Naftali Weinberger
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3943509 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Naftali Weinberger |
| NOMBRES | Naftali |
| APELLIDO | Weinberger |
| FIRMA | WEINBERGER N |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation
This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant philosophical approaches to the metaphysics of causation. It is motivated by the gap that currently exists between metaphysical accounts and recent epistemological research on causal reasoning and methods for discovering causal relationships. Our approach aims at characterizing structural features of the actual world that support, and are exploited by, successful strategies for causal reas…
Intervening and Letting Go
Causal representations are distinguished from non-causal ones by their ability to predict the results of interventions. This widely-accepted view suggests the following adequacy condition for causal models: a causal model is adequate only if it does not contain variables regarding which it makes systematically false predictions about the results of interventions. Here I argue that this condition should be rejected. For a class of equilibrium syst…
Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science
Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation
Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ …
Path-Specific Effects
A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1976]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on (Pearl [2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were it to be transmitted only via P. Fa…
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
If intelligence is a cause, it is a within-subjects cause
Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden argue that latent variables such as intelligence should be given a between-subjects causal interpretation, but not a within-subjects causal interpretation. That is, while intelligence is a cause of one subject’s doing better than another on an IQ test, there is no non-comparative sense in which intelligence – as standardly measured – is a cause of an individual’s performance. Here I expand upon Pearl’s discu…
Systems without a graphical causal representation
Is There an Empirical Disagreement between Genic and Genotypic Selection Models? A Response to Brandon and Nijhout
In a recent paper, Brandon and Nijhout argue against genic selectionism—the thesis, roughly, that evolutionary processes are best understood from the gene's-eye point of view—by presenting a case in which genic models of selection allegedly make predictions that conflict with the (correct) predictions of higher-level genotypic selection models. Their argument, if successful, would refute the widely held belief that genic models and higher-level m…
Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation
Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ …
The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation
This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant philosophical approaches to the metaphysics of causation. It is motivated by the gap that currently exists between metaphysical accounts and recent epistemological research on causal reasoning and methods for discovering causal relationships. Our approach aims at characterizing structural features of the actual world that support, and are exploited by, successful strategies for causal reas…
Path-Specific Effects
A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1976]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on (Pearl [2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were it to be transmitted only via P. Fa…
Systems without a graphical causal representation
Is There an Empirical Disagreement between Genic and Genotypic Selection Models? A Response to Brandon and Nijhout
In a recent paper, Brandon and Nijhout argue against genic selectionism—the thesis, roughly, that evolutionary processes are best understood from the gene's-eye point of view—by presenting a case in which genic models of selection allegedly make predictions that conflict with the (correct) predictions of higher-level genotypic selection models. Their argument, if successful, would refute the widely held belief that genic models and higher-level m…
Systems without a graphical causal representation
If intelligence is a cause, it is a within-subjects cause
Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden argue that latent variables such as intelligence should be given a between-subjects causal interpretation, but not a within-subjects causal interpretation. That is, while intelligence is a cause of one subject’s doing better than another on an IQ test, there is no non-comparative sense in which intelligence – as standardly measured – is a cause of an individual’s performance. Here I expand upon Pearl’s discu…
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation
Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ …
Path-Specific Effects
A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1976]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on (Pearl [2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were it to be transmitted only via P. Fa…
Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science
Intervening and Letting Go
Causal representations are distinguished from non-causal ones by their ability to predict the results of interventions. This widely-accepted view suggests the following adequacy condition for causal models: a causal model is adequate only if it does not contain variables regarding which it makes systematically false predictions about the results of interventions. Here I argue that this condition should be rejected. For a class of equilibrium syst…
The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation
This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant philosophical approaches to the metaphysics of causation. It is motivated by the gap that currently exists between metaphysical accounts and recent epistemological research on causal reasoning and methods for discovering causal relationships. Our approach aims at characterizing structural features of the actual world that support, and are exploited by, successful strategies for causal reas…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (5 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Causal inference (4 obras) · Causality (physics) (4 obras) · Econometrics (4 obras) · Causal model (3 obras)