Patricia Rich
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943455 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patricia Rich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patricia |
| FAMILY NAME | Rich |
| SIGNATURE | RICH P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bayreuth |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2284-6798 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The evolution of ambiguous beliefs
Ambiguity, in the decision-theoretic sense, means that agents are unable to identify unique probabilities for some events that they care about. Ambiguity characterizes many real-life situations, but many important questions surrounding it are still open. Descriptively, we know that people typically perceive and are sensitive to ambiguity in certain kinds of situations. Intuitively, this is well justified. Normatively, however, many think that amb…
Hidden Costs of Epistemic Conformity
Knowledge and decision
Objective and subjective rationality and decisions with the best and worst case in mind
Naturalism, tractability and the adaptive toolbox
Many compelling examples have recently been provided in which people can achieve impressive epistemic success, e.g. draw highly accurate inferences, by using simple heuristics and very little information. This is possible by taking advantage of the features of the environment. The examples suggest an easy and appealing naturalization of rationality: on the one hand, people clearly can apply simple heuristics, and on the other hand, they intuitive…
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
Knowledge-first epistemology includes a knowledge norm of action: roughly, act only on what you know. This norm has been criticized, especially from the perspective of so-called standard decision theory. Mueller and Ross provide example decision problems which seem to show that acting properly cannot require knowledge. I argue that this conclusion depends on applying a particular decision theory (namely, Savage-style Expected Utility Theory) whic…
Comparing the axiomatic and ecological approaches to rationality
Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
Comparing the axiomatic and ecological approaches to rationality
Naturalism, tractability and the adaptive toolbox
Many compelling examples have recently been provided in which people can achieve impressive epistemic success, e.g. draw highly accurate inferences, by using simple heuristics and very little information. This is possible by taking advantage of the features of the environment. The examples suggest an easy and appealing naturalization of rationality: on the one hand, people clearly can apply simple heuristics, and on the other hand, they intuitive…
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
Knowledge-first epistemology includes a knowledge norm of action: roughly, act only on what you know. This norm has been criticized, especially from the perspective of so-called standard decision theory. Mueller and Ross provide example decision problems which seem to show that acting properly cannot require knowledge. I argue that this conclusion depends on applying a particular decision theory (namely, Savage-style Expected Utility Theory) whic…
Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
Comparing the axiomatic and ecological approaches to rationality
Objective and subjective rationality and decisions with the best and worst case in mind
Naturalism, tractability and the adaptive toolbox
Many compelling examples have recently been provided in which people can achieve impressive epistemic success, e.g. draw highly accurate inferences, by using simple heuristics and very little information. This is possible by taking advantage of the features of the environment. The examples suggest an easy and appealing naturalization of rationality: on the one hand, people clearly can apply simple heuristics, and on the other hand, they intuitive…
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
Knowledge-first epistemology includes a knowledge norm of action: roughly, act only on what you know. This norm has been criticized, especially from the perspective of so-called standard decision theory. Mueller and Ross provide example decision problems which seem to show that acting properly cannot require knowledge. I argue that this conclusion depends on applying a particular decision theory (namely, Savage-style Expected Utility Theory) whic…
Knowledge and decision
Hidden Costs of Epistemic Conformity
The evolution of ambiguous beliefs
Ambiguity, in the decision-theoretic sense, means that agents are unable to identify unique probabilities for some events that they care about. Ambiguity characterizes many real-life situations, but many important questions surrounding it are still open. Descriptively, we know that people typically perceive and are sensitive to ambiguity in certain kinds of situations. Intuitively, this is well justified. Normatively, however, many think that amb…
Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Rationality (4 works) · Decision theory (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works)