Aaron Wells
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943602 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aaron Wells |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aaron |
| FAMILY NAME | Wells |
| SIGNATURE | WELLS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0132-8238 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory
There is a relatively overlooked problem with Kant’s claim that in inquiry we must treat nature as if it were actually infinite in extent: he also states that the concept of an actually infinite world is self-contradictory. This threatens to make the command to treat the world as infinite incoherent; the problem also affects his error theory for traditional metaphysics and his account of the sublime. After laying out this worry in greater detail …
Arguments for the Continuity of Matter in Kant and Du Châtelet
In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , Kant attempts to argue a priori from the indefinite divisibility of space to the indefinite metaphysical divisibility of matter. This is one type of argument from the continuity of space – purportedly established by Euclidean geometry – to the continuity of matter. I compare Kant’s argument to parallel reasoning in Du Châtelet, whose work he knew. Both philosophers appeal to idealism about matt…
Laws first: Kant as a nomic essentialist
Du Châtelet, induction, and Newton's rules for reasoning
I examine Du Châtelet's methodology for physics and metaphysics through the lens of her engagement with Newton's Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy. I first show that her early manuscript writings discuss and endorse these Rules. Then, I argue that her famous published account of hypotheses continues to invoke close analogues of Rules 3 and 4, despite various developments in her position. Once relevant experimental evidence and some basic …
Lambert on moral certainty and the justification of induction
I reconstruct J. H. Lambert's views on how practical grounds relate to epistemic features, such as certainty. I argue, first, that Lambert's account of moral certainty does not involve any distinctively practical influence on theoretical belief. However, it does present an interesting form of fallibilism about justification as well as a denial of a tight link between knowledge and action. Second, I argue that for Lambert, the persistence principl…
The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic
One response to long-standing worries about the justification of metaphysical assertions is to finesse just what kind of assertion they are. Perhaps the claims of metaphysics, useful or even indispensable as they may be, are not factual, or fail to track what's fundamental. The most familiar versions of these moves may be relatively recent. But there is now widespread recognition that Kant was up to something similar. His system retains weaker ve…
Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation
For Émilie Du Châtelet, I argue, a central role of the principle of sufficient reason is to discriminate between better and worse explanations. Her principle of sufficient reason does not play this role for just any conceivable intellect: it specifically enables understanding for minds like ours. She develops this idea in terms of two criteria for the success of our explanations: “understanding how” and “understanding why.” These criteria can res…
Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics
There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out def…
Kant, Linnaeus, and the economy of nature
The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic
One response to long-standing worries about the justification of metaphysical assertions is to finesse just what kind of assertion they are. Perhaps the claims of metaphysics, useful or even indispensable as they may be, are not factual, or fail to track what's fundamental. The most familiar versions of these moves may be relatively recent. But there is now widespread recognition that Kant was up to something similar. His system retains weaker ve…
Kant, Linnaeus, and the economy of nature
Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation
For Émilie Du Châtelet, I argue, a central role of the principle of sufficient reason is to discriminate between better and worse explanations. Her principle of sufficient reason does not play this role for just any conceivable intellect: it specifically enables understanding for minds like ours. She develops this idea in terms of two criteria for the success of our explanations: “understanding how” and “understanding why.” These criteria can res…
Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics
There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out def…
The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic
One response to long-standing worries about the justification of metaphysical assertions is to finesse just what kind of assertion they are. Perhaps the claims of metaphysics, useful or even indispensable as they may be, are not factual, or fail to track what's fundamental. The most familiar versions of these moves may be relatively recent. But there is now widespread recognition that Kant was up to something similar. His system retains weaker ve…
Du Châtelet, induction, and Newton's rules for reasoning
I examine Du Châtelet's methodology for physics and metaphysics through the lens of her engagement with Newton's Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy. I first show that her early manuscript writings discuss and endorse these Rules. Then, I argue that her famous published account of hypotheses continues to invoke close analogues of Rules 3 and 4, despite various developments in her position. Once relevant experimental evidence and some basic …
Lambert on moral certainty and the justification of induction
I reconstruct J. H. Lambert's views on how practical grounds relate to epistemic features, such as certainty. I argue, first, that Lambert's account of moral certainty does not involve any distinctively practical influence on theoretical belief. However, it does present an interesting form of fallibilism about justification as well as a denial of a tight link between knowledge and action. Second, I argue that for Lambert, the persistence principl…
Arguments for the Continuity of Matter in Kant and Du Châtelet
In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , Kant attempts to argue a priori from the indefinite divisibility of space to the indefinite metaphysical divisibility of matter. This is one type of argument from the continuity of space – purportedly established by Euclidean geometry – to the continuity of matter. I compare Kant’s argument to parallel reasoning in Du Châtelet, whose work he knew. Both philosophers appeal to idealism about matt…
Laws first: Kant as a nomic essentialist
Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory
There is a relatively overlooked problem with Kant’s claim that in inquiry we must treat nature as if it were actually infinite in extent: he also states that the concept of an actually infinite world is self-contradictory. This threatens to make the command to treat the world as infinite incoherent; the problem also affects his error theory for traditional metaphysics and his account of the sublime. After laying out this worry in greater detail …
Metaphysics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · History and Theory of Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)