Jonathan P Thomas
Biographic Data
| ID | 3889564 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan P Thomas |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan P |
| FAMILY NAME | Thomas |
| SIGNATURE | THOMAS J P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| ORCID | 0009-0008-3798-7319 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market
We present an overview of models of long‐term self‐enforcing labour contracts in which risk‐sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two‐agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two‐sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empiric…
Introduction to Special Issue
Fair Pay and a Wage‐Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability
This article considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. In the absence of fully contingent contracts, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary…
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by …
Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games
This book is based on the Churchill Lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1997. Rather than a single approach, it contains a number of loosely related attacks on some of the central questions of strategic foundations, based partly on previous work undertaken by the author, partly on others' work, but it also contains much previously unpublished material. The first chapter contains an overview of the main issues, including an introduction to dynamic …
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device
A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When …
Pooling sovereign risks: The case of environmental treaties and international debt
The confidence heuristic: A game-theoretic analysis
Book notes
Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference by Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp.x + 237; £30. ISBN 0 521 33040 8 Representation and Party Politics: A Comparative Perspective by B.D. Graham. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1993. Pp.242 + table; £40 (hardback); £13.99 (paperback). ISBN 0 63117 395 1 and 0 63117 396 X The Market, Competition and Democracy: A Critique of…
Sovereign debt: Ignorance can be bliss
IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device
A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When …
The confidence heuristic: A game-theoretic analysis
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
Pooling sovereign risks: The case of environmental treaties and international debt
Fair Pay and a Wage‐Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability
This article considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. In the absence of fully contingent contracts, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary…
Sovereign debt: Ignorance can be bliss
Book notes
Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference by Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp.x + 237; £30. ISBN 0 521 33040 8 Representation and Party Politics: A Comparative Perspective by B.D. Graham. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1993. Pp.242 + table; £40 (hardback); £13.99 (paperback). ISBN 0 63117 395 1 and 0 63117 396 X The Market, Competition and Democracy: A Critique of…
The confidence heuristic: A game-theoretic analysis
Pooling sovereign risks: The case of environmental treaties and international debt
IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device
A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When …
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by …
Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games
This book is based on the Churchill Lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1997. Rather than a single approach, it contains a number of loosely related attacks on some of the central questions of strategic foundations, based partly on previous work undertaken by the author, partly on others' work, but it also contains much previously unpublished material. The first chapter contains an overview of the main issues, including an introduction to dynamic …
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
Fair Pay and a Wage‐Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability
This article considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. In the absence of fully contingent contracts, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary…
Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market
We present an overview of models of long‐term self‐enforcing labour contracts in which risk‐sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two‐agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two‐sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empiric…
Introduction to Special Issue
Economics (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Law (5 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Creditor (3 works) · Debt (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (3 works)