Athol Yates
Biographic Data
| ID | 3922513 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Athol Yates |
| GIVEN NAMES | Athol |
| FAMILY NAME | Yates |
| SIGNATURE | YATES A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Khalifa University of Science and Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2405-624X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Abu Dhabi’s drive for defence industrialization
Mitigating the Risks of Imported Soldiery
Various polities have imported soldiers to compensate for a lack of manpower, to reduce costs, or to avoid the risk of arming potentially disloyal citizenry. However, importing soldiery is not without dangers. Foreign soldiers may carry with them subversive ideas, continue homegrown conflicts in their employer’s territory, be unreliable, or, worse, revolt. How importers of foreign soldiers might mitigate these risks is little studied. This case s…
Britain’s key counter-subversion instrument before the 1971 withdrawal from the Gulf
Countering nationalistic, pan-Arabic and anti-British subversion became a core British security policy in the Middle East in the 1950s but Britain only became concerned with subversion in its protected states of the lower Arabian Gulf (now known as the United Arab Emirates) in the early 1960s. A core element of its local counter-subversion strategy in this region was the covert Arabic radio station Voice of the Coast [Sawt Al Saahil] in Sharjah. …
British Military Assistance to Help Establish Abu Dhabi’s Air Force, 1967–1971
Britain has long provided military assistance to help develop and support the local armed forces of its dominions, colonies and other parts of its Empire. This was not done out of benevolence but as part of Britain’s efforts to encourage its partners to be responsible for their own security. This article describes an unusual case of such assistance, which was provided to help establish Abu Dhabi’s air force in the 1967–1971 period. The Abu Dhabi …
Britain and the Protection of the Gulf During the Second World War
The Gulf, a little-studied theatre of the Second World War, grew in importance to the area's leading power, Britain, as well as the Allies, as war progressed. All three Axis powers at one time or another tested Britain's ability to discharge its defence obligations, which included the protection of tiny Arab shaikhdoms and guarding nearby waters. With Britain's strategic imperatives lying elsewhere, British officials on the spot received scant re…
Operation Intradon in the Musandam,1970-1971
This article examines Operation Intradon, a covert British counter-insurgency operation in the northern Omani enclave of Musandam. The operation, which ran from December 1970 to March 1971, was driven by the political aim of forcing the Sultan of Oman to take administrative control of this ungoverned enclave. This would then provide protection to the Strait of Hormuz oil route and remove a threat to the process of federating British protected sta…
Military Assistance as Political Gimmickry? The Case of Britain and the Newly Federated United Arab Emirates after 1971
What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates…
British naval assistance at the twilight of empire
Britain long sought to establish, develop and utilise local military capabilities across its empire. In its informal empire among the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, Britain increasingly encouraged – and often cajoled – its protégés to build up their own security forces as London's moment in the Middle East was coming to an end. The scholarly literature on imperial assistance to local forces is invariably army-centric; little attention is…
Intelligence collection in Arabia
Imperial powers, facing considerable information challenges in far-flung territories, adapted intelligence practices and machinery to fit local conditions. In contrast to the attention placed on British intelligence activities in territories considered within the ‘formal empire’ (i.e. where Britain was in direct control), we know very little about intelligence arrangements in ‘informal empire,’ where external powers exerted influence and protecte…
Challenging the accepted understanding of the executive branch of the UAE’s Federal Government
The accepted understanding of what constitutes executive government in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is that power rests with the Cabinet. This is, however, only partially correct. In reality, executive power over national security is excised from the Cabinet, and instead rests with a group of legislatively-defined agencies and posts. In other words, institutionally the UAE’s executive branch is bifurcated, with one part handling ‘high’ policy, …
Forging a force
It has long been observed that the development of professional security institutions is a key stage in modern state formation. Leaders of many proto-states embarking on programs of rapid development – such as many of the rulers of the Arab Gulf States in the 1960s – have brought in foreign professional expertise to assist in building up fledgling state institutions, including militaries, police forces and intelligence services. We know little, ho…
Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015
There has been a Western expatriate presence in ruler-controlled military forces of the Trucial States and, later, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) since the 1960s. Their numbers and roles have varied enormously during this time, and can be grouped into three distinct periods. The first, from 1964 to 1980, begins with the engagement of the first expatriate in the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was controlled by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Expatriate nu…
The Future of Professional Engineers in the Public Service
The last two decades have not been kind to professional engineers in the public service. Numbers have been slashed, their status has declined and engineering advice does not carry the weight it once did. While it has been said that non-engineers do not appreciate the benefits of engineering advice, part of the reason for this is that engineers themselves and the engineering profession have taken a low-key approach to promoting the benefits of eng…
Military Assistance as Political Gimmickry? The Case of Britain and the Newly Federated United Arab Emirates after 1971
What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates…
Challenging the accepted understanding of the executive branch of the UAE’s Federal Government
The accepted understanding of what constitutes executive government in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is that power rests with the Cabinet. This is, however, only partially correct. In reality, executive power over national security is excised from the Cabinet, and instead rests with a group of legislatively-defined agencies and posts. In other words, institutionally the UAE’s executive branch is bifurcated, with one part handling ‘high’ policy, …
Abu Dhabi’s drive for defence industrialization
Operation Intradon in the Musandam,1970-1971
This article examines Operation Intradon, a covert British counter-insurgency operation in the northern Omani enclave of Musandam. The operation, which ran from December 1970 to March 1971, was driven by the political aim of forcing the Sultan of Oman to take administrative control of this ungoverned enclave. This would then provide protection to the Strait of Hormuz oil route and remove a threat to the process of federating British protected sta…
Forging a force
It has long been observed that the development of professional security institutions is a key stage in modern state formation. Leaders of many proto-states embarking on programs of rapid development – such as many of the rulers of the Arab Gulf States in the 1960s – have brought in foreign professional expertise to assist in building up fledgling state institutions, including militaries, police forces and intelligence services. We know little, ho…
The Future of Professional Engineers in the Public Service
The last two decades have not been kind to professional engineers in the public service. Numbers have been slashed, their status has declined and engineering advice does not carry the weight it once did. While it has been said that non-engineers do not appreciate the benefits of engineering advice, part of the reason for this is that engineers themselves and the engineering profession have taken a low-key approach to promoting the benefits of eng…
Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015
There has been a Western expatriate presence in ruler-controlled military forces of the Trucial States and, later, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) since the 1960s. Their numbers and roles have varied enormously during this time, and can be grouped into three distinct periods. The first, from 1964 to 1980, begins with the engagement of the first expatriate in the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was controlled by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Expatriate nu…
Intelligence collection in Arabia
Imperial powers, facing considerable information challenges in far-flung territories, adapted intelligence practices and machinery to fit local conditions. In contrast to the attention placed on British intelligence activities in territories considered within the ‘formal empire’ (i.e. where Britain was in direct control), we know very little about intelligence arrangements in ‘informal empire,’ where external powers exerted influence and protecte…
Challenging the accepted understanding of the executive branch of the UAE’s Federal Government
The accepted understanding of what constitutes executive government in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is that power rests with the Cabinet. This is, however, only partially correct. In reality, executive power over national security is excised from the Cabinet, and instead rests with a group of legislatively-defined agencies and posts. In other words, institutionally the UAE’s executive branch is bifurcated, with one part handling ‘high’ policy, …
Forging a force
It has long been observed that the development of professional security institutions is a key stage in modern state formation. Leaders of many proto-states embarking on programs of rapid development – such as many of the rulers of the Arab Gulf States in the 1960s – have brought in foreign professional expertise to assist in building up fledgling state institutions, including militaries, police forces and intelligence services. We know little, ho…
Military Assistance as Political Gimmickry? The Case of Britain and the Newly Federated United Arab Emirates after 1971
What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates…
British naval assistance at the twilight of empire
Britain long sought to establish, develop and utilise local military capabilities across its empire. In its informal empire among the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, Britain increasingly encouraged – and often cajoled – its protégés to build up their own security forces as London's moment in the Middle East was coming to an end. The scholarly literature on imperial assistance to local forces is invariably army-centric; little attention is…
British Military Assistance to Help Establish Abu Dhabi’s Air Force, 1967–1971
Britain has long provided military assistance to help develop and support the local armed forces of its dominions, colonies and other parts of its Empire. This was not done out of benevolence but as part of Britain’s efforts to encourage its partners to be responsible for their own security. This article describes an unusual case of such assistance, which was provided to help establish Abu Dhabi’s air force in the 1967–1971 period. The Abu Dhabi …
Britain and the Protection of the Gulf During the Second World War
The Gulf, a little-studied theatre of the Second World War, grew in importance to the area's leading power, Britain, as well as the Allies, as war progressed. All three Axis powers at one time or another tested Britain's ability to discharge its defence obligations, which included the protection of tiny Arab shaikhdoms and guarding nearby waters. With Britain's strategic imperatives lying elsewhere, British officials on the spot received scant re…
Operation Intradon in the Musandam,1970-1971
This article examines Operation Intradon, a covert British counter-insurgency operation in the northern Omani enclave of Musandam. The operation, which ran from December 1970 to March 1971, was driven by the political aim of forcing the Sultan of Oman to take administrative control of this ungoverned enclave. This would then provide protection to the Strait of Hormuz oil route and remove a threat to the process of federating British protected sta…
Britain’s key counter-subversion instrument before the 1971 withdrawal from the Gulf
Countering nationalistic, pan-Arabic and anti-British subversion became a core British security policy in the Middle East in the 1950s but Britain only became concerned with subversion in its protected states of the lower Arabian Gulf (now known as the United Arab Emirates) in the early 1960s. A core element of its local counter-subversion strategy in this region was the covert Arabic radio station Voice of the Coast [Sawt Al Saahil] in Sharjah. …
Abu Dhabi’s drive for defence industrialization
Mitigating the Risks of Imported Soldiery
Various polities have imported soldiers to compensate for a lack of manpower, to reduce costs, or to avoid the risk of arming potentially disloyal citizenry. However, importing soldiery is not without dangers. Foreign soldiers may carry with them subversive ideas, continue homegrown conflicts in their employer’s territory, be unreliable, or, worse, revolt. How importers of foreign soldiers might mitigate these risks is little studied. This case s…
Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts (10 works) · Law (8 works) · History (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Abu dhabi (5 works) · Archaeology (5 works) · Global Maritime and Colonial Histories (5 works) · Economics (4 works)