Changsheng Lai
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943254 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Changsheng Lai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Changsheng |
| FAMILY NAME | Lai |
| SIGNATURE | LAI C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Shanghai Jiao Tong University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4856-1766 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Neuromorphic Computing and Extended Memory
Believe It or Not, Disbelief Remains Mysterious
As a basic doxastic attitude ranking with belief and withholding, disbelief remains a comparatively underexplored concept. According to the standard account of disbelief, to disbelieve that p is to believe that not‐ p . A recently proposed rejection account of disbelief argues that disbelief is a sui generis doxastic attitude, viz., an attitude of rejection. This paper argues against both the standard account and the rejection account. I first il…
Is ‘Remembering’ a Normative Concept
There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remembering’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the conc…
Remembering requires no reliability
Memory belief is weak
Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due t…
Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism
Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘thresho…
Remembering is not a kind of knowing
Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck
Does 'remembering that p' entail 'knowing that p'? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on pro…
Against epistemic absolutism
Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck
Does 'remembering that p' entail 'knowing that p'? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on pro…
Against epistemic absolutism
Against epistemic absolutism
Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism
Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘thresho…
Remembering is not a kind of knowing
Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck
Does 'remembering that p' entail 'knowing that p'? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on pro…
Memory belief is weak
Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due t…
Is ‘Remembering’ a Normative Concept
There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remembering’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the conc…
Remembering requires no reliability
Believe It or Not, Disbelief Remains Mysterious
As a basic doxastic attitude ranking with belief and withholding, disbelief remains a comparatively underexplored concept. According to the standard account of disbelief, to disbelieve that p is to believe that not‐ p . A recently proposed rejection account of disbelief argues that disbelief is a sui generis doxastic attitude, viz., an attitude of rejection. This paper argues against both the standard account and the rejection account. I first il…
Neuromorphic Computing and Extended Memory
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Memory Processes and Influences (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works)