Shelly Kagan
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873413 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shelly Kagan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shelly |
| FAMILY NAME | Kagan |
| SIGNATURE | KAGAN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0928-2353 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 87 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Is Norcross Right about Right
In Morality by Degrees , Alastair Norcross defends a view he calls “scalar consequentialism.” I argue, first, that Norcross does not use the term consistently, since in most passages this seems to refer to a version of consequentialism that rejects all claims about rightness altogether, yet in other passages Norcross claims that scalar consequentialists should nonetheless embrace his favored “contextualist” account of rightness. I also argue, sec…
Deontological Desert
Although the nature of moral desert has sometimes been examined in axiological terms—focusing on the thought that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve—deontologists typically think desert is more appropriately treated in terms of duties and obligations. They may, for example, prefer to talk in terms of there being a moral duty to give people what they deserve. This essay distinguishes a number of forms such a duty might take, and ex…
How to Count Animals, more or less
According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more…
The paradox of methods
Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the m…
Variation
This chapter examines different forms of variation. It first studies the concept of comparative bell motion, which features comparative desert lines that have various orientations. It then discusses comparative skylines that result from disregarding all points of the comparative desert lines except for the peaks, and considering the line that is composed of only the peaks. The next section looks at variation in the amount of good carried out when…
The Geometry of Desert
This title explores the hidden complexity of moral desert. Using graphs to illustrate and contrast alternative views, it carefully investigates the various ways in which the value of an outcome varies when people get (or fail to get) what they deserve
Do I Make a Difference
Well‐being as Enjoying the Good
Rethinking Intrinsic Value
Normative ethics
Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an act's rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers. Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to …
Defending Options
The Structure of Normative Ethics
If you open a typical textbook on normative ethics, it will have a discussion of what it thinks of as rival theories: there might be a chapter each on, say, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and virtue theory. The assumption seems to be that these three are alternative attempts to answer the same basic questions. This seems to me exactly incorrect At least as they are ordinarily understood, these three are addressing three different concerns in n…
Defending Moral Options
Shelly Kagan has produced a sustained and powerful attack on two central features of ordinary morality (the defender of which he calls the moderate) the belief in agent-relative options to give special weight to one's own interests and projects and thereby not maximally to promote the good, and the belief in agent-relative constraints against harming persons even if doing so would prevent more such harms done by others or would, more generally, m…
Precis of The Limits of Morality
Most of us believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us. Intuitively, it seems, I am not morally required to be forever making my greatest possible contribution to the overall good-for this would involve considerable hardship and sacrifice on my part. Instead, I am permitted to favor the various goals and projects that I most care about, even if by doing so I fail to perform the act that would lead to the best co…
Replies to My Critics
Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality
The limits of morality
Do I Make a Difference
The Geometry of Desert
This title explores the hidden complexity of moral desert. Using graphs to illustrate and contrast alternative views, it carefully investigates the various ways in which the value of an outcome varies when people get (or fail to get) what they deserve
Well‐being as Enjoying the Good
The Structure of Normative Ethics
If you open a typical textbook on normative ethics, it will have a discussion of what it thinks of as rival theories: there might be a chapter each on, say, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and virtue theory. The assumption seems to be that these three are alternative attempts to answer the same basic questions. This seems to me exactly incorrect At least as they are ordinarily understood, these three are addressing three different concerns in n…
Defending Moral Options
Shelly Kagan has produced a sustained and powerful attack on two central features of ordinary morality (the defender of which he calls the moderate) the belief in agent-relative options to give special weight to one's own interests and projects and thereby not maximally to promote the good, and the belief in agent-relative constraints against harming persons even if doing so would prevent more such harms done by others or would, more generally, m…
Replies to My Critics
Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality
The paradox of methods
Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the m…
Defending Moral Options
Shelly Kagan has produced a sustained and powerful attack on two central features of ordinary morality (the defender of which he calls the moderate) the belief in agent-relative options to give special weight to one's own interests and projects and thereby not maximally to promote the good, and the belief in agent-relative constraints against harming persons even if doing so would prevent more such harms done by others or would, more generally, m…
Precis of The Limits of Morality
Most of us believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us. Intuitively, it seems, I am not morally required to be forever making my greatest possible contribution to the overall good-for this would involve considerable hardship and sacrifice on my part. Instead, I am permitted to favor the various goals and projects that I most care about, even if by doing so I fail to perform the act that would lead to the best co…
Replies to My Critics
Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality
The limits of morality
The Structure of Normative Ethics
If you open a typical textbook on normative ethics, it will have a discussion of what it thinks of as rival theories: there might be a chapter each on, say, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and virtue theory. The assumption seems to be that these three are alternative attempts to answer the same basic questions. This seems to me exactly incorrect At least as they are ordinarily understood, these three are addressing three different concerns in n…
Defending Options
Rethinking Intrinsic Value
Normative ethics
Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an act's rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers. Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to …
Well‐being as Enjoying the Good
Do I Make a Difference
Variation
This chapter examines different forms of variation. It first studies the concept of comparative bell motion, which features comparative desert lines that have various orientations. It then discusses comparative skylines that result from disregarding all points of the comparative desert lines except for the peaks, and considering the line that is composed of only the peaks. The next section looks at variation in the amount of good carried out when…
The Geometry of Desert
This title explores the hidden complexity of moral desert. Using graphs to illustrate and contrast alternative views, it carefully investigates the various ways in which the value of an outcome varies when people get (or fail to get) what they deserve
The paradox of methods
Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the m…
How to Count Animals, more or less
According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more…
Deontological Desert
Although the nature of moral desert has sometimes been examined in axiological terms—focusing on the thought that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve—deontologists typically think desert is more appropriately treated in terms of duties and obligations. They may, for example, prefer to talk in terms of there being a moral duty to give people what they deserve. This essay distinguishes a number of forms such a duty might take, and ex…
Is Norcross Right about Right
In Morality by Degrees , Alastair Norcross defends a view he calls “scalar consequentialism.” I argue, first, that Norcross does not use the term consistently, since in most passages this seems to refer to a version of consequentialism that rejects all claims about rightness altogether, yet in other passages Norcross claims that scalar consequentialists should nonetheless embrace his favored “contextualist” account of rightness. I also argue, sec…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Morality (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)