Jonathan Weisberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873262 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Weisberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Weisberg |
| SIGNATURE | WEISBERG J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6697-1633 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 74 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Updating on the evidence of others
One often learns the opinions of others without getting to hear the evidence behind them. How should you revise your own opinions in such cases? Dietrich (2010) shows that, for opinions about objective chance, the method known as upco effectively adds your interlocutor’s evidence to your own. We provide a simple way of viewing upco that makes properties like Dietrich’s easy to appreciate, and we do three things with it. First, we unify Dietrich’s…
Geometric Pooling
Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered.When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence?In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling.We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally…
Updating, Undermining, and Independence
Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the prob…
The Bootstrapping Problem
Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking the source against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion …
Bootstrapping in General
Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers
Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the …
Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning
Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when …
Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers
Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the …
Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
Bootstrapping in General
Updating, Undermining, and Independence
Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the prob…
Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning
Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when …
The Bootstrapping Problem
Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking the source against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion …
Geometric Pooling
Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered.When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence?In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling.We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally…
Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning
Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when …
Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers
Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the …
Bootstrapping in General
The Bootstrapping Problem
Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking the source against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion …
Updating, Undermining, and Independence
Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the prob…
Geometric Pooling
Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered.When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence?In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling.We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally…
Updating on the evidence of others
One often learns the opinions of others without getting to hear the evidence behind them. How should you revise your own opinions in such cases? Dietrich (2010) shows that, for opinions about objective chance, the method known as upco effectively adds your interlocutor’s evidence to your own. We provide a simple way of viewing upco that makes properties like Dietrich’s easy to appreciate, and we do three things with it. First, we unify Dietrich’s…
Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Economics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works)