Viktor J Vanberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 391871 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Viktor J Vanberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Viktor J |
| FAMILY NAME | Vanberg |
| SIGNATURE | VANBERG V J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Walter Eucken Institut |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2200-8260 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 68 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 335 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 50 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 15 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1972 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Macht und Gesellschaftsstruktur
Macht und Gesellschaftsstruktur
Der ökonomische Ansatz zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens
Der ökonomische Ansatz zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens
Competitive federalism, individual autonomy, and citizen sovereignty
The paper examines the theory of competitive federalism , focusing specifically on Hayek's and Buchanan's significant contributions to this theory. Looking at the rivalry between sub‐units in federal systems and drawing an analogy between market competition and intergovernmental competition , the theory of competitive federalism stresses the critical role viable exit options play as operating force in both arenas. The principal claim argued for i…
Freiheit, Staat und Sozialismus: Gesammelte Schriften Band II/3
In diesem Band der Gesammelten Schriften werden 15 Beiträge sowie Notizen aus dem Nachlass Walter Euckens ediert, kommentiert und in einer ausführlichen Einleitung systematisch und historisch eingeordnet, die Walter Eucken zwischen 1921 und 1950 verfasst hat. Das Thema, das diese Beiträge verbindet, ist die Wahrnehmung der Gegenwart als Krisenzeit und die Frage danach, worin die Ursachen der Krise zu sehen sind und auf welchem Wege ihre Lösung ge…
Liberalism and democracy: Legitimacy and institutional expediency
Adam Smith: Classical political economy and Ordoliberalism
Various authors have pointed to the puzzling discrepancy between the emphasis with which Ordoliberals have sought to dissociate their version of liberalism from Adam Smith’s, and the apparent commonalities that their own outlook in fact share with his political economy. Focusing on the Ordoliberal Freiburg School, the argument in this chapter is based on the supposition that this discrepancy should be attributed to the fact that, in a time when l…
J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: Political economy for democratic society
Choice and Economic Welfare
This important research review discusses some of the most celebrated and classical literature in the field of choice and economic welfare. It analyses material exploring how economics as a scientific enterprise may inform political decision-making. A premise that is explored paradigmatically through different interpretations including utility-individualism in the context of welfare economics, preference-individualism in social choice theory, and …
Gesammelte Schriften in deutscher Sprache: Abt A + B Gesamtpaket (alle Bände)
Jetzt abgeschlossen: Die Gesammelten Schriften in deutscher Sprache von Friedrich A. von Hayek bieten Aufsätze und Bücher, die von ihm ursprünglich auf Deutsch verfasst wurden oder in autorisierter Übersetzung vorliegen. Sofern dies besonders geboten erschien, wurden ergänzend bislang nicht in deutscher Fassung vorliegende Beiträge in Erstübersetzung aufgenommen. Friedrich A. von Hayeks Gesammelte Schriften in deutscher Sprache umfassen: 1. die u…
James M. Buchanan (1919–2013)
Volume I contains original biographical profiles of many of the most important and influential economists from the seventeenth century to the present day. These inform the reader about their lives, works and impact on the further development of the discipline. The emphasis is on their lasting contributions to our understanding of the complex system known as the economy. The entries also shed light on the means and ways in which the functioning of…
Von Hayek, Friedrich A. (1899–1992)
James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism
Marktwirtschaft und soziale Gerechtigkeit: Gestaltungsfragen der Wirtschaftsordnung in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft
In diesem Band wird das Verhältnis zwischen den Funktionsprinzipien und Wirkungseigenschaften marktwirtschaftlicher Ordnungen einerseits und dem Problem der »sozialen Gerechtigkeit« andererseits aus der Perspektive verschiedener Fachrichtungen wie der Philosophie, Sozial- und Wirtschaftsethik, Ökonomik, Soziologie, Politikwissenschaft, Rechtswissenschaft und Wirtschaftsdidaktik diskutiert. Dem liegt die Überzeugung zugrunde, dass die Klärung dies…
Marktwirtschaft und soziale Gerechtigkeit: Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik 63
The Market Economy and Social Justice. Structural Issues of the Market Order in a Democratic Society.
Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50
Methodological and normative individualism in The Calculus
Hayek Lesebuch
F.A. von Hayek zählt zu den bedeutendsten Ökonomen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts, dessen Werk weit über die Wirtschaftswissenschaften hinaus in den Sozialwissenschaften prägende Wirkung entfaltet hat. Die in diesem Band zusammengestellten Aufsätze bieten dem Leser einen repräsentativen Überblick über zentrale Themen, denen F.A. von Hayek sich in den sechs Jahrzehnten seines aktiven wissenschaftlichen Wirkens gewidmet hat. Die in die Auswahl aufgen…
Gesammelte Schriften in deutscher Sprache: Abt. B Band 7: Die verhängnisvolle Anmaßung. Die Irrtümer des Sozialismus
In diesem Band, dessen englische Originalausgabe »The Fatal Conceit - The Errors of Socialism« 1988, kurz vor dem Zusammenbruch des sowjetischen Imperiums erschien, präsentiert Friedrich August von Hayek die Hauptargumente für eine freiheitliche, marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung und legt sein Manifest über die 'Irrtümer des Sozialismus' vor. Hayek stellt dar, daß der Sozialismus seit seinen Anfängen auf irrigen faktischen und theoretischen Annahmen b…
Social Dilemmas and Self-Organization in Pre-Defined and in Self-Selected Groups
Research Article| January 01 2011 Social Dilemmas and Self-Organization in Pre-Defined and in Self-Selected Groups Viktor J. Vanberg Viktor J. Vanberg Viktor J. Vanberg is Professor Emeritus, University of Freiburg and former Director of the Walter Eucken Institut in Frieburg, Germany. He is author of The Constitution of Markets: Essays in Political Economy. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Good Society (2011) 20 (1)…
Evolution und freiheitlicher Wettbewerb: Erich Hoppmann und die aktuelle Diskussion
Die wettbewerbstheoretischen Beiträge von Erich Hoppmann, in denen das Leitbild der Wettbewerbsfreiheit und ein evolutorisches Wettbewerbsverständnis im Vordergrund standen, haben die wettbewerbspolitische Diskussion in Deutschland maßgeblich geprägt. Das Werk Hoppmanns aus heutiger Sicht kritisch würdigend und an seinen Beitrag anknüpfend setzen sich die in diesem Band zusammengestellten Aufsätze renommierter Autoren mit grundsätzlichen Fragen d…
Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy
Wettbewerb und Regelordnung
"Wettbewerb und Regelordnung" sind die beiden Kernelemente des Forschungsprogramms von Viktor J. Vanberg. Er steht hiermit in einer langen Tradition ausgehend von der Schottischen Moralphilosophie, über die Freiburger Ordnungsökonomik, hin zur Sozialtheorie von Friedrich August von Hayek und zur Verfassungsökonomik von James Buchanan. In der jetzt vorliegenden Studienausgabe widmet Vanberg all diesen Forschungstraditionen seine Aufmerksamkeit, oh…
Wettbewerb und Regelordnung: Wettbewerb und Regelordnung
Wettbewerb und Regelordnung sind die beiden Kernelemente des Forschungsprogramms von Viktor J. Vanberg. Er steht hiermit in einer langen Tradition ausgehend von der Schottischen Moralphilosophie, uber die Freiburger Ordnungsoekonomik, hin zur Sozialtheorie von Friedrich August von Hayek und zur Verfassungsoekonomik von James Buchanan. In der jetzt vorliegenden Studienausgabe widmet Vanberg all diesen Forschungstraditionen seine Aufmerksamkeit, oh…
On the complementarity of liberalism and democracy – a reading of F.A. Hayek and J.M. Buchanan
The principal claim of this paper is that liberalism and democracy are not only compatible ideals, as F.A. Hayek has suggested, but rather complementary ideals. The argument in support of this claim is based on a distinction between three different levels at which liberalism and democracy can be compared, the level of their institutional embodiment, the level of their principal ideals, and the level of their underlying normative premise. It is ar…
The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: A constitutional economics perspective
Choice and Economic Welfare
This important research review discusses some of the most celebrated and classical literature in the field of choice and economic welfare. It analyses material exploring how economics as a scientific enterprise may inform political decision-making. A premise that is explored paradigmatically through different interpretations including utility-individualism in the context of welfare economics, preference-individualism in social choice theory, and …
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice
The paper contrasts two interpretations of the role of agreement in politics, a social contract notion and a dialogue notion. It is argued that the two notions can be viewed as complementing each other if one explicitly separates two components in human choice that in rational choice theory are often inseparably blended in the concept of preferences - an interest-component and a theory component. It is suggested that the contractarian agreement n…
Rationality, Morality, and Exit
The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be det…
Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach
Rational Choice vs. Program-based Behavior: Alternative Theoretical Approaches and their Relevance for the Study of Institutions
Rational choice theory is contrasted with the paradigm of program-based behavior suggested by biologist Ernst Mayr. This alternative behavioral paradigm, it is argued, captures much of what makes rational choice explanations intuitively appealing; it avoids, however, many of the criticisms that have been persistently raised against rational choice theory, and it has the advantage of being more in accord with theoretical approaches that are well e…
Carl Menger's evolutionary and John R. Commons' collective action approach to institutions: A comparison
This essay examines the relation between Carl Menger's and John R. Commons' approaches to institutional analysis. It draws attention to certain aspects of their respective approaches which are of systematic relevance to the ongoing debate on the direction into which an adequate economic theory of institutions ought to be developed. It is argued that – contrary to a common perception – Menger's and Commons' concepts of institutions represent compa…
Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy
The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective
Organizations as constitutional systems
The politicization of market failure
Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints: The Normative Element in Classical and Contractarian Liberalism
Normative individualism appears to be an obvious normative premise underlying a liberal conception of the desirable social order. The shortcomings of some common Interpretations of this premise are discussed and a more consistent as well as a more workable standard for assessing the ‘goodness’ of alternative socio-institutional arrangements is specified. With such an Interpretation of normative individualism, a contractrarian conception as advoca…
James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism
On the Economics of Moral Preferences
The long-standing critique of the "economic model of man" has gained new impetus, not least due to the broadening research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused on the apparent difficulty of traditional rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical concerns in human conduct, and a number of authors have suggested modifications in the standard model in response to such critique. This articl…
Rules and Choice in Economics
Journal Article Rules and Choice in Economics. Get access Rules and Choice in Economics. By (VIKTOR J.) Vanberg. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Pp. vi + 310. £47.50 hardback, £15.99 paperback. ISBN 0 415 06873 8, 0 415 09479 8.) Alan Hamlin Alan Hamlin University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 432, 1 September 1995, Pages 1297–1298, https://do…
A theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction
J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: Political economy for democratic society
The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: A constitutional economics perspective
Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: The perspective of constitutional economics
Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice
Liberalism and democracy: Legitimacy and institutional expediency
Methodological and normative individualism in The Calculus
Globalization, Democracy, and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy? 1
Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons
Nachwort
»Um was geht es letztlich bei unserem Gegenstand? Geht es um Menschen oder geht es um Gesellschaften?« 1
Wissenschaftsverständnis, Sozialtheorie und politische Programmatik: Zur Analyse des Gegensatzes zwischen liberalem und totalitärem Politikverständnis
Wissenschaftsverständnis, Sozialtheorie und politische Programmatik. Zur Analyse des Gegensatzes zwischen liberalem und totalitärem Politikverständnis
Die zwei Soziologien: Individualismus und Kollektivismus in der Sozialtheorie
Die zwei Soziologien. Individualismus und Kollektivismus in der Sozialtheorie
Lars Clausen: Tausch. Entwürfe zu einer soziologischen Theorie
Macht und Gesellschaftsstruktur
Liberaler Evolutionismus oder vertragstheoretischer Konstitutionalismus?: Zum Problem institutioneller Reformen bei F.A. von Hayek und J.M. Buchanan
Liberaler Evolutionismus oder vertragstheoretischer Konstitutionalismus?. Zum Problem institutioneller Reformen bei F.A. von Hayek und J.M. Buchanan
Markt und Organisation: Individualistische Sozialtheorie und das Problem korporativen Handelns
Markt und Organisation. Individualistische Sozialtheorie und das Problem korporativen Handelns
Verbrechen, Strafe und Abschreckung: Die Theorie der Generalprävention im Lichte der neueren sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskussion
Verbrechen, Strafe und Abschreckung. Die Theorie der Generalprävention im Lichte der neueren sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskussion
Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints: The Normative Element in Classical and Contractarian Liberalism
Normative individualism appears to be an obvious normative premise underlying a liberal conception of the desirable social order. The shortcomings of some common Interpretations of this premise are discussed and a more consistent as well as a more workable standard for assessing the ‘goodness’ of alternative socio-institutional arrangements is specified. With such an Interpretation of normative individualism, a contractrarian conception as advoca…
The politicization of market failure
Essays on individualism: Modern ideology in anthropological perspective
Carl Menger's evolutionary and John R. Commons' collective action approach to institutions: A comparison
This essay examines the relation between Carl Menger's and John R. Commons' approaches to institutional analysis. It draws attention to certain aspects of their respective approaches which are of systematic relevance to the ongoing debate on the direction into which an adequate economic theory of institutions ought to be developed. It is argued that – contrary to a common perception – Menger's and Commons' concepts of institutions represent compa…
A theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice
The paper contrasts two interpretations of the role of agreement in politics, a social contract notion and a dialogue notion. It is argued that the two notions can be viewed as complementing each other if one explicitly separates two components in human choice that in rational choice theory are often inseparably blended in the concept of preferences - an interest-component and a theory component. It is suggested that the contractarian agreement n…
Organizations as constitutional systems
Rationality, Morality, and Exit
The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be det…
Der ökonomische Ansatz zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens
Kulturelle Evolution und die Gestaltung von Regeln
Kulturelle Evolution und die Gestaltung von Regeln
Rules and Choice in Economics: Essays in Constitutional Political Economy
Why do the conventions that enable society to cohere survive, even when it is not in everyone's interests to obey them? This book is about how the rules and institutions which are the basis of co-operation in society can be systematically explained. The social sciences which have concerned themselves with this question have frequently come up with opposite explanations, neither of which seem adequate. Economics, with its emphasis on individual ch…
Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach
Rules and Choice in Economics
Journal Article Rules and Choice in Economics. Get access Rules and Choice in Economics. By (VIKTOR J.) Vanberg. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Pp. vi + 310. £47.50 hardback, £15.99 paperback. ISBN 0 415 06873 8, 0 415 09479 8.) Alan Hamlin Alan Hamlin University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 432, 1 September 1995, Pages 1297–1298, https://do…
Rules and Choice in Economics
Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie: Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie. Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie: Band 19: Globalisierung und Weltwirtschaft
This volume is concerned with institutional-constitutional issues of an integrated international economic order in the era of globalization. It includes papers on two main subjects. These are, first, contributions discussing specific aspects of the world economy, such as international competition, financial markets and commerce. And there are, second, contributions concerned with the question of the legal feasibility of an international economic …
Political science (38 works) · Economics (30 works) · Philosophy (27 works) · Law (25 works) · Politics (20 works) · Positive economics (20 works) · Sociology (20 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (18 works) · Law (18 works) · Economic Order, Economic Policy (17 works)