Wallace J Thies
Biographic Data
| ID | 390048 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wallace J Thies |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wallace J |
| FAMILY NAME | Thies |
| SIGNATURE | THIES W J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Catholic University of America |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 30 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War
Peace Proposals, Diplomacy, and War: Was an Opportunity Lost for an Early Settlement in Vietnam
This forum includes essays by six leading experts on the Vietnam War discussing the recent book by James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), which recounts the various secret efforts mediated by East European governments to foster peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam that would bring an end to the war. All of the commentators praise the book and the scope…
When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War
How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestra…
Does Nato Enlargement Spread Democracy? Evidence from Three Cases∗
Does NATO enlargement spread democracy? The issue has been vigorously disputed since the mid-1990s, but no consensus has yet emerged. We test rival claims about what NATO enlargement can and cannot do by examining three cases—Slovakia, Latvia, and Croatia. We use both numerical ratings by Freedom House and our own qualitative assessment to determine whether these three became more democratic after 1994, when NATO opened the door to expansion, and…
When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait
Are authoritarian states better at coercion than democracies? The latter frequently find it difficult to make credible and persuasive threats; orchestrate words and deeds; and signal by deed as well as by word. Authoritarian states are often believed to be less bound by constraints such as divided government and organizational rivalries, but this belief has rarely been tested. This paper examines the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, in which the Peo…
Compellence Failure or Coercive Success? The Case of Nato and Yugoslavia
What is coercion? How does it work? Much recent work in this regard has centered on two issues: the relative merits of punishment versus denial strategies, and whether air power can work in the absence of forces on the ground. These are important issues, but they also convey the misleading impression that coercion is something that occurs after the first bomb is dropped. This paper argues that an air war is better viewed as a last resort that occ…
The Secret War Against Hanoi
Journal Article The Secret War Against Hanoi Get access The Secret War Against Hanoi by Richard Shultz. New York, Harper-Collins, 2000. 408 pp. Paper, $15.00. Wallace J. Thies Wallace J. Thies Catholic University of America Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116, Issue 2, Summer 2001, Pages 320–321, https://doi.org/10.2307/798073 Published: 15 February 2013
Proliferation and critical risk
Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers. To bridge th…
United States
Rethinking the new world order
How We (Almost) Won in Vietnam: Ellsworth Bunker's Reports to the President
A Twenty-First Century Army
Randomness, contagion and heterogeneity in the formation of interstate alliances— a reconsideration
The diversity in form and purpose exhibited by interstate alliances and the difficulty of developing generalizations about them have led political scientists interested in alliances to investigate new research techniques to help them in coping with the intractability of their subject matter. Prominent in this regard have been efforts to use stochastic process models to search for regularities in the process by which alliances have formed and re‐f…
The "Demise" of Nato: A Postmortem
Crises and the Study Of Alliance Politics
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is one of recurrent 'crises' among its members. Participants and observers alike have been prone to use the notion of an 'Alliance crisis' as a form of political shorthand to indicate the presence of greater-than-normal tensions and strains. An excessive reliance on this kind of shorthand, however, can obscure far more than it reveals; it can also serve as an impediment rather than as an aid to theory construc…
On Nato Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy
Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal
How are burdens shared within an alliance? How many and what kinds of armed forces are alliance members likely to purchase in support of their collective interest in deterrence and defense? These questions are the province of the economic theory of alliances, which has been widely accepted as offering an explanation for two tendencies often found within alliances: disproportionality in burden sharing and suboptimality in the amount of military sp…
What Future for the Atlantic Alliance
When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968
Why Vietnam
Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949. Escott Reid
When Governments Collide. Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968
Searching for Peace: Vietnam & the Question of How Wars End
Contemporary American political science has dealt too little, too late (the late 1960's), and generally too weakly with the question of how wars end, Thies argues. Theorists of the 1950's-1960's are grouped into: limited war theorists, who tended to see warring nations on the analogy of rationally calculating individuals; those concerned with ending wars quickly; and those applying game theory to the Vietnam war. Thies carefully criticizes each a…
Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal
How are burdens shared within an alliance? How many and what kinds of armed forces are alliance members likely to purchase in support of their collective interest in deterrence and defense? These questions are the province of the economic theory of alliances, which has been widely accepted as offering an explanation for two tendencies often found within alliances: disproportionality in burden sharing and suboptimality in the amount of military sp…
When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War
How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestra…
Rethinking the new world order
Crises and the Study Of Alliance Politics
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is one of recurrent 'crises' among its members. Participants and observers alike have been prone to use the notion of an 'Alliance crisis' as a form of political shorthand to indicate the presence of greater-than-normal tensions and strains. An excessive reliance on this kind of shorthand, however, can obscure far more than it reveals; it can also serve as an impediment rather than as an aid to theory construc…
Searching for Peace: Vietnam & the Question of How Wars End
Contemporary American political science has dealt too little, too late (the late 1960's), and generally too weakly with the question of how wars end, Thies argues. Theorists of the 1950's-1960's are grouped into: limited war theorists, who tended to see warring nations on the analogy of rationally calculating individuals; those concerned with ending wars quickly; and those applying game theory to the Vietnam war. Thies carefully criticizes each a…
Why Vietnam
Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949. Escott Reid
When Governments Collide. Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968
When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968
What Future for the Atlantic Alliance
Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal
How are burdens shared within an alliance? How many and what kinds of armed forces are alliance members likely to purchase in support of their collective interest in deterrence and defense? These questions are the province of the economic theory of alliances, which has been widely accepted as offering an explanation for two tendencies often found within alliances: disproportionality in burden sharing and suboptimality in the amount of military sp…
On Nato Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy
Crises and the Study Of Alliance Politics
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is one of recurrent 'crises' among its members. Participants and observers alike have been prone to use the notion of an 'Alliance crisis' as a form of political shorthand to indicate the presence of greater-than-normal tensions and strains. An excessive reliance on this kind of shorthand, however, can obscure far more than it reveals; it can also serve as an impediment rather than as an aid to theory construc…
The "Demise" of Nato: A Postmortem
A Twenty-First Century Army
Randomness, contagion and heterogeneity in the formation of interstate alliances— a reconsideration
The diversity in form and purpose exhibited by interstate alliances and the difficulty of developing generalizations about them have led political scientists interested in alliances to investigate new research techniques to help them in coping with the intractability of their subject matter. Prominent in this regard have been efforts to use stochastic process models to search for regularities in the process by which alliances have formed and re‐f…
How We (Almost) Won in Vietnam: Ellsworth Bunker's Reports to the President
Rethinking the new world order
United States
Proliferation and critical risk
Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers. To bridge th…
The Secret War Against Hanoi
Journal Article The Secret War Against Hanoi Get access The Secret War Against Hanoi by Richard Shultz. New York, Harper-Collins, 2000. 408 pp. Paper, $15.00. Wallace J. Thies Wallace J. Thies Catholic University of America Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116, Issue 2, Summer 2001, Pages 320–321, https://doi.org/10.2307/798073 Published: 15 February 2013
Compellence Failure or Coercive Success? The Case of Nato and Yugoslavia
What is coercion? How does it work? Much recent work in this regard has centered on two issues: the relative merits of punishment versus denial strategies, and whether air power can work in the absence of forces on the ground. These are important issues, but they also convey the misleading impression that coercion is something that occurs after the first bomb is dropped. This paper argues that an air war is better viewed as a last resort that occ…
When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait
Are authoritarian states better at coercion than democracies? The latter frequently find it difficult to make credible and persuasive threats; orchestrate words and deeds; and signal by deed as well as by word. Authoritarian states are often believed to be less bound by constraints such as divided government and organizational rivalries, but this belief has rarely been tested. This paper examines the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, in which the Peo…
Does Nato Enlargement Spread Democracy? Evidence from Three Cases∗
Does NATO enlargement spread democracy? The issue has been vigorously disputed since the mid-1990s, but no consensus has yet emerged. We test rival claims about what NATO enlargement can and cannot do by examining three cases—Slovakia, Latvia, and Croatia. We use both numerical ratings by Freedom House and our own qualitative assessment to determine whether these three became more democratic after 1994, when NATO opened the door to expansion, and…
When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War
How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestra…
Peace Proposals, Diplomacy, and War: Was an Opportunity Lost for an Early Settlement in Vietnam
This forum includes essays by six leading experts on the Vietnam War discussing the recent book by James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), which recounts the various secret efforts mediated by East European governments to foster peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam that would bring an end to the war. All of the commentators praise the book and the scope…
Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War
Political science (21 works) · Law (20 works) · Law (13 works) · Political economy (13 works) · Sociology (13 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (11 works) · Politics (10 works) · Economics (7 works) · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies (7 works) · History (6 works)