Eva Schmidt
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866368 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eva Schmidt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eva |
| FAMILY NAME | Schmidt |
| SIGNATURE | SCHMIDT E |
| AFFILIATIONS | TU Dortmund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7305-7126 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Epistemic Cost of Opacity
Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given …
Localized Histories and Pedagogical Revolutions
Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Mini Publics
The foundational principles of deliberation rest on citizens meeting as political and moral equals. If we take them seriously, we need to consider the exclusion that arises from power asymmetries. These can lead to some groups being absent from decision-making processes, but often they are excluded even when they are present. This exclusion can be conceptualised as internal exclusion, which is the way in which some people—typically members of mar…
Bare statistical evidence and the legitimacy of software-based judicial decisions
Can the evidence provided by software systems meet the standard of proof for civil or criminal cases, and is it individualized evidence? Or, to the contrary, do software systems exclusively provide bare statistical evidence? In this paper, we argue that there are cases in which evidence in the form of probabilities computed by software systems is not bare statistical evidence, and is thus able to meet the standard of proof. First, based on the ca…
Reasons First
Mark Schroeder’s latest book delves deeper into the topic of normativity and reasons, while moving his focus from ethics to epistemology. His central aims are, first, to argue that theorizing in normative epistemology profits from comparison with other normative domains (his “Core Hypothesis” [9]); and second, to defend a picture of epistemic normativity that puts reasons first: they can be used to explain and analyze all other epistemic normativ…
The case of Mesut Özil
This paper examines how German media discourses reflect debates around integration, based on a newspaper corpus spanning the period 2008–2018. Considering these discourses, our research interest is focussed on how integration is constructed as a responsibility of those who are expected to integrate into society. To analyze how media might play a role in reproducing essentialist constructions of difference, we present a case study that combines me…
From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence
We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Seco…
Wittgenstein and Beyond
What do we want from Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A stakeholder perspective on XAI and a conceptual model guiding interdisciplinary XAI research
Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “ stakeholders' desiderata ”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approache…
Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations
This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’…
Where reasons and reasoning come apart
Proponents of the reasoning view analyze normative reasons as premises of good reasoning and explain the normativity of reasons by appeal to their role as premises of good reasoning. The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on the reasoning view by providing counterexamples to the proposed analysis of reasons, counterexamples in which premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing are not reasons to φ
Stor begejstring over Carrol og Clive Robbins
No prominent works on this page.
Stor begejstring over Carrol og Clive Robbins
What do we want from Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A stakeholder perspective on XAI and a conceptual model guiding interdisciplinary XAI research
Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “ stakeholders' desiderata ”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approache…
Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations
This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’…
Where reasons and reasoning come apart
Proponents of the reasoning view analyze normative reasons as premises of good reasoning and explain the normativity of reasons by appeal to their role as premises of good reasoning. The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on the reasoning view by providing counterexamples to the proposed analysis of reasons, counterexamples in which premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing are not reasons to φ
The case of Mesut Özil
This paper examines how German media discourses reflect debates around integration, based on a newspaper corpus spanning the period 2008–2018. Considering these discourses, our research interest is focussed on how integration is constructed as a responsibility of those who are expected to integrate into society. To analyze how media might play a role in reproducing essentialist constructions of difference, we present a case study that combines me…
From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence
We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Seco…
Wittgenstein and Beyond
Bare statistical evidence and the legitimacy of software-based judicial decisions
Can the evidence provided by software systems meet the standard of proof for civil or criminal cases, and is it individualized evidence? Or, to the contrary, do software systems exclusively provide bare statistical evidence? In this paper, we argue that there are cases in which evidence in the form of probabilities computed by software systems is not bare statistical evidence, and is thus able to meet the standard of proof. First, based on the ca…
Reasons First
Mark Schroeder’s latest book delves deeper into the topic of normativity and reasons, while moving his focus from ethics to epistemology. His central aims are, first, to argue that theorizing in normative epistemology profits from comparison with other normative domains (his “Core Hypothesis” [9]); and second, to defend a picture of epistemic normativity that puts reasons first: they can be used to explain and analyze all other epistemic normativ…
Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Mini Publics
The foundational principles of deliberation rest on citizens meeting as political and moral equals. If we take them seriously, we need to consider the exclusion that arises from power asymmetries. These can lead to some groups being absent from decision-making processes, but often they are excluded even when they are present. This exclusion can be conceptualised as internal exclusion, which is the way in which some people—typically members of mar…
The Epistemic Cost of Opacity
Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given …
Localized Histories and Pedagogical Revolutions
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (3 works) · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI (3 works)