Erasmus Mayr
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943625 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erasmus Mayr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erasmus |
| FAMILY NAME | Mayr |
| SIGNATURE | MAYR E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2802-5173 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Anscombe and Intentional Agency Incompatibilism (for human and animal agents)
In “Causality and Determination”, Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human ‘ethical’ freedom, but (also) due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intenti…
Alternative possibilities and asymmetry
Powers and Downward Causation
This chapter examines to what extent the force of Kim's challenge is affected by the increasing shift from a 'Humean' metaphysical framework towards a neo-Aristotelian 'power ontology', which has been taking place in metaphysics during the last twenty years. One of the main problems for non-reductive physicalism, according to which mental properties are distinct from and not reducible to the physical properties which underlie them, is taken to be…
International Criminal Law, Causation, and Responsibility
In this article, I explore the question whether criminal responsibility, within the international criminal law, should be considered as a causal notion. I start off with the connection between causation and criminal responsibility in general and introduce three more specific claims about this connection (Sections 1 and 2). Afterwards, I go on to examine a much-discussed case in international criminal law, the case of command responsibility from f…
Understanding human agency
Anscombe and Intentional Agency Incompatibilism (for human and animal agents)
In “Causality and Determination”, Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human ‘ethical’ freedom, but (also) due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intenti…
Alternative possibilities and asymmetry
Understanding human agency
International Criminal Law, Causation, and Responsibility
In this article, I explore the question whether criminal responsibility, within the international criminal law, should be considered as a causal notion. I start off with the connection between causation and criminal responsibility in general and introduce three more specific claims about this connection (Sections 1 and 2). Afterwards, I go on to examine a much-discussed case in international criminal law, the case of command responsibility from f…
Powers and Downward Causation
This chapter examines to what extent the force of Kim's challenge is affected by the increasing shift from a 'Humean' metaphysical framework towards a neo-Aristotelian 'power ontology', which has been taking place in metaphysics during the last twenty years. One of the main problems for non-reductive physicalism, according to which mental properties are distinct from and not reducible to the physical properties which underlie them, is taken to be…
Alternative possibilities and asymmetry
Anscombe and Intentional Agency Incompatibilism (for human and animal agents)
In “Causality and Determination”, Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human ‘ethical’ freedom, but (also) due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intenti…
Causation (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Compatibilism (2 works)