Francey Russell
Biographic Data
| ID | 3935514 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Francey Russell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Francey |
| FAMILY NAME | Russell |
| SIGNATURE | RUSSELL F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Barnard College, Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6642-4370 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Obscure representations from a pragmatic point of view
Kant's most sustained discussion of obscure representations can be found in the first book of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . What is puzzling is that in the middle of the section devoted to the topic, Kant asserts that “because this field can only be perceived in his passive side as a play of sensations, the theory of obscure representations belongs only to physiological anthropology, and so it is properly disregarded here.” So…
“A Wedge-Shaped Core of Darkness”
This paper explores the idea that forms of self-opacity— vicissitudes of self-consciousness and disruptions of straightforward self-knowledge, registrations of dissonance and self-strangeness— need not be understood exclusively or necessarily as pathologies nor as brute psychological facts, but can be valued as part of a rich moral psychology and conception of selfhood. I consider a prominent contemporary account of self-knowledge that situates s…
Moral psychology as soul-picture
Iris Murdoch offers a distinctive conception of moral psychology. She suggests that to develop a moral psychology is to develop what she calls a soul-picture; different philosophical moral psychologies are, as she puts it, 'rival soul-pictures'. In this paper, I clarify Murdoch's generic notion of 'soul-picture', the genus of which, for example, Aristotle's, Kant's, Nietzsche's, and Murdoch's constitute rival species. Are all philosophical moral …
Feeling Like It
I may feel like doing something and decide not to do it; I may do something without feeling like it. How does what I want bear on what I decide to do? Tamar Schapiro pursues this question in her extremely engaging and creative new book Feeling Like It. Schapiro’s primary explanandum is not inclination per se but the agent’s relation to her own inclination in what Schapiro calls “the moment of drama,” when an agent is inclined to or feels like φ-i…
How Shall We Put Ourselves in Touch with Reality
Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority
There is a debate in the literature as to whether Kantian self-conceit is intrapsychic or interpersonal. I argue that self-conceit is both. I argue that, for Kant, self-conceit is fundamentally an illusion about authority, one’s own and any authority one stands in relation to. Self-conceit refuses to recognize the authority of the law. But the law “shows up” for us in two guises: one’s own reason and other persons. Thus, self-conceit refuses to r…
Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal
Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal: Reading Freud’s Concept through Kant’s Philosophy Francey Russell (bio) Although men are not normally aware of it, they must believe that they are something more than they are, in order to be capable of being what they are; they need to feel this something more above and around them . . . —Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities I Throughout the transformations of his theories of mind, Freud consistently rega…
Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority
There is a debate in the literature as to whether Kantian self-conceit is intrapsychic or interpersonal. I argue that self-conceit is both. I argue that, for Kant, self-conceit is fundamentally an illusion about authority, one’s own and any authority one stands in relation to. Self-conceit refuses to recognize the authority of the law. But the law “shows up” for us in two guises: one’s own reason and other persons. Thus, self-conceit refuses to r…
Moral psychology as soul-picture
Iris Murdoch offers a distinctive conception of moral psychology. She suggests that to develop a moral psychology is to develop what she calls a soul-picture; different philosophical moral psychologies are, as she puts it, 'rival soul-pictures'. In this paper, I clarify Murdoch's generic notion of 'soul-picture', the genus of which, for example, Aristotle's, Kant's, Nietzsche's, and Murdoch's constitute rival species. Are all philosophical moral …
How Shall We Put Ourselves in Touch with Reality
Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal
Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal: Reading Freud’s Concept through Kant’s Philosophy Francey Russell (bio) Although men are not normally aware of it, they must believe that they are something more than they are, in order to be capable of being what they are; they need to feel this something more above and around them . . . —Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities I Throughout the transformations of his theories of mind, Freud consistently rega…
Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority
There is a debate in the literature as to whether Kantian self-conceit is intrapsychic or interpersonal. I argue that self-conceit is both. I argue that, for Kant, self-conceit is fundamentally an illusion about authority, one’s own and any authority one stands in relation to. Self-conceit refuses to recognize the authority of the law. But the law “shows up” for us in two guises: one’s own reason and other persons. Thus, self-conceit refuses to r…
How Shall We Put Ourselves in Touch with Reality
Feeling Like It
I may feel like doing something and decide not to do it; I may do something without feeling like it. How does what I want bear on what I decide to do? Tamar Schapiro pursues this question in her extremely engaging and creative new book Feeling Like It. Schapiro’s primary explanandum is not inclination per se but the agent’s relation to her own inclination in what Schapiro calls “the moment of drama,” when an agent is inclined to or feels like φ-i…
Obscure representations from a pragmatic point of view
Kant's most sustained discussion of obscure representations can be found in the first book of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . What is puzzling is that in the middle of the section devoted to the topic, Kant asserts that “because this field can only be perceived in his passive side as a play of sensations, the theory of obscure representations belongs only to physiological anthropology, and so it is properly disregarded here.” So…
“A Wedge-Shaped Core of Darkness”
This paper explores the idea that forms of self-opacity— vicissitudes of self-consciousness and disruptions of straightforward self-knowledge, registrations of dissonance and self-strangeness— need not be understood exclusively or necessarily as pathologies nor as brute psychological facts, but can be valued as part of a rich moral psychology and conception of selfhood. I consider a prominent contemporary account of self-knowledge that situates s…
Moral psychology as soul-picture
Iris Murdoch offers a distinctive conception of moral psychology. She suggests that to develop a moral psychology is to develop what she calls a soul-picture; different philosophical moral psychologies are, as she puts it, 'rival soul-pictures'. In this paper, I clarify Murdoch's generic notion of 'soul-picture', the genus of which, for example, Aristotle's, Kant's, Nietzsche's, and Murdoch's constitute rival species. Are all philosophical moral …
Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Psychoanalysis (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 works) · Aesthetics (1 works)