David Ripley
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3873347 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | David Ripley |
| NOMBRES | David |
| APELLIDO | Ripley |
| FIRMA | RIPLEY D |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Melbourne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3356-0771 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Two traditions in abstract valuational model theory
Tolerant reasoning
The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to…
Denial
Denial is something we do; it is a speech act. Negation, on the other hand, is a particular lexical item. Despite being very different kinds of things, denial and negation certainly seem to have something to do with each other. There’s something negative about them both. This ‘negative’ aspect, whatever it is, unifies denial and negation across these categories. It is something that denial does not share with the speech act of assertion, for exam…
Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-transitive Reasoning
Tolerant, Classical, Strict
In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P , then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x . The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defi…
Structures and circumstances
Negation, Denial, and Rejection
At least since Frege (1960) and Geach (1965), there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejecti…
Structures and circumstances
Negation, Denial, and Rejection
At least since Frege (1960) and Geach (1965), there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejecti…
Tolerant reasoning
The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to…
Negation, Denial, and Rejection
At least since Frege (1960) and Geach (1965), there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejecti…
Tolerant, Classical, Strict
In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P , then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x . The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defi…
Structures and circumstances
Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-transitive Reasoning
Denial
Denial is something we do; it is a speech act. Negation, on the other hand, is a particular lexical item. Despite being very different kinds of things, denial and negation certainly seem to have something to do with each other. There’s something negative about them both. This ‘negative’ aspect, whatever it is, unifies denial and negation across these categories. It is something that denial does not share with the speech act of assertion, for exam…
Two traditions in abstract valuational model theory
Tolerant reasoning
The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 obras) · Linguistics (4 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 obras) · Philosophy of language (3 obras)