Matthew Mackenzie
Biographic Data
| ID | 3947305 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Mackenzie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Mackenzie |
| SIGNATURE | MACKENZIE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Los Angeles |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Reflexivity, Intentionality, and the Embodied Subject
In The Concept of Intentionality , J. N. Mohanty identifies two significant conceptions of consciousness in both India and the West: "(i) the concept of consciousness as that which exhibits a peculiar property called 'intentionality' or saviṣayakatva ; and (ii) the concept of consciousness as that which is characterized by a peculiar property called 'reflexivity' or svayamprakāśatva " (Mohanty 1971, p. 153). Following Mohanty's lead, we may ask h…
Buddhist Philosophy and the Embodied Mind
In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engages the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist…
Reflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self
The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousne…
Ontological deflationism in Madhyamaka
Self-Awareness without a Self
In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch …
The Five Factors of Action and the Decentring of Agency in the Bhagavad Gītā
I will here analyse the five factors of action given in the Bhagavad Gītā, paying specific attention to the implications of this account for the Gītā's moral and soteriological psychologies. I argue that the Gītā's account of action constitutes a decentring of agency which paves the way for liberation. Further, while the ethics and moral psychology of the Gītā are often seen as similar to Kant's, I will argue that the decentring of agency in the …
Jean-Paul Sartre on violence and terror
The article examines Sartre's understanding of the internal meaning of group violence, and in particular the role of violence in forming the group's collective personality. The pledge creates the justification for internal terror; through the group, the ‘origin of humanity’ emerges and a ‘common freedom’ is realized. For Sartre, there is no substitute for the creative function of violence
No prominent works on this page.
Jean-Paul Sartre on violence and terror
The article examines Sartre's understanding of the internal meaning of group violence, and in particular the role of violence in forming the group's collective personality. The pledge creates the justification for internal terror; through the group, the ‘origin of humanity’ emerges and a ‘common freedom’ is realized. For Sartre, there is no substitute for the creative function of violence
The Five Factors of Action and the Decentring of Agency in the Bhagavad Gītā
I will here analyse the five factors of action given in the Bhagavad Gītā, paying specific attention to the implications of this account for the Gītā's moral and soteriological psychologies. I argue that the Gītā's account of action constitutes a decentring of agency which paves the way for liberation. Further, while the ethics and moral psychology of the Gītā are often seen as similar to Kant's, I will argue that the decentring of agency in the …
Ontological deflationism in Madhyamaka
Self-Awareness without a Self
In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch …
Reflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self
The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousne…
Buddhist Philosophy and the Embodied Mind
In the last 30 years, embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) accounts of mind and experience have flourished. A more cosmopolitan and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind has also emerged, drawing on analytic, phenomenological, pragmatist, and non-Western sources and traditions. This is the first book to fully engages the 4E approach and Buddhist philosophy, drawing on and integrating the intersection of enactivism and Buddhist…
Reflexivity, Intentionality, and the Embodied Subject
In The Concept of Intentionality , J. N. Mohanty identifies two significant conceptions of consciousness in both India and the West: "(i) the concept of consciousness as that which exhibits a peculiar property called 'intentionality' or saviṣayakatva ; and (ii) the concept of consciousness as that which is characterized by a peculiar property called 'reflexivity' or svayamprakāśatva " (Mohanty 1971, p. 153). Following Mohanty's lead, we may ask h…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Indian and Buddhist Studies (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Reflexivity (3 works) · Anthropology (2 works) · Buddhism (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)