Casey O’callaghan

Biographic Data

ID3873258
NAMECasey O’callaghan
GIVEN NAMESCasey
FAMILY NAMEO’callaghan
SIGNATUREO’CALLAGHAN C
AFFILIATIONSWashington University in St. Louis
ORCID0000-0001-7124-641X
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS23
AUTHOR COUNT10
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2007
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2

  • Softening the Border: A Capacities Approach to the Perception–Cognition Distinction

    Open AccessJacob Beck, Casey O’callaghan et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2026

    Approaches to the perception–cognition distinction tend toward two extremes. Many embrace a hard border, treating perception and cognition as mutually exclusive, non‐overlapping categories. By contrast, eliminativism denies that any principled, theoretically useful distinction exists between perception and cognition. This article offers a third way, describing a principled but soft border between perception and cognition. This non‐exclusive appro…

  • Perceptual expertise, universality, and objectivity

    Open AccessCasey O’callaghanARTICLEPhilosophical Studies2024

  • Perceptual Capacities, Success, and Content

    Open AccessCasey O’callaghanARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2020

  • The Rationality of Perception

    Casey O’callaghan, Casey O'CallaghanARTICLEThe Philosophical Review2019

  • Sensing, the Senses, and Attention

    Open AccessCasey O’callaghanARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2017Cited by: 1

  • Not All Perceptual Experience Is Modality Specific

    Casey O’callaghanCHAPTERPerception and Its Modalities2014

    Recent science demonstrates that the senses do not act merely in parallel or in isolation from each other. Different senses interact and influence each other in ways that affect perceptual experience. But each aspect of perceptual experience might remain modality specific. One sense might causally but not constitutively impact perceptual experience that is associated with another. This chapter argues that not every perceptual experience is modali…

  • Against Hearing Meanings: Against Hearing Meanings

    Casey O''Callaghan, Casey O’callaghan et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly2011Cited by: 10

    Listening to speech in a language you know differs phenomenologically from listening to speech in an unfamiliar language, a fact often exploited in debates about the phenomenology of thought and cognition. It is plausible that the difference is partly perceptual. Some contend that hearing familiar language involves auditory perceptual awareness of meanings or semantic properties of spoken utterances; but if this were so, there must be something d…

  • Sounds and Perception

    Matthew Nudds, Casey O’callaghan et al.BOOKSounds and perception2009

    'Sounds and Perception' examines auditory perception and the nature of sounds, an emerging area of interest in the philosophy of mind & perception, & in the metaphysics of sensible qualities. The individual essays discuss a wide range of issues including the nature of sound & the spatial aspects of auditory experience.

  • Object Perception: Vision and Audition

    Open AccessCasey O’callaghanARTICLEPhilosophy Compass2008Cited by: 12References: 27

    Vision has been the primary focus of naturalistic philosophical research concerning perception and perceptual experience. Guided by visual experience and vision science, many philosophers have focused upon theoretical issues dealing with the perception of objects. Recently, however, hearing researchers have discussed auditory objects. I present the case for object perception in vision, and argue that an analog of object perception occurs in audit…

  • Sounds

    Casey O’callaghan, Casey O'CallaghanBOOKSounds2007

    O'Callaghan offers an original systematic treatment of sound and sound experience, and shows how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships between multiple sense modalities can enrich our understanding of perception and the mind.