David Braddon-Mitchell
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873614 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Braddon-Mitchell |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Braddon-Mitchell |
| SIGNATURE | BRADDON-MITCHELL D |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind
Bringing together some of the world’s leading philosophers of mind as well as some exciting emerging philosophers, this volume examines origins, impacts, and contemporary relevance of one of the twentieth century’s most important books on the philosophy of mind, D. M. Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of the Mind , first published in 1968.
David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind
Conativism about personal identity
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that…
Intentionality and Rationality
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism
A new program of philosophical analysis that reconciles a certain account of analysis with philosophical naturalism is applied to a range of philosophical issues. Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosoph…
The Subsumption of Reference
How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood…
Explanation and the Language of Thought
The Subsumption of Reference
How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood…
Explanation and the Language of Thought
Explanation and the Language of Thought
The Subsumption of Reference
How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood…
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism
A new program of philosophical analysis that reconciles a certain account of analysis with philosophical naturalism is applied to a range of philosophical issues. Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosoph…
Intentionality and Rationality
Conativism about personal identity
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that…
Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind
Bringing together some of the world’s leading philosophers of mind as well as some exciting emerging philosophers, this volume examines origins, impacts, and contemporary relevance of one of the twentieth century’s most important books on the philosophy of mind, D. M. Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of the Mind , first published in 1968.
David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 works) · Analysis (Philosophy) (1 works) · Art (1 works)