Jordi Fernández
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873471 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jordi Fernández |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jordi |
| FAMILY NAME | Fernández |
| SIGNATURE | FERNANDEZ J |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Adelaide |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Memory and Self-Reference
Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are 'token-reflexives', in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories…
Memory in two dimensions
Memories can be accurate or inaccurate. They have, then, accuracy conditions. A reasonable picture of the accuracy conditions of a memory is that a memory is accurate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory. But how are the references of our memories determined exactly? And what are the accuracy conditions of memories, given their references? In this paper, I argue that the notion of accuracy condit…
Imagining oneself being someone else
Sometimes, one can imagine, in virtue of having some experience, that one is someone else having some property. This is puzzling if imagination is a guide to possibility, since it seems impossible for one to be someone else. In this paper, I offer a way of dissolving the puzzle. When one claims that, by having some experience, one imagines that one is someone else having some property, what one imagines, I suggest, is that if the other person had…
The Contents of Imagination
Our imaginings seem to be similar to our perceiving and remembering episodes in that they all represent something. They all seem to have content. But what exactly is the structure and the source of the content of our imaginings? In this paper, I put forward an account of imaginative content. The main tenet of this account is that, when a subject tries to imagine a state of affairs by having some experience, their imagining has a counterfactual co…
Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
What are the benefits of memory distortion
I defend the view that beneficial memory distortion is possible. • I distinguish the reconstructive function of memory from its preservative function. • Observer memories of trauma could be beneficial in certain circumstances. • Fabricated memories of abuse could be beneficial in certain circumstances
Epistemic Generation in Memory
Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to…
Memory, past and self
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those…
Schopenhauer's Pessimism
My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other prem…
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the m…
Privileged Access Revisited
Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma
Privileged Access Naturalized
Journal Article Privileged Access Naturalized Get access Jordi Fernández Jordi Fernández Macquarie University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 352–372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00317 Published: 10 June 2003
Privileged Access Naturalized
Journal Article Privileged Access Naturalized Get access Jordi Fernández Jordi Fernández Macquarie University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 352–372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00317 Published: 10 June 2003
Epistemic Generation in Memory
Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to…
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the m…
Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
Privileged Access Revisited
Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma
Memory, past and self
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those…
Schopenhauer's Pessimism
My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other prem…
Privileged Access Naturalized
Journal Article Privileged Access Naturalized Get access Jordi Fernández Jordi Fernández Macquarie University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 352–372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00317 Published: 10 June 2003
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the m…
Privileged Access Revisited
Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma
Schopenhauer's Pessimism
My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other prem…
Memory, past and self
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those…
What are the benefits of memory distortion
I defend the view that beneficial memory distortion is possible. • I distinguish the reconstructive function of memory from its preservative function. • Observer memories of trauma could be beneficial in certain circumstances. • Fabricated memories of abuse could be beneficial in certain circumstances
Epistemic Generation in Memory
Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to…
Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification
The Contents of Imagination
Our imaginings seem to be similar to our perceiving and remembering episodes in that they all represent something. They all seem to have content. But what exactly is the structure and the source of the content of our imaginings? In this paper, I put forward an account of imaginative content. The main tenet of this account is that, when a subject tries to imagine a state of affairs by having some experience, their imagining has a counterfactual co…
Imagining oneself being someone else
Sometimes, one can imagine, in virtue of having some experience, that one is someone else having some property. This is puzzling if imagination is a guide to possibility, since it seems impossible for one to be someone else. In this paper, I offer a way of dissolving the puzzle. When one claims that, by having some experience, one imagines that one is someone else having some property, what one imagines, I suggest, is that if the other person had…
Memory and Self-Reference
Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are 'token-reflexives', in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories…
Memory in two dimensions
Memories can be accurate or inaccurate. They have, then, accuracy conditions. A reasonable picture of the accuracy conditions of a memory is that a memory is accurate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory. But how are the references of our memories determined exactly? And what are the accuracy conditions of memories, given their references? In this paper, I argue that the notion of accuracy condit…
Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Cognitive psychology (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Identity, Memory, and Therapy (3 works) · Memory and Neural Mechanisms (3 works)