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Manolo Martínez

Biographic Data

ID3874140
NAMEManolo Martínez
GIVEN NAMESManolo
FAMILY NAMEMartínez
SIGNATUREMARTINEZ M
AFFILIATIONSUniversitat de Barcelona
ORCID0000-0002-6194-7121
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS21
WORKS AS AUTHOR10
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2016
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX3
  • Many-to-One Intentionalism

    Manolo Martínez, Bence Nanay et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2024

    Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of…

  • The experience of dysmenorrhea

    Open Access•Carlota Serrahima, Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2023•References: 69

    Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call i…

  • The informational profile of valence

    Manolo Martínez, Luca Barlassina•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 41

    Some mental states have valence—they are pleasant or unpleasant. According to imperativism, valence depends on imperative content, while evaluativism tells us that it depends on evaluative content. We argue that if one considers valence’s \ninformational profile, it becomes evident that imperativism is superior to evaluativism. More precisely, we show that if one applies the best available metasemantics to the role played by (un)pleasant mental s…

  • Neural Oscillations as Representations

    Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 96

    We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neural activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscillations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscillations help to establish a communication channel between sender and receiver, or are causally involved in…

  • Real patterns and indispensability

    Open Access•Albert Sune, Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 31

  • The meaning of biological signals

    Open Access•Marc Artiga, Jonathan Birch et al.•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2020

  • Synergic kinds

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • Deception as cooperation

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out …

  • Representations Are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 17

    Theorists working on information and representation are often not centrally concerned with “Shannon” information, as it is often put, but with some other, sometimes called “semantic,” kind of information. This perception is wrong. Shannon’s theory of information is the only one we need. I sketch a (Shannon) informational account of representation, for a certain important family of cases. This account, which represents a significant departure from…

  • Common Interest and Signaling Games

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2016•Cited by: 5•References: 24

    We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial informa…

  • Common Interest and Signaling Games

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2016•Cited by: 5•References: 24

    We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial informa…

  • Real patterns and indispensability

    Open Access•Albert Sune, Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 31

  • Neural Oscillations as Representations

    Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 96

    We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neural activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscillations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscillations help to establish a communication channel between sender and receiver, or are causally involved in…

  • Deception as cooperation

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out …

  • Representations Are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 17

    Theorists working on information and representation are often not centrally concerned with “Shannon” information, as it is often put, but with some other, sometimes called “semantic,” kind of information. This perception is wrong. Shannon’s theory of information is the only one we need. I sketch a (Shannon) informational account of representation, for a certain important family of cases. This account, which represents a significant departure from…

  • Synergic kinds

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • The informational profile of valence

    Manolo Martínez, Luca Barlassina•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 41

    Some mental states have valence—they are pleasant or unpleasant. According to imperativism, valence depends on imperative content, while evaluativism tells us that it depends on evaluative content. We argue that if one considers valence’s \ninformational profile, it becomes evident that imperativism is superior to evaluativism. More precisely, we show that if one applies the best available metasemantics to the role played by (un)pleasant mental s…

  • Common Interest and Signaling Games

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2016•Cited by: 5•References: 24

    We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial informa…

  • Deception as cooperation

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out …

  • Representations Are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 17

    Theorists working on information and representation are often not centrally concerned with “Shannon” information, as it is often put, but with some other, sometimes called “semantic,” kind of information. This perception is wrong. Shannon’s theory of information is the only one we need. I sketch a (Shannon) informational account of representation, for a certain important family of cases. This account, which represents a significant departure from…

  • The meaning of biological signals

    Open Access•Marc Artiga, Jonathan Birch et al.•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2020

  • Synergic kinds

    Open Access•Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • Real patterns and indispensability

    Open Access•Albert Sune, Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 31

  • The experience of dysmenorrhea

    Open Access•Carlota Serrahima, Manolo Martínez•ARTICLE•Synthese•2023•References: 69

    Dysmenorrhea, or menstrual pain, is regularly suffered by 45 to 95% of menstruating women. Despite its prevalence, and despite the philosophical importance of pain as a general phenomenon, dysmenorrhea has been all but completely overlooked in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. This paper aims at rectifying this situation. We single out three properties of what is often considered the paradigmatic case of painful experience, what we call i…

  • The informational profile of valence

    Manolo Martínez, Luca Barlassina•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 41

    Some mental states have valence—they are pleasant or unpleasant. According to imperativism, valence depends on imperative content, while evaluativism tells us that it depends on evaluative content. We argue that if one considers valence’s \ninformational profile, it becomes evident that imperativism is superior to evaluativism. More precisely, we show that if one applies the best available metasemantics to the role played by (un)pleasant mental s…

  • Neural Oscillations as Representations

    Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 96

    We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neural activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscillations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscillations help to establish a communication channel between sender and receiver, or are causally involved in…

  • Many-to-One Intentionalism

    Manolo Martínez, Bence Nanay et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2024

    Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of…

Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Communication source (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Telecommunications (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)

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