Philipp Münch
Biographic Data
| ID | 3922393 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philipp Münch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philipp |
| FAMILY NAME | Münch |
| SIGNATURE | MUNCH P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6527-0050 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Ambitious solidarity. German politico-military decision-making in the wake of “9/11”
Poya, Abbas
Indefinite by design
Creating common sense
This article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and how it formulated its strategy. In doing this, I follow the general premises of practice theory. However, instead of the common focus on diplomats and their everyday doings, this article suggests an approach that pays more attention to the structure of the field of positions. I demonstrate that the actio…
Never Again? Germany's Lessons from the War in Afghanistan
Defense officials and politicians claimed to learn lessons from Germany's involvement in Afghanistan.Practitioners asserted a successful mission would have required more time and resources.Politicians developed a preference for training missions instead of combat missions.While both concluded interventions intended to transform foreign societies still made sense in principle, the most logical lesson is quite the opposite: Germany must avoid such …
Forces of heresy versus forces of conservation
Ethnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate …
Intermediaries of Intervention
Why do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent yea…
Afrika
Vier Jahre nach Beendigung des Krieges im angolanischen Kernland scheint sich auch im Sezessionskonflikt in der Exklave Cabinda eine friedliche Lösung anzubahnen, nachdem die angolanische Regierung Anfang August einen Friedensvertrag mit Vertretern der Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC, Front für die Befreiung der Enklave Cabinda) unterzeichnet hat. Der Vertrag ist allerdings umstritten und wird von Teilen sowohl der FLEC als auch …
Afrika
Auch drei Jahre nach Beendigung des Krieges im angolanischen Kernland wurde der bewaffnete Konflikt in der Exklave Cabinda mit geringer Intensität fortgesetzt. In dem zum angolanischen Staatsgebiet gehörenden Territorium kam es seit den 1970er Jahren immer wieder zu bewaffneten Zusammenstößen zwischen verschiedenen Splittergruppen der Freute de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC, Front für die Befreiung der Enklave Cabinda) und Regierungsstre…
Intermediaries of Intervention
Why do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent yea…
Creating common sense
This article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and how it formulated its strategy. In doing this, I follow the general premises of practice theory. However, instead of the common focus on diplomats and their everyday doings, this article suggests an approach that pays more attention to the structure of the field of positions. I demonstrate that the actio…
Afrika
Auch drei Jahre nach Beendigung des Krieges im angolanischen Kernland wurde der bewaffnete Konflikt in der Exklave Cabinda mit geringer Intensität fortgesetzt. In dem zum angolanischen Staatsgebiet gehörenden Territorium kam es seit den 1970er Jahren immer wieder zu bewaffneten Zusammenstößen zwischen verschiedenen Splittergruppen der Freute de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC, Front für die Befreiung der Enklave Cabinda) und Regierungsstre…
Afrika
Vier Jahre nach Beendigung des Krieges im angolanischen Kernland scheint sich auch im Sezessionskonflikt in der Exklave Cabinda eine friedliche Lösung anzubahnen, nachdem die angolanische Regierung Anfang August einen Friedensvertrag mit Vertretern der Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC, Front für die Befreiung der Enklave Cabinda) unterzeichnet hat. Der Vertrag ist allerdings umstritten und wird von Teilen sowohl der FLEC als auch …
Intermediaries of Intervention
Why do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent yea…
Forces of heresy versus forces of conservation
Ethnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate …
Never Again? Germany's Lessons from the War in Afghanistan
Defense officials and politicians claimed to learn lessons from Germany's involvement in Afghanistan.Practitioners asserted a successful mission would have required more time and resources.Politicians developed a preference for training missions instead of combat missions.While both concluded interventions intended to transform foreign societies still made sense in principle, the most logical lesson is quite the opposite: Germany must avoid such …
Creating common sense
This article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and how it formulated its strategy. In doing this, I follow the general premises of practice theory. However, instead of the common focus on diplomats and their everyday doings, this article suggests an approach that pays more attention to the structure of the field of positions. I demonstrate that the actio…
Poya, Abbas
Indefinite by design
Ambitious solidarity. German politico-military decision-making in the wake of “9/11”
Political science (6 works) · Politics (4 works) · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East (4 works) · International relations (3 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Medicine (3 works) · Peacebuilding and International Security (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Power (physics (3 works)