Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Biographic Data
| ID | 3912253 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci |
| GIVEN NAMES | Giuseppe |
| FAMILY NAME | Dari-Mattiacci |
| SIGNATURE | DARI-MATTIACCI G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Differentiation through Legal Uncertainty
Fines for unequal societies
One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and da…
Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the market tends to disappear from the bottom rather than from the top. In contrast to the traditional model, it is the high-value goods (gems) that are traded on t…
Unexpected Effects of Expected Sanctions
This review of the criminal deterrence literature focuses on the questions that are largely missing from many recent, excellent, comprehensive reviews of that literature, and from the literature itself. By “missing” I mean, first, questions that criminal deterrence scholars have ignored either completely or to a large extent. These questions range from fundamental (the distributional analysis of the criminal justice system), to those hidden in pl…
The Virtuous Cycle of Property
This paper shows that formalizing private property rights has a positive effect on the propensity to respect the property of others. We study a recent large-scale land tenure reform in West Africa that was the first of its kind to be implemented as a randomized control trial. Results of a modified dictator game show that the formalization of private property rights reduced an individual's willingness to take from others' endowment. We used additi…
Roman Law and Economics: Volume II: Exchange, Ownership, and Disputes
Rome is the only western society that autonomously grew a legal profession distinct from the political and religious power. Roman legal thought and the institutions that it generated have had and continue to have an enormous influence on legal thinking in the western world and beyond. This book investigates the economics of Roman legal institutions, their functions and their evolution. It brings together most of the scholars that have been active…
Agency Problems and Organizational Costs in Slave-Run Businesses
This chapter examines the internal economic organization of the peculium servi communis —that is, of separate business assets assigned to a slave—and its (external) relationships with creditors. Literary, legal, and epigraphic evidence points predominantly to businesses of small or medium size, suggesting that there must have been some constraints to growth. We identify both agency problems arising within the business organization (governance pro…
Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication
Roman Law and Economics: Institutions and Organizations Volume I
Ancient Rome is the only society in the history of the western world whose legal profession evolved autonomously, distinct and separate from institutions of political and religious power. Roman legal thought has left behind an enduring legacy and exerted enormous influence on the shaping of modern legal frameworks and systems, but its own genesis and context pose their own explanatory problems. The economic analysis of Roman law has enormous unta…
Roman Law and Economics: Volume II
The Property-Contract Balance
We identify a key trade-off between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts. For instance, when a dishonest intermediary transfers a good to an innocent buyer without the owner's consent, should the buyer or the owner retain the good? We show that the optimal rule maximizes the agents' valuation of the good rather than their incentives to protect property and inquire about title. Furthermore, enhancing reliance on contracts…
Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties
Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost of accidents between nonnegligent parties, effectively rendering injurer and victim partial residual bearers of loss. We introduce a bilateral accident m…
Returns to effort in rent-seeking games
Slavery and Information
This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentives to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model's implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the At…
Luxury in Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing and Enforcement of Sumptuary Laws
Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase
In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants compete à-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent à-la-Coase. We consider a complete information Tullock game in which the contestants have different valuations for the rent. The analysis focuses on the ex ante effects of a secondary market on efforts, payoffs, rent-dissipation and rent-misallocation. We show that the secondary market, w…
Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process
There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject to uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, the law is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balanc…
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively …
Arbitration versus Settlement
Le caractère incomplet des contrats et des règles de droit conduit souvent à des contentieux. Avant qu’un conflit ne survienne, les parties peuvent décider de recourir à l’arbitrage. Si elles choisissent de procéder de la sorte, les conflits futurs seront résolus devant un arbitre. Dans le cas contraire, les parties choisiront entre la négociation et le procès. Cet article analyse les variables qui sont susceptibles d’influencer les choix des par…
Judgment Proofness under Four Different Precaution Technologies
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer can reduce the probability of the accident, the magnitude of the harm, or both. Different legal solutions to the problem are examined: punitive damages, average compensation, undercompensation, accurate compensation, and negligence. We find that when the injurer can only reduce the probability of the accident, negligence with average compensation i…
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox
Slavery and Information
This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentives to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model's implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the At…
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively …
Judgment Proofness under Four Different Precaution Technologies
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer can reduce the probability of the accident, the magnitude of the harm, or both. Different legal solutions to the problem are examined: punitive damages, average compensation, undercompensation, accurate compensation, and negligence. We find that when the injurer can only reduce the probability of the accident, negligence with average compensation i…
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox
Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process
There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject to uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, the law is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balanc…
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively …
Arbitration versus Settlement
Le caractère incomplet des contrats et des règles de droit conduit souvent à des contentieux. Avant qu’un conflit ne survienne, les parties peuvent décider de recourir à l’arbitrage. Si elles choisissent de procéder de la sorte, les conflits futurs seront résolus devant un arbitre. Dans le cas contraire, les parties choisiront entre la négociation et le procès. Cet article analyse les variables qui sont susceptibles d’influencer les choix des par…
Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase
In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants compete à-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent à-la-Coase. We consider a complete information Tullock game in which the contestants have different valuations for the rent. The analysis focuses on the ex ante effects of a secondary market on efforts, payoffs, rent-dissipation and rent-misallocation. We show that the secondary market, w…
Luxury in Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing and Enforcement of Sumptuary Laws
Slavery and Information
This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentives to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model's implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the At…
Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties
Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost of accidents between nonnegligent parties, effectively rendering injurer and victim partial residual bearers of loss. We introduce a bilateral accident m…
Returns to effort in rent-seeking games
The Property-Contract Balance
We identify a key trade-off between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts. For instance, when a dishonest intermediary transfers a good to an innocent buyer without the owner's consent, should the buyer or the owner retain the good? We show that the optimal rule maximizes the agents' valuation of the good rather than their incentives to protect property and inquire about title. Furthermore, enhancing reliance on contracts…
Roman Law and Economics: Volume II: Exchange, Ownership, and Disputes
Rome is the only western society that autonomously grew a legal profession distinct from the political and religious power. Roman legal thought and the institutions that it generated have had and continue to have an enormous influence on legal thinking in the western world and beyond. This book investigates the economics of Roman legal institutions, their functions and their evolution. It brings together most of the scholars that have been active…
Agency Problems and Organizational Costs in Slave-Run Businesses
This chapter examines the internal economic organization of the peculium servi communis —that is, of separate business assets assigned to a slave—and its (external) relationships with creditors. Literary, legal, and epigraphic evidence points predominantly to businesses of small or medium size, suggesting that there must have been some constraints to growth. We identify both agency problems arising within the business organization (governance pro…
Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication
Roman Law and Economics: Institutions and Organizations Volume I
Ancient Rome is the only society in the history of the western world whose legal profession evolved autonomously, distinct and separate from institutions of political and religious power. Roman legal thought has left behind an enduring legacy and exerted enormous influence on the shaping of modern legal frameworks and systems, but its own genesis and context pose their own explanatory problems. The economic analysis of Roman law has enormous unta…
Roman Law and Economics: Volume II
Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the market tends to disappear from the bottom rather than from the top. In contrast to the traditional model, it is the high-value goods (gems) that are traded on t…
Unexpected Effects of Expected Sanctions
This review of the criminal deterrence literature focuses on the questions that are largely missing from many recent, excellent, comprehensive reviews of that literature, and from the literature itself. By “missing” I mean, first, questions that criminal deterrence scholars have ignored either completely or to a large extent. These questions range from fundamental (the distributional analysis of the criminal justice system), to those hidden in pl…
The Virtuous Cycle of Property
This paper shows that formalizing private property rights has a positive effect on the propensity to respect the property of others. We study a recent large-scale land tenure reform in West Africa that was the first of its kind to be implemented as a randomized control trial. Results of a modified dictator game show that the formalization of private property rights reduced an individual's willingness to take from others' endowment. We used additi…
Fines for unequal societies
One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and da…
Differentiation through Legal Uncertainty
Economics (17 works) · Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (12 works) · Microeconomics (10 works) · Law and economics (8 works) · Business (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (5 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works)