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Catherine Legg

Biographic Data

ID3873364
NAMECatherine Legg
GIVEN NAMESCatherine
FAMILY NAMELegg
SIGNATURELEGG C
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS4
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2013
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX1
  • A properly pragmatist pragmatics

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•2020

    Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce’s …

  • Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 21

    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or 'limit' of inquiry. This account is distinct from - and arguably more objectivist than - views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its 'internal realism', not reali…

  • Peirce, meaning, and the Semantic Web

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Semiotica•2013•Cited by: 1

    This paper seeks an explanation for the challenges faced by Semantic Web developers in achieving their vision, compared to the staggering near-instantaneous success of the World Wide Web. To this end it contrasts two broad philosophical understandings of meaning and argues that the choice between them carries real consequences for how developers attempt to engineer the Semantic Web. The first is Rene Descartes' “private,” static account of meanin…

  • Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 21

    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or 'limit' of inquiry. This account is distinct from - and arguably more objectivist than - views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its 'internal realism', not reali…

  • Peirce, meaning, and the Semantic Web

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Semiotica•2013•Cited by: 1

    This paper seeks an explanation for the challenges faced by Semantic Web developers in achieving their vision, compared to the staggering near-instantaneous success of the World Wide Web. To this end it contrasts two broad philosophical understandings of meaning and argues that the choice between them carries real consequences for how developers attempt to engineer the Semantic Web. The first is Rene Descartes' “private,” static account of meanin…

  • Peirce, meaning, and the Semantic Web

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Semiotica•2013•Cited by: 1

    This paper seeks an explanation for the challenges faced by Semantic Web developers in achieving their vision, compared to the staggering near-instantaneous success of the World Wide Web. To this end it contrasts two broad philosophical understandings of meaning and argues that the choice between them carries real consequences for how developers attempt to engineer the Semantic Web. The first is Rene Descartes' “private,” static account of meanin…

  • Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 21

    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or 'limit' of inquiry. This account is distinct from - and arguably more objectivist than - views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its 'internal realism', not reali…

  • A properly pragmatist pragmatics

    Open Access•Charles Legg, Catherine Legg•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•2020

    Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce’s …

Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Pragmatism (2 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Digital Humanities and Scholarship (1 works) · Faith (1 works) · Mathematics (1 works) · Meaning (existential) (1 works)

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