Ulrik Franke
Biographic Data
| ID | 3889610 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ulrik Franke |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ulrik |
| FAMILY NAME | Franke |
| SIGNATURE | FRANKE U |
| AFFILIATIONS | RISE Research Institutes of Sweden |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2017-7914 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Rawlsian Algorithmic Fairness and a Missing Aggregation Property of the Difference Principle
Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. Based on complications with this approach identified in the literature, this article discusses how Rawls’s theory in general, and espe…
Algorithmic Transparency, Manipulation, and Two Concepts of Liberty
As more decisions are made by automated algorithmic systems, the transparency of these systems has come under scrutiny. While such transparency is typically seen as beneficial, there is a also a critical, Foucauldian account of it. From this perspective, worries have recently been articulated that algorithmic transparency can be used for manipulation, as part of a disciplinary power structure. Klenk ( Philosophy & Technology 36, 79, 2023) recentl…
The Limits of Calibration and the Possibility of Roles for Trustworthy AI
With increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in high-stakes contexts, a race for “trustworthy AI” is under way. However, Dorsch and Deroy ( Philosophy & Technology 37, 62, 2024) recently argued that regardless of its feasibility, morally trustworthy AI is unnecessary: We should merely rely on rather than trust AI, and carefully calibrate our reliance using the reliability scores which are often available. This short commentary on Dorsch an…
Two Metaverse Dystopias
In recent years, the metaverse—some form of immersive digital extension of the physical world—has received much attention. As tech companies present their bold visions, scientists and scholars have also turned to metaverse issues, from technological challenges via societal implications to profound philosophical questions. This article contributes to this growing literature by identifying the possibilities of two dystopian metaverse scenarios, nam…
Algorithmic Fairness, Risk, and the Dominant Protective Agency
With increasing use of automated algorithmic decision-making, issues of algorithmic fairness have attracted much attention lately. In this growing literature, existing concepts from ethics and political philosophy are often applied to new contexts. The reverse—that novel insights from the algorithmic fairness literature are fed back into ethics and political philosophy—is far less established. However, this short commentary on Baumann and Loi ( P…
First- and Second-Level Bias in Automated Decision-making
Recent advances in artificial intelligence offer many beneficial prospects. However, concerns have been raised about the opacity of decisions made by these systems, some of which have turned out to be biased in various ways. This article makes a contribution to a growing body of literature on how to make systems for automated decision-making more transparent, explainable, and fair by drawing attention to and further elaborating a distinction firs…
Algorithmic Political Bias—an Entrenchment Concern
This short commentary on Peters ( Philosophy & Technology 35, 2022) identifies the entrenchment of political positions as one additional concern related to algorithmic political bias, beyond those identified by Peters. First, it is observed that the political positions detected and predicted by algorithms are typically contingent and largely explained by “political tribalism”, as argued by Brennan (2016). Second, following Hacking (1999), the soc…
How Much Should You Care About Algorithmic Transparency as Manipulation
Wang ( Philosophy & Technology 35, 2022) introduces a Foucauldian power account of algorithmic transparency. This short commentary explores when this power account is appropriate. It is first observed that the power account is a constructionist one, and that such accounts often come with both factual and evaluative claims. In an instance of Hume’s law, the evaluative claims do not follow from the factual claims, leaving open the question of how m…
Rawls’s Original Position and Algorithmic Fairness
Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. This article aims to identify some complications with this approach: Under which circumstances can Rawls’s original position reasonabl…
Partial participation towards collective action: To stifle or instigate
In this paper we extend the Granovetter threshold model with partial participation towards a collective action. That is, agents may partake by conducting an action that is less costly than the ultimate collective action, but costly enough to signal a commitment to the cause. We show that it is not just the exact distribution of thresholds, but also the distribution of available actions that determines whether a collective action will be achieved.…
Partial participation towards collective action: To stifle or instigate
In this paper we extend the Granovetter threshold model with partial participation towards a collective action. That is, agents may partake by conducting an action that is less costly than the ultimate collective action, but costly enough to signal a commitment to the cause. We show that it is not just the exact distribution of thresholds, but also the distribution of available actions that determines whether a collective action will be achieved.…
Partial participation towards collective action: To stifle or instigate
In this paper we extend the Granovetter threshold model with partial participation towards a collective action. That is, agents may partake by conducting an action that is less costly than the ultimate collective action, but costly enough to signal a commitment to the cause. We show that it is not just the exact distribution of thresholds, but also the distribution of available actions that determines whether a collective action will be achieved.…
Rawls’s Original Position and Algorithmic Fairness
Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. This article aims to identify some complications with this approach: Under which circumstances can Rawls’s original position reasonabl…
First- and Second-Level Bias in Automated Decision-making
Recent advances in artificial intelligence offer many beneficial prospects. However, concerns have been raised about the opacity of decisions made by these systems, some of which have turned out to be biased in various ways. This article makes a contribution to a growing body of literature on how to make systems for automated decision-making more transparent, explainable, and fair by drawing attention to and further elaborating a distinction firs…
Algorithmic Political Bias—an Entrenchment Concern
This short commentary on Peters ( Philosophy & Technology 35, 2022) identifies the entrenchment of political positions as one additional concern related to algorithmic political bias, beyond those identified by Peters. First, it is observed that the political positions detected and predicted by algorithms are typically contingent and largely explained by “political tribalism”, as argued by Brennan (2016). Second, following Hacking (1999), the soc…
How Much Should You Care About Algorithmic Transparency as Manipulation
Wang ( Philosophy & Technology 35, 2022) introduces a Foucauldian power account of algorithmic transparency. This short commentary explores when this power account is appropriate. It is first observed that the power account is a constructionist one, and that such accounts often come with both factual and evaluative claims. In an instance of Hume’s law, the evaluative claims do not follow from the factual claims, leaving open the question of how m…
Algorithmic Fairness, Risk, and the Dominant Protective Agency
With increasing use of automated algorithmic decision-making, issues of algorithmic fairness have attracted much attention lately. In this growing literature, existing concepts from ethics and political philosophy are often applied to new contexts. The reverse—that novel insights from the algorithmic fairness literature are fed back into ethics and political philosophy—is far less established. However, this short commentary on Baumann and Loi ( P…
Rawlsian Algorithmic Fairness and a Missing Aggregation Property of the Difference Principle
Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. Based on complications with this approach identified in the literature, this article discusses how Rawls’s theory in general, and espe…
Algorithmic Transparency, Manipulation, and Two Concepts of Liberty
As more decisions are made by automated algorithmic systems, the transparency of these systems has come under scrutiny. While such transparency is typically seen as beneficial, there is a also a critical, Foucauldian account of it. From this perspective, worries have recently been articulated that algorithmic transparency can be used for manipulation, as part of a disciplinary power structure. Klenk ( Philosophy & Technology 36, 79, 2023) recentl…
The Limits of Calibration and the Possibility of Roles for Trustworthy AI
With increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in high-stakes contexts, a race for “trustworthy AI” is under way. However, Dorsch and Deroy ( Philosophy & Technology 37, 62, 2024) recently argued that regardless of its feasibility, morally trustworthy AI is unnecessary: We should merely rely on rather than trust AI, and carefully calibrate our reliance using the reliability scores which are often available. This short commentary on Dorsch an…
Two Metaverse Dystopias
In recent years, the metaverse—some form of immersive digital extension of the physical world—has received much attention. As tech companies present their bold visions, scientists and scholars have also turned to metaverse issues, from technological challenges via societal implications to profound philosophical questions. This article contributes to this growing literature by identifying the possibilities of two dystopian metaverse scenarios, nam…
Epistemology (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Philosophy of technology (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security (5 works) · Economics (5 works)