Misato Inaba
Biographic Data
| ID | 3889526 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Misato Inaba |
| GIVEN NAMES | Misato |
| FAMILY NAME | Inaba |
| SIGNATURE | INABA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kansai University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1177-2220 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Trivial giving as a signal of trustworthiness
The effect of commitment in the public goods game with endogenous institution formation
This study focuses on the endogenous formation of institutions for the provision of public goods. Institutions that impose a contribution on their members can increase social welfare. However, without powerful executive authority, not all players become institutional members, and those who choose not to join the institution do not contribute to public goods. Endogenous institution formation—for example, international treaties to prevent global wa…
The use of reputation in repeated dyadic interactions
How cooperation is possible has been one of the major puzzles in social sciences. Traditionally, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain cooperation. Cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions has been explained by direct reciprocity, while cooperation between more than two individuals has been explained by indirect reciprocity. Although reputation is theoretically unnecessary to achieve mutual cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions, s…
The use of reputation in repeated dyadic interactions
How cooperation is possible has been one of the major puzzles in social sciences. Traditionally, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain cooperation. Cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions has been explained by direct reciprocity, while cooperation between more than two individuals has been explained by indirect reciprocity. Although reputation is theoretically unnecessary to achieve mutual cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions, s…
The use of reputation in repeated dyadic interactions
How cooperation is possible has been one of the major puzzles in social sciences. Traditionally, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain cooperation. Cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions has been explained by direct reciprocity, while cooperation between more than two individuals has been explained by indirect reciprocity. Although reputation is theoretically unnecessary to achieve mutual cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions, s…
Trivial giving as a signal of trustworthiness
The effect of commitment in the public goods game with endogenous institution formation
This study focuses on the endogenous formation of institutions for the provision of public goods. Institutions that impose a contribution on their members can increase social welfare. However, without powerful executive authority, not all players become institutional members, and those who choose not to join the institution do not contribute to public goods. Endogenous institution formation—for example, international treaties to prevent global wa…
Economics (3 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Biology (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 works)