Kyle Haynes
Biographic Data
| ID | 3877138 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kyle Haynes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kyle |
| FAMILY NAME | Haynes |
| SIGNATURE | HAYNES K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2713-6827 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 114 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
The trajectories of personalization
Endogenous preferences, credible signaling, and the security dilemma
How does the potential for socialization affect states' abilities to reassure each other and mitigate the security dilemma? Rationalist scholarship has identified numerous mechanisms by which states can credibly signal benign intentions. Yet it omits the possibility that states' interactions might endogenously shape their identities and domestic structures, and thus alter their basic preferences for or against cooperative outcomes. We present a f…
Arms Transfers and Extended Deterrence
Provocation, Bargaining, and War
The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, ass…
Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity
This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the go…
Rising Titans, Falling Giants
Signaling under the Security Dilemma
One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, b…
Votes and violence
This article argues that the effect of a democratic leader’s electoral margin of victory on their conflict behaviour once in office is highly dependent upon the state’s institutional structure. I show that, uniquely in parliamentary democracies, governments that win a larger share of the vote are significantly less likely to initiate disputes abroad. Such governments entail broad coalitions that, combined with the ever-present possibility of gove…
Mutual uncertainty and credible reassurance
Recent theoretical work has suggested that mutual uncertainty of a particular kind can promote credible reassurance and cooperation among states with compatible preferences. Specifically, on issues where cooperation is subjective, such that states are uncertain what types of actions the other will view as cooperative, credible reassurance under mutual uncertainty is straightforward. This finding, if correct, has profound implications for the scop…
Offsetting Uncertainty
Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real‐world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a …
Balancing or backscratching? Sino-Russian logrolling during US decline
A Question of Costliness
This article examines how interstate signaling processes operate under multiple dimensions of uncertainty. The existing signaling literature largely assumes that states communicate and infer one another’s intentions in a simplified context where they are only uncertain about one component of the other’s preferences. Relaxing this unrealistic assumption, I develop a model of interstate reassurance in which the receiver is uncertain of both the com…
Useful ignorance
This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commitments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncertainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incentives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions. But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state t…
Simulating the Bargaining Model of War
This article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model’s core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to fo…
Diversionary conflict
How do embattled leaders hope to secure their hold on power by initiating conflict abroad? The literature on diversionary war has emphasized two distinct mechanisms by which leaders stand to gain from conflict — the “rally around the flag” and “gambling for resurrection” theories. But despite a massive literature on the subject, these competing theories of diversionary incentives have never been subjected to comparative empirical evaluation. This…
Diversity and Diversion
How does a state’s ethnic composition affect its propensity to engage in diversionary conflicts? Recent empirical work examines the political conditions under which domestic unrest compels an embattled leader to initiate conflict abroad. We remain uncertain, however, of what social or demographic characteristics make states particularly prone to diversionary behavior. This article tries to address this gap, examining whether a state’s ethnic stru…
Decline and Devolution
This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional “successor” to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retre…
Decline and Retrenchment
April 01 2012 Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise? Kyle Haynes, Kyle Haynes Kyle Haynes is a Ph.D candidate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar William R. Thompson, William R. Thompson William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Search for other works by thi…
Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy
The literature on “audience costs” in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader’s electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader’s accountability, a democracy’s advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether “lame-duck” presi…
Diversionary conflict
How do embattled leaders hope to secure their hold on power by initiating conflict abroad? The literature on diversionary war has emphasized two distinct mechanisms by which leaders stand to gain from conflict — the “rally around the flag” and “gambling for resurrection” theories. But despite a massive literature on the subject, these competing theories of diversionary incentives have never been subjected to comparative empirical evaluation. This…
Offsetting Uncertainty
Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real‐world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a …
Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy
The literature on “audience costs” in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader’s electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader’s accountability, a democracy’s advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether “lame-duck” presi…
A Question of Costliness
This article examines how interstate signaling processes operate under multiple dimensions of uncertainty. The existing signaling literature largely assumes that states communicate and infer one another’s intentions in a simplified context where they are only uncertain about one component of the other’s preferences. Relaxing this unrealistic assumption, I develop a model of interstate reassurance in which the receiver is uncertain of both the com…
Decline and Devolution
This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional “successor” to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retre…
Signaling under the Security Dilemma
One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, b…
Diversity and Diversion
How does a state’s ethnic composition affect its propensity to engage in diversionary conflicts? Recent empirical work examines the political conditions under which domestic unrest compels an embattled leader to initiate conflict abroad. We remain uncertain, however, of what social or demographic characteristics make states particularly prone to diversionary behavior. This article tries to address this gap, examining whether a state’s ethnic stru…
Provocation, Bargaining, and War
The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, ass…
Endogenous preferences, credible signaling, and the security dilemma
How does the potential for socialization affect states' abilities to reassure each other and mitigate the security dilemma? Rationalist scholarship has identified numerous mechanisms by which states can credibly signal benign intentions. Yet it omits the possibility that states' interactions might endogenously shape their identities and domestic structures, and thus alter their basic preferences for or against cooperative outcomes. We present a f…
Useful ignorance
This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commitments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncertainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incentives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions. But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state t…
Simulating the Bargaining Model of War
This article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model’s core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to fo…
Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity
This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the go…
Arms Transfers and Extended Deterrence
Rising Titans, Falling Giants
Votes and violence
This article argues that the effect of a democratic leader’s electoral margin of victory on their conflict behaviour once in office is highly dependent upon the state’s institutional structure. I show that, uniquely in parliamentary democracies, governments that win a larger share of the vote are significantly less likely to initiate disputes abroad. Such governments entail broad coalitions that, combined with the ever-present possibility of gove…
Mutual uncertainty and credible reassurance
Recent theoretical work has suggested that mutual uncertainty of a particular kind can promote credible reassurance and cooperation among states with compatible preferences. Specifically, on issues where cooperation is subjective, such that states are uncertain what types of actions the other will view as cooperative, credible reassurance under mutual uncertainty is straightforward. This finding, if correct, has profound implications for the scop…
Balancing or backscratching? Sino-Russian logrolling during US decline
Decline and Retrenchment
April 01 2012 Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise? Kyle Haynes, Kyle Haynes Kyle Haynes is a Ph.D candidate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar William R. Thompson, William R. Thompson William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Search for other works by thi…
Decline and Retrenchment
April 01 2012 Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise? Kyle Haynes, Kyle Haynes Kyle Haynes is a Ph.D candidate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar William R. Thompson, William R. Thompson William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Search for other works by thi…
Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy
The literature on “audience costs” in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader’s electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader’s accountability, a democracy’s advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether “lame-duck” presi…
Simulating the Bargaining Model of War
This article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model’s core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to fo…
Diversionary conflict
How do embattled leaders hope to secure their hold on power by initiating conflict abroad? The literature on diversionary war has emphasized two distinct mechanisms by which leaders stand to gain from conflict — the “rally around the flag” and “gambling for resurrection” theories. But despite a massive literature on the subject, these competing theories of diversionary incentives have never been subjected to comparative empirical evaluation. This…
Diversity and Diversion
How does a state’s ethnic composition affect its propensity to engage in diversionary conflicts? Recent empirical work examines the political conditions under which domestic unrest compels an embattled leader to initiate conflict abroad. We remain uncertain, however, of what social or demographic characteristics make states particularly prone to diversionary behavior. This article tries to address this gap, examining whether a state’s ethnic stru…
Decline and Devolution
This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional “successor” to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retre…
Useful ignorance
This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commitments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncertainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incentives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions. But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state t…
Balancing or backscratching? Sino-Russian logrolling during US decline
A Question of Costliness
This article examines how interstate signaling processes operate under multiple dimensions of uncertainty. The existing signaling literature largely assumes that states communicate and infer one another’s intentions in a simplified context where they are only uncertain about one component of the other’s preferences. Relaxing this unrealistic assumption, I develop a model of interstate reassurance in which the receiver is uncertain of both the com…
Votes and violence
This article argues that the effect of a democratic leader’s electoral margin of victory on their conflict behaviour once in office is highly dependent upon the state’s institutional structure. I show that, uniquely in parliamentary democracies, governments that win a larger share of the vote are significantly less likely to initiate disputes abroad. Such governments entail broad coalitions that, combined with the ever-present possibility of gove…
Mutual uncertainty and credible reassurance
Recent theoretical work has suggested that mutual uncertainty of a particular kind can promote credible reassurance and cooperation among states with compatible preferences. Specifically, on issues where cooperation is subjective, such that states are uncertain what types of actions the other will view as cooperative, credible reassurance under mutual uncertainty is straightforward. This finding, if correct, has profound implications for the scop…
Offsetting Uncertainty
Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real‐world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a …
Rising Titans, Falling Giants
Signaling under the Security Dilemma
One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, b…
Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity
This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the go…
Arms Transfers and Extended Deterrence
Provocation, Bargaining, and War
The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, ass…
The trajectories of personalization
Endogenous preferences, credible signaling, and the security dilemma
How does the potential for socialization affect states' abilities to reassure each other and mitigate the security dilemma? Rationalist scholarship has identified numerous mechanisms by which states can credibly signal benign intentions. Yet it omits the possibility that states' interactions might endogenously shape their identities and domestic structures, and thus alter their basic preferences for or against cooperative outcomes. We present a f…
Economics (17 works) · Political science (16 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (14 works) · Law (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Political economy (8 works) · Politics (8 works)