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Manabu Saeki

Biographic Data

ID3894087
NAMEManabu Saeki
GIVEN NAMESManabu
FAMILY NAMESaeki
SIGNATURESAEKI M
AFFILIATIONSSoutheastern Louisiana University
ORCID0000-0003-2455-9936
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS19
AUTHOR COUNT10
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX2
  • Forecasting Popular Vote and Electoral College Vote Results: Partisan-Bounded Economic Model

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2024•References: 7

    The Partisan-Bounded Economic Model forecasts popular vote and Electoral College vote results in the 2024 presidential election based on economic growth, presidential popularity, and shifts in party identification within the electorate. Due to the partisan vote and voter inertia, presidential elections are unlikely to result in lopsided outcomes even in the face of economic turmoil or prosperity. In the Partisan-Bounded Economic Model, outliers i…

  • Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Politics & Policy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Scholars explain that the ideological divide among the political elites has heightened the homogeneity in voters' ideology within parties, thereby resulting in the appearance of ideological polarization in the American electorate today. This article postulates and tests four modes of party sorting in the United States based upon: (1) if partisan voters adjust their ideology to the preference of their party elites or switch to the ideologically pr…

  • Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 14

    David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern significantly challenged the conventional wisdom of the adversarial effect of divided government on government effectiveness in the United States. While the post-Mayhewian literature has been centred on legislative productivity as a measure of gridlock, gridlock is here defined as an ‘inability to change policy’. In this study, the preferences of the legislators, such as the filibuster, override and House median v…

  • Appointing the Fed Chair: The Political Influence of Presidential Appointment on the Federal Reserve Board in the United States

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Public Policy and Administration•2008•References: 24

    Several scholars observe presidential appointment as a principal mechanism for the president to influence the bureaucracy in the United States. In order to study presidential influence on the Federal Reserve Board, which is widely considered to be one of the most independent governmental agencies, this article examines the influences of the Chairs and Governors of the Board appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents separately on monetary …

  • Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal Policies in the United States and the Threat of Direct Initiatives

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2006•References: 6

    Many studies have argued that the initiative process in U.S. state governments strengthened the proximity between the citizens' preferences and policy output. In contrast, this study hypothesizes that the direct initiative process weakens, rather than strengthens, the link between citizen preferences and state fiscal policy. Governments respond to the threat of initiatives but only those of conservative agendas. The results show that while the le…

  • Vote.com? Issue Voting of Internet Users in the 2000 Presidential Election

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Politics & Policy•2005•References: 9

    In recent years, Internet use has grown rapidly and changed citizens' daily lives. This study examines the influence of Internet usage on issue-voting in the 2000 presidential election. Using NES data on voters who planned to vote in the 2000 presidential election, I test the hypotheses that voters who use the Internet for obtaining information about elections are more issue-oriented in their voting behaviors. I find mixed results. While the Inte…

  • Systematic, Political, and Socioeconomic Influences on Educational Spending in the American States1

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2005•Cited by: 1•References: 14

    For decades, scholars have debated the relative explanatory power of economic and political factors in determining policy outputs. In addition, I introduce a new concept, "systematic determinants," which includes incrementalism and proportionalism. Policy spending is likely to change only marginally, or incrementally, from previous spending levels. Also, the relative sizes of policy programs in a government are likely to remain similar, or propor…

  • Override propensity in the US congress: Veto Challenge and Override Vote by the Two Chambers

    Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Journal of Legislative Studies•2004•Cited by: 2

    In contrast to the study of the US presidential veto, the study of the congressional override of vetoes has been scarce. This study examines the influences of partisanship in Congress, presidential popularity, presidential legislative assertiveness and the chamber in which a bill originated. By using the logit model, the article examines the models of House veto challenge, Senate veto challenge, House vote for override and Senate vote for overrid…

  • Who Influences the Fed? Presidential Versus Congressional Leadership

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki, Steven A Shull•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2003•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    This paper examines political influences over U.S monetary policy, analysed quarterly from 1953 to 2000. We use indicators of presidential and congressional ideology as predictors of actor preferences and as representative of overhead democracy. We also include several economic variables predicting percent change in the federal funds rate. While not surprised to find that economic conditions are important in explaining Fed decisionmaking, we also…

  • Explaining Federal Reserve Monetary Policy

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki, Steven A Shull•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2002•References: 11

    In an examination of Federal Funds rate monthly from 1954 to 2000, we compare a model using presidential party as a compositional variable with a model using presidential party as an interactive variable. Federal Reserve monetary policy was found responsive to the economy, to business elites, and to political circumstances. However, these influences had different patterns depending upon presidential party. The Federal Reserve appears to act neith…

  • Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 14

    David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern significantly challenged the conventional wisdom of the adversarial effect of divided government on government effectiveness in the United States. While the post-Mayhewian literature has been centred on legislative productivity as a measure of gridlock, gridlock is here defined as an ‘inability to change policy’. In this study, the preferences of the legislators, such as the filibuster, override and House median v…

  • Override propensity in the US congress: Veto Challenge and Override Vote by the Two Chambers

    Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Journal of Legislative Studies•2004•Cited by: 2

    In contrast to the study of the US presidential veto, the study of the congressional override of vetoes has been scarce. This study examines the influences of partisanship in Congress, presidential popularity, presidential legislative assertiveness and the chamber in which a bill originated. By using the logit model, the article examines the models of House veto challenge, Senate veto challenge, House vote for override and Senate vote for overrid…

  • Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Politics & Policy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Scholars explain that the ideological divide among the political elites has heightened the homogeneity in voters' ideology within parties, thereby resulting in the appearance of ideological polarization in the American electorate today. This article postulates and tests four modes of party sorting in the United States based upon: (1) if partisan voters adjust their ideology to the preference of their party elites or switch to the ideologically pr…

  • Systematic, Political, and Socioeconomic Influences on Educational Spending in the American States1

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2005•Cited by: 1•References: 14

    For decades, scholars have debated the relative explanatory power of economic and political factors in determining policy outputs. In addition, I introduce a new concept, "systematic determinants," which includes incrementalism and proportionalism. Policy spending is likely to change only marginally, or incrementally, from previous spending levels. Also, the relative sizes of policy programs in a government are likely to remain similar, or propor…

  • Who Influences the Fed? Presidential Versus Congressional Leadership

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki, Steven A Shull•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2003•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    This paper examines political influences over U.S monetary policy, analysed quarterly from 1953 to 2000. We use indicators of presidential and congressional ideology as predictors of actor preferences and as representative of overhead democracy. We also include several economic variables predicting percent change in the federal funds rate. While not surprised to find that economic conditions are important in explaining Fed decisionmaking, we also…

  • Explaining Federal Reserve Monetary Policy

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki, Steven A Shull•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2002•References: 11

    In an examination of Federal Funds rate monthly from 1954 to 2000, we compare a model using presidential party as a compositional variable with a model using presidential party as an interactive variable. Federal Reserve monetary policy was found responsive to the economy, to business elites, and to political circumstances. However, these influences had different patterns depending upon presidential party. The Federal Reserve appears to act neith…

  • Who Influences the Fed? Presidential Versus Congressional Leadership

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki, Steven A Shull•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2003•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    This paper examines political influences over U.S monetary policy, analysed quarterly from 1953 to 2000. We use indicators of presidential and congressional ideology as predictors of actor preferences and as representative of overhead democracy. We also include several economic variables predicting percent change in the federal funds rate. While not surprised to find that economic conditions are important in explaining Fed decisionmaking, we also…

  • Override propensity in the US congress: Veto Challenge and Override Vote by the Two Chambers

    Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Journal of Legislative Studies•2004•Cited by: 2

    In contrast to the study of the US presidential veto, the study of the congressional override of vetoes has been scarce. This study examines the influences of partisanship in Congress, presidential popularity, presidential legislative assertiveness and the chamber in which a bill originated. By using the logit model, the article examines the models of House veto challenge, Senate veto challenge, House vote for override and Senate vote for overrid…

  • Vote.com? Issue Voting of Internet Users in the 2000 Presidential Election

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Politics & Policy•2005•References: 9

    In recent years, Internet use has grown rapidly and changed citizens' daily lives. This study examines the influence of Internet usage on issue-voting in the 2000 presidential election. Using NES data on voters who planned to vote in the 2000 presidential election, I test the hypotheses that voters who use the Internet for obtaining information about elections are more issue-oriented in their voting behaviors. I find mixed results. While the Inte…

  • Systematic, Political, and Socioeconomic Influences on Educational Spending in the American States1

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2005•Cited by: 1•References: 14

    For decades, scholars have debated the relative explanatory power of economic and political factors in determining policy outputs. In addition, I introduce a new concept, "systematic determinants," which includes incrementalism and proportionalism. Policy spending is likely to change only marginally, or incrementally, from previous spending levels. Also, the relative sizes of policy programs in a government are likely to remain similar, or propor…

  • Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal Policies in the United States and the Threat of Direct Initiatives

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•2006•References: 6

    Many studies have argued that the initiative process in U.S. state governments strengthened the proximity between the citizens' preferences and policy output. In contrast, this study hypothesizes that the direct initiative process weakens, rather than strengthens, the link between citizen preferences and state fiscal policy. Governments respond to the threat of initiatives but only those of conservative agendas. The results show that while the le…

  • Appointing the Fed Chair: The Political Influence of Presidential Appointment on the Federal Reserve Board in the United States

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Public Policy and Administration•2008•References: 24

    Several scholars observe presidential appointment as a principal mechanism for the president to influence the bureaucracy in the United States. In order to study presidential influence on the Federal Reserve Board, which is widely considered to be one of the most independent governmental agencies, this article examines the influences of the Chairs and Governors of the Board appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents separately on monetary …

  • Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 14

    David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern significantly challenged the conventional wisdom of the adversarial effect of divided government on government effectiveness in the United States. While the post-Mayhewian literature has been centred on legislative productivity as a measure of gridlock, gridlock is here defined as an ‘inability to change policy’. In this study, the preferences of the legislators, such as the filibuster, override and House median v…

  • Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•Politics & Policy•2019•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Scholars explain that the ideological divide among the political elites has heightened the homogeneity in voters' ideology within parties, thereby resulting in the appearance of ideological polarization in the American electorate today. This article postulates and tests four modes of party sorting in the United States based upon: (1) if partisan voters adjust their ideology to the preference of their party elites or switch to the ideologically pr…

  • Forecasting Popular Vote and Electoral College Vote Results: Partisan-Bounded Economic Model

    Open Access•Manabu Saeki•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2024•References: 7

    The Partisan-Bounded Economic Model forecasts popular vote and Electoral College vote results in the 2024 presidential election based on economic growth, presidential popularity, and shifts in party identification within the electorate. Due to the partisan vote and voter inertia, presidential elections are unlikely to result in lopsided outcomes even in the face of economic turmoil or prosperity. In the Partisan-Bounded Economic Model, outliers i…

Law (10 works) · Political science (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Public Administration (7 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (5 works)

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