Micah Lott
Biographic Data
| ID | 3874650 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Micah Lott |
| GIVEN NAMES | Micah |
| FAMILY NAME | Lott |
| SIGNATURE | LOTT M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boston College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5919-7640 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
“Where lies the grail? AI, common sense, and human practical intelligence”
The creation of machines with intelligence comparable to human beings—so-called "human-level” and “general” intelligence—is often regarded as the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. However, many prominent discussions of AI lean heavily on the notion of human-level intelligence to frame AI research, but then rely on conceptions of human cognitive capacities, including “common sense,” that are sketchy, one-sided, philosophically l…
Why AGI could not be (just) a tool: Goals, life, and general intelligence
It is widely believed that AGI has the potential to be a wonderful tool that humans can use to meet our needs, solve our problems, and improve our lives. Against this view, we argue that any entity with truly general, human-level intelligence would have the capacity to lead its own life, with its own purposes and integrated hierarchy of goals. And thus any true AGI could not be merely a tool, even if it turned out to be extremely helpful for huma…
Are life forms real? Aristotelian naturalism and biological science
Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader conception of natural normativity is incomp…
Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers
The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content , plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argu…
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma
The System Isn't Broken. It's Fixed
This paper has two distinct and related aims. First, I attempt to clarify the oft-made claim that somehow the "system is fixed". What is meant by that charge and how is it distinct from other kinds of complaints with regard to economic inequality? Second, I attempt to show how important it is to understand what we are doing together as members of a (political) economy. Without a clear conception of our joint, collaborative active, it is difficult…
Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
In The Second Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also …
Because I Said So: Practical Authority in Plato’s Crito
This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must acc…
Situationism, Skill, and the Rarity of Virtue
Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature
Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form
In an essay discussing practical wisdom and its relation to philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre makes the following claim:We all of us begin our adult lives with some classification and rank ordering of goods, some hierarchy of ends, some implicit or partially explicit conception of human good that we have acquired from our upbringing and from the culture into which that upbringing and was an initiation.(emphasis mine) 15 In this essay and elsewhere, …
Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist's Error in Plato's Sophist
In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–231e, has received less attention. Moreover, there have been even fewer sustained attempts to connect the sixth definition of…
Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint: A Problem for Rawls’ Ideal of Public Reason
It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls’ ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls’ ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls’ ideal of public reason. Because it …
Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Account of Tradition–Based Rationality
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre’s account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understoo…
Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma
Because I Said So: Practical Authority in Plato’s Crito
This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must acc…
Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist's Error in Plato's Sophist
In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–231e, has received less attention. Moreover, there have been even fewer sustained attempts to connect the sixth definition of…
Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Account of Tradition–Based Rationality
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre’s account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understoo…
Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint: A Problem for Rawls’ Ideal of Public Reason
It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls’ ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls’ ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls’ ideal of public reason. Because it …
Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form
In an essay discussing practical wisdom and its relation to philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre makes the following claim:We all of us begin our adult lives with some classification and rank ordering of goods, some hierarchy of ends, some implicit or partially explicit conception of human good that we have acquired from our upbringing and from the culture into which that upbringing and was an initiation.(emphasis mine) 15 In this essay and elsewhere, …
Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist's Error in Plato's Sophist
In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–231e, has received less attention. Moreover, there have been even fewer sustained attempts to connect the sixth definition of…
Situationism, Skill, and the Rarity of Virtue
Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature
Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
In The Second Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also …
Because I Said So: Practical Authority in Plato’s Crito
This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must acc…
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma
The System Isn't Broken. It's Fixed
This paper has two distinct and related aims. First, I attempt to clarify the oft-made claim that somehow the "system is fixed". What is meant by that charge and how is it distinct from other kinds of complaints with regard to economic inequality? Second, I attempt to show how important it is to understand what we are doing together as members of a (political) economy. Without a clear conception of our joint, collaborative active, it is difficult…
Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers
The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content , plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argu…
Why AGI could not be (just) a tool: Goals, life, and general intelligence
It is widely believed that AGI has the potential to be a wonderful tool that humans can use to meet our needs, solve our problems, and improve our lives. Against this view, we argue that any entity with truly general, human-level intelligence would have the capacity to lead its own life, with its own purposes and integrated hierarchy of goals. And thus any true AGI could not be merely a tool, even if it turned out to be extremely helpful for huma…
Are life forms real? Aristotelian naturalism and biological science
Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader conception of natural normativity is incomp…
“Where lies the grail? AI, common sense, and human practical intelligence”
The creation of machines with intelligence comparable to human beings—so-called "human-level” and “general” intelligence—is often regarded as the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. However, many prominent discussions of AI lean heavily on the notion of human-level intelligence to frame AI research, but then rely on conceptions of human cognitive capacities, including “common sense,” that are sketchy, one-sided, philosophically l…
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works)