Lucy Mcdonald
Biographic Data
| ID | 3943828 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lucy Mcdonald |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lucy |
| FAMILY NAME | Mcdonald |
| SIGNATURE | MCDONALD L |
| AFFILIATIONS | St John's College, University of Cambridge , UK |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5064-0810 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Romantic Domination
Romantic relationships between professors and students, between employers and employees, and between other partners at different points on an institutional hierarchy are widely regarded as morally troubling. Popular explanations as to why have appealed variously to violations of institutional duties, to the impossibility of sexual consent within such relationships, and to the vices of the more powerful partner. I advance an alternative explanatio…
Communicative Gaslighting
In this paper I identify a distinctive kind of gaslighting: communicative gaslighting. Communicative gaslighters intentionally misrepresent the communicative properties of an utterance—their own or their target’s—in a way which functions to undermine the target’s confidence in her abilities as a communicator. I argue that we can gaslight people as both speakers and hearers, and about (among other properties) the locutionary, perlocutionary, and i…
Making Sense of Emoji
Many online messages now contain emoji – these small images have quickly become an important means of communicating. Yet they have not yet been taken seriously in philosophy of language. In this exploratory paper, I attempt to remedy this neglect by analysing the communicative functions of emoji. I argue that emoji have at least three communicative functions. Firstly, they can serve a replicative function, in that they can play the same role as w…
Cat‐Calls, Compliments and Coercion
In this paper, I offer a novel argument for why cat‐calling is wrong. After warding off the objection that cat‐calls are compliments and therefore morally benign, I show that it cannot be the semantic content of cat‐calls which makes cat‐calling wrong, because some cat‐calls have seemingly benign content yet seem to wrong their targets (usually women and LGBTQ people) nonetheless. Instead, cat‐calling is wrong because it silences targets, by prev…
Reimagining Illocutionary Force
Speech act theorists tend to hold that the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by one interlocutor alone: either the speaker or the hearer. Yet experience tells us that the force of our utterances is not determined unilaterally. Rather, communication often feels collaborative. In this paper, I develop and defend a collaborative theory of illocutionary force, according to which the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by…
Please Like This Paper
In this paper I offer a philosophical analysis of the act of ‘liking’ a post on social media. First, I consider what it means to ‘like’ something. I argue that ‘liking’ is best understood as a phatic gesture; it signals uptake and anoints the poster’s positive face. Next, I consider how best to theorise the power that comes with amassing many ‘likes’. I suggest that ‘like’ tallies alongside posts institute and record a form of digital social capi…
Your word against mine
Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have …
Reimagining Illocutionary Force
Speech act theorists tend to hold that the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by one interlocutor alone: either the speaker or the hearer. Yet experience tells us that the force of our utterances is not determined unilaterally. Rather, communication often feels collaborative. In this paper, I develop and defend a collaborative theory of illocutionary force, according to which the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by…
Your word against mine
Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have …
Please Like This Paper
In this paper I offer a philosophical analysis of the act of ‘liking’ a post on social media. First, I consider what it means to ‘like’ something. I argue that ‘liking’ is best understood as a phatic gesture; it signals uptake and anoints the poster’s positive face. Next, I consider how best to theorise the power that comes with amassing many ‘likes’. I suggest that ‘like’ tallies alongside posts institute and record a form of digital social capi…
Your word against mine
Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have …
Cat‐Calls, Compliments and Coercion
In this paper, I offer a novel argument for why cat‐calling is wrong. After warding off the objection that cat‐calls are compliments and therefore morally benign, I show that it cannot be the semantic content of cat‐calls which makes cat‐calling wrong, because some cat‐calls have seemingly benign content yet seem to wrong their targets (usually women and LGBTQ people) nonetheless. Instead, cat‐calling is wrong because it silences targets, by prev…
Reimagining Illocutionary Force
Speech act theorists tend to hold that the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by one interlocutor alone: either the speaker or the hearer. Yet experience tells us that the force of our utterances is not determined unilaterally. Rather, communication often feels collaborative. In this paper, I develop and defend a collaborative theory of illocutionary force, according to which the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by…
Making Sense of Emoji
Many online messages now contain emoji – these small images have quickly become an important means of communicating. Yet they have not yet been taken seriously in philosophy of language. In this exploratory paper, I attempt to remedy this neglect by analysing the communicative functions of emoji. I argue that emoji have at least three communicative functions. Firstly, they can serve a replicative function, in that they can play the same role as w…
Communicative Gaslighting
In this paper I identify a distinctive kind of gaslighting: communicative gaslighting. Communicative gaslighters intentionally misrepresent the communicative properties of an utterance—their own or their target’s—in a way which functions to undermine the target’s confidence in her abilities as a communicator. I argue that we can gaslight people as both speakers and hearers, and about (among other properties) the locutionary, perlocutionary, and i…
Romantic Domination
Romantic relationships between professors and students, between employers and employees, and between other partners at different points on an institutional hierarchy are widely regarded as morally troubling. Popular explanations as to why have appealed variously to violations of institutional duties, to the impossibility of sexual consent within such relationships, and to the vices of the more powerful partner. I advance an alternative explanatio…
Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Power (physics) (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Communication (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works)