |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hong Yu |
| FAMILY NAME | Wong |
| SIGNATURE | WONG H Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Tübingen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5662-7553 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Modal and amodal cognition
Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this pape…
How can we be moved by magic
When engaging with magic, we are moved by seemingly impossible events that contradict what we believe to be possible in the real world. We are surprised, curious, and baffled when we cannot explain how the magic we are witnessing is possible. We generally understand the events to be illusions. But how is it possible to be moved by something we know to be unreal? This problem is related to the paradox of fiction in aesthetics. Here, we introduce t…
The World at Our Fingertips
Where do you end and the external world begin? This might seem to be a straightforward, binary question: your skin is the boundary, with the self on one side and the rest of the world on the other. Peripersonal space shows that the division is not that simple. The boundary is blurrier than you might have thought. Our ability to monitor the space near the body appears to be deeply ingrained. Our evolutionary history has equipped our brains with a …
World at Our Fingertips
Embodied Agency
Is bodily awareness a condition on bodily action? I approach this question by weaving an argument based on considerations from action theory, the phenomenology of embodied agency, and from the psychology and neuroscience of action. In this paper, I discuss two accounts on which bodily awareness is a condition on bodily action. The first is an influential philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy, which claims that bodily awareness is necessary for…
On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action
What is the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action? The orthodox philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy claims that bodily awareness is necessary for bodily action. Whilst O'Shaughnessy's account appears to be consonant with the phenomenology of ordinary agency, it falls afoul to empirical counterexamples. The failure of O'Shaughnessy's account and its cousins might suggest that bodily action does not depend on bodily awareness. On …
A measure of my agency
Emergents from Fusion
This is a critical discussion of Paul Humphreys's fusion view of emergence, focusing on the basal loss feature of his ontology. The discussion yields some general morals for special science ontology
On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action
What is the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action? The orthodox philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy claims that bodily awareness is necessary for bodily action. Whilst O'Shaughnessy's account appears to be consonant with the phenomenology of ordinary agency, it falls afoul to empirical counterexamples. The failure of O'Shaughnessy's account and its cousins might suggest that bodily action does not depend on bodily awareness. On …
Embodied Agency
Is bodily awareness a condition on bodily action? I approach this question by weaving an argument based on considerations from action theory, the phenomenology of embodied agency, and from the psychology and neuroscience of action. In this paper, I discuss two accounts on which bodily awareness is a condition on bodily action. The first is an influential philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy, which claims that bodily awareness is necessary for…
Emergents from Fusion
This is a critical discussion of Paul Humphreys's fusion view of emergence, focusing on the basal loss feature of his ontology. The discussion yields some general morals for special science ontology
A measure of my agency
On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action
What is the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action? The orthodox philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy claims that bodily awareness is necessary for bodily action. Whilst O'Shaughnessy's account appears to be consonant with the phenomenology of ordinary agency, it falls afoul to empirical counterexamples. The failure of O'Shaughnessy's account and its cousins might suggest that bodily action does not depend on bodily awareness. On …
Embodied Agency
Is bodily awareness a condition on bodily action? I approach this question by weaving an argument based on considerations from action theory, the phenomenology of embodied agency, and from the psychology and neuroscience of action. In this paper, I discuss two accounts on which bodily awareness is a condition on bodily action. The first is an influential philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy, which claims that bodily awareness is necessary for…
The World at Our Fingertips
Where do you end and the external world begin? This might seem to be a straightforward, binary question: your skin is the boundary, with the self on one side and the rest of the world on the other. Peripersonal space shows that the division is not that simple. The boundary is blurrier than you might have thought. Our ability to monitor the space near the body appears to be deeply ingrained. Our evolutionary history has equipped our brains with a …
World at Our Fingertips
How can we be moved by magic
When engaging with magic, we are moved by seemingly impossible events that contradict what we believe to be possible in the real world. We are surprised, curious, and baffled when we cannot explain how the magic we are witnessing is possible. We generally understand the events to be illusions. But how is it possible to be moved by something we know to be unreal? This problem is related to the paradox of fiction in aesthetics. Here, we introduce t…
Modal and amodal cognition
Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this pape…
Psychology (7 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works)