Jeff Jordan
Biographic Data
| ID | 3873682 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeff Jordan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeff |
| FAMILY NAME | Jordan |
| SIGNATURE | JORDAN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Delaware |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3701-9966 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Game theory and omniscience
Evil and divine sovereignty
The Topography of Divine Love
Does God love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible?In an earlier article 1 argued that no one could, in principle, love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible.Thomas Talbott has objected and argues that a model of the divine love extended equally to all best captures the idea of God as loving parent. 1 contend that Talbott's argument fails, in part, as it implies that the divine love treats the interests of human…
The No-Minimum argument and satisficing
Chris Dragos has recently presented two objections to criticisms I've published against Peter van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. He also suggests that the best way to criticize the No-Minimum argument is via the concept of divine satisficing. In this article I argue that both of Dragos's objections fail, and I question whether satisficing is relevant to the viability of the No-Minimum argument
The Topography of Divine Love
It is widely thought that God must love each and every human to the same depth and degree.This proposition plays a prominent role in influential versions of the problem of evil, and in theistic attempts to answer the problem of evil.A common reason cited in support of the idea of God's loving equally every human is that a perfect being would possess every great-making property and loving equally every human would be a great-making property.It is …
Is the no-minimum claim true? Reply to Cullison
Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong
Pascal's Wager
Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. This work proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, 'Pascal's Wager', & explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief decision theory, & theology.
Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism
The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge co…
Pascal's Wagers
Why Friends Shouldn’t Let Friends Be Eaten
Le vegetarisme trouve generalement des justifications d'ordre religieux, philosophique ou de sante. Pour completer les arguments philosophiques en termes de droits de l'animal ou en termes utilitaristes, cet article developpe un argumentaire en faveur du vegetarisme a partir de l'idee de l'amitie portee aux animaux et de ses implications morales
Pascal's wager revisited
Pascal's wager attempts to provide a prudential reason in support of the rationality of believing that God exists. The wager employs the idea that the utility of theistic belief, if true, is infinite, and in this way, the expected utility of theism swamps that of any of its rivals. Not surprisingly the wager generates more than a good share of philosophical criticism. In this essay I examine two recent objections levelled against the wager and I …
Uncertain Belief
Why Negative Rights Only?
Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism
The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge co…
Why Negative Rights Only?
Pascal's wager revisited
Pascal's wager attempts to provide a prudential reason in support of the rationality of believing that God exists. The wager employs the idea that the utility of theistic belief, if true, is infinite, and in this way, the expected utility of theism swamps that of any of its rivals. Not surprisingly the wager generates more than a good share of philosophical criticism. In this essay I examine two recent objections levelled against the wager and I …
Uncertain Belief
Why Friends Shouldn’t Let Friends Be Eaten
Le vegetarisme trouve generalement des justifications d'ordre religieux, philosophique ou de sante. Pour completer les arguments philosophiques en termes de droits de l'animal ou en termes utilitaristes, cet article developpe un argumentaire en faveur du vegetarisme a partir de l'idee de l'amitie portee aux animaux et de ses implications morales
Pascal's Wagers
Pascal's Wager
Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. This work proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, 'Pascal's Wager', & explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief decision theory, & theology.
Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism
The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge co…
Is the no-minimum claim true? Reply to Cullison
Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong
The Topography of Divine Love
It is widely thought that God must love each and every human to the same depth and degree.This proposition plays a prominent role in influential versions of the problem of evil, and in theistic attempts to answer the problem of evil.A common reason cited in support of the idea of God's loving equally every human is that a perfect being would possess every great-making property and loving equally every human would be a great-making property.It is …
The No-Minimum argument and satisficing
Chris Dragos has recently presented two objections to criticisms I've published against Peter van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. He also suggests that the best way to criticize the No-Minimum argument is via the concept of divine satisficing. In this article I argue that both of Dragos's objections fail, and I question whether satisficing is relevant to the viability of the No-Minimum argument
The Topography of Divine Love
Does God love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible?In an earlier article 1 argued that no one could, in principle, love every human equally and to the deepest degree possible.Thomas Talbott has objected and argues that a model of the divine love extended equally to all best captures the idea of God as loving parent. 1 contend that Talbott's argument fails, in part, as it implies that the divine love treats the interests of human…
Evil and divine sovereignty
Game theory and omniscience
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works)