Scott Newton
Biographic Data
| ID | 3952826 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Scott Newton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Scott |
| FAMILY NAME | Newton |
| SIGNATURE | NEWTON S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Cardiff University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 20 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Sterling, Bretton Woods, and Social Democracy, 1968–1970
Following the November 1967 sterling devaluation, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson struggled to defend the new exchange rate of £1 = $2.40. Sterling's travails continued throughout 1968 and well into 1969 despite growing evidence that the external balance was moving into the black. Its problems arose from external difficulties, notably from the growth of footloose balances of foreign currencies—especially Eurodollars—within the inte…
The two sterling crises of 1964
Oliver's C omment on my recent article challenges my argument that there were two sterling crises in the autumn of 1964. He argues that there was one only and that the L abour government mishandled it. Oliver has, however, reached these conclusions on the basis of a partial reading of the evidence and a failure to grasp how the changing international context imposed constraints on national economic sovereignty
Keynes
Money, oil, and empire in the Middle East
The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International Economy and Post-War Social Democracy
T he Labour government of Harold Wilson devalued sterling from 1 = $2.80 to 1 = $2.40 on 18 November 1967. It had come to power in 1964 committed to the modernisation of Britain to be achieved by an average annual growth in the economy up to 1970 of 3.8 per cent. The vehicle for this transformation was to be the National Plan, in which the government was to co-operate with industry and the unions to increase both private and public investment, wi…
Business in Britain in the twentieth century
The Marshall Plan
British business in the formative years of European integration, 1945–1973 – By Neil Rollings
Orderly change
The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue1
Conventional wisdom is critical of the newly elected Labour government's reaction to external financial difficulties in the autumn of 1964. Anxious about its political position, it avoided the necessary measures, involving stringent deflation and possibly devaluation. This article seeks to revise the traditional view by re-examining the response to what were actually two sterling crises. The first was handled efficiently. The second was provoked …
Global capitalism
The New Law and Economic Development
This book is a collection of essays that identify and analyze a new phase in thinking about the role of law in economic development and in the practices of development agencies that support law reform. The authors trace the history of theory and doctrine in this field, relating it to changing ideas about development and its institutional practices. The essays describe a new phase in thinking about the relation between law and economic development…
J. M. Keynes and the Postwar International Economic Order
Keynes was at the heart of efforts to establish a reformed international economy after World War Two. But the outcome of his efforts left him a disappointed man. Although the postwar international economic architecture owed much to Keynes it fell short of his ideals. It is arguable that international politics had as much to do with the era of expansion as the Bretton Woods institutions, and that even today the world has not yet grasped the full e…
Constitutionalism and imperialism Sub Specie Spinozae
International financial history in the twentieth century
The essays, written by leading experts, examine the history of the international financial system in terms of the debate about globalization and its limits. In the nineteenth century, international markets existed without international institutions. A response to the problems of capital flows came in the form of attempts to regulate national capital markets (for instance through the establishment of central banks). In the inter-war years, there w…
A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated
During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation.…
A Levite Among the Priests
Journal Article A Levite Among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System Get access A Levite Among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System. By W. Black Stanley. (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991. Pp. viii+127. £l9-50 hardback. ISBN 0 8133 12353.) Scott Newton Scott Newton University of Wales Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google …
The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement
(1991). The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement. Diplomacy & Statecraft: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 178-207
Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50
(1985). Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History: Vol. 13, Money, Finance and Empire, pp. 163-182
The 1949 sterling crisis and British policy towards European integration
Most commentators on the 1949 sterling crisis have viewed it as an episode with implications merely for the management of the British economy. This paper, based on the public records now available, discusses the impact of the crisis on British economic foreign policy. In particular it suggests that the crisis revealed deep Anglo-American differences, centring on the nature of the Marshall Plan, on the international value of the sterling area, and…
Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50
(1985). Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History: Vol. 13, Money, Finance and Empire, pp. 163-182
The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue1
Conventional wisdom is critical of the newly elected Labour government's reaction to external financial difficulties in the autumn of 1964. Anxious about its political position, it avoided the necessary measures, involving stringent deflation and possibly devaluation. This article seeks to revise the traditional view by re-examining the response to what were actually two sterling crises. The first was handled efficiently. The second was provoked …
A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated
During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation.…
The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International Economy and Post-War Social Democracy
T he Labour government of Harold Wilson devalued sterling from 1 = $2.80 to 1 = $2.40 on 18 November 1967. It had come to power in 1964 committed to the modernisation of Britain to be achieved by an average annual growth in the economy up to 1970 of 3.8 per cent. The vehicle for this transformation was to be the National Plan, in which the government was to co-operate with industry and the unions to increase both private and public investment, wi…
Constitutionalism and imperialism Sub Specie Spinozae
The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement
(1991). The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement. Diplomacy & Statecraft: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 178-207
Sterling, Bretton Woods, and Social Democracy, 1968–1970
Following the November 1967 sterling devaluation, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson struggled to defend the new exchange rate of £1 = $2.40. Sterling's travails continued throughout 1968 and well into 1969 despite growing evidence that the external balance was moving into the black. Its problems arose from external difficulties, notably from the growth of footloose balances of foreign currencies—especially Eurodollars—within the inte…
Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50
(1985). Britain, the sterling area and European integration, 1945–50. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History: Vol. 13, Money, Finance and Empire, pp. 163-182
The 1949 sterling crisis and British policy towards European integration
Most commentators on the 1949 sterling crisis have viewed it as an episode with implications merely for the management of the British economy. This paper, based on the public records now available, discusses the impact of the crisis on British economic foreign policy. In particular it suggests that the crisis revealed deep Anglo-American differences, centring on the nature of the Marshall Plan, on the international value of the sterling area, and…
The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement
(1991). The ‘Anglo‐German connection’ and the political economy of appeasement. Diplomacy & Statecraft: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 178-207
A Levite Among the Priests
Journal Article A Levite Among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System Get access A Levite Among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System. By W. Black Stanley. (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991. Pp. viii+127. £l9-50 hardback. ISBN 0 8133 12353.) Scott Newton Scott Newton University of Wales Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google …
A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated
During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation.…
International financial history in the twentieth century
The essays, written by leading experts, examine the history of the international financial system in terms of the debate about globalization and its limits. In the nineteenth century, international markets existed without international institutions. A response to the problems of capital flows came in the form of attempts to regulate national capital markets (for instance through the establishment of central banks). In the inter-war years, there w…
The New Law and Economic Development
This book is a collection of essays that identify and analyze a new phase in thinking about the role of law in economic development and in the practices of development agencies that support law reform. The authors trace the history of theory and doctrine in this field, relating it to changing ideas about development and its institutional practices. The essays describe a new phase in thinking about the relation between law and economic development…
J. M. Keynes and the Postwar International Economic Order
Keynes was at the heart of efforts to establish a reformed international economy after World War Two. But the outcome of his efforts left him a disappointed man. Although the postwar international economic architecture owed much to Keynes it fell short of his ideals. It is arguable that international politics had as much to do with the era of expansion as the Bretton Woods institutions, and that even today the world has not yet grasped the full e…
Constitutionalism and imperialism Sub Specie Spinozae
Global capitalism
British business in the formative years of European integration, 1945–1973 – By Neil Rollings
Orderly change
The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue1
Conventional wisdom is critical of the newly elected Labour government's reaction to external financial difficulties in the autumn of 1964. Anxious about its political position, it avoided the necessary measures, involving stringent deflation and possibly devaluation. This article seeks to revise the traditional view by re-examining the response to what were actually two sterling crises. The first was handled efficiently. The second was provoked …
The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International Economy and Post-War Social Democracy
T he Labour government of Harold Wilson devalued sterling from 1 = $2.80 to 1 = $2.40 on 18 November 1967. It had come to power in 1964 committed to the modernisation of Britain to be achieved by an average annual growth in the economy up to 1970 of 3.8 per cent. The vehicle for this transformation was to be the National Plan, in which the government was to co-operate with industry and the unions to increase both private and public investment, wi…
Business in Britain in the twentieth century
The Marshall Plan
Money, oil, and empire in the Middle East
Keynes
Sterling, Bretton Woods, and Social Democracy, 1968–1970
Following the November 1967 sterling devaluation, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson struggled to defend the new exchange rate of £1 = $2.40. Sterling's travails continued throughout 1968 and well into 1969 despite growing evidence that the external balance was moving into the black. Its problems arose from external difficulties, notably from the growth of footloose balances of foreign currencies—especially Eurodollars—within the inte…
The two sterling crises of 1964
Oliver's C omment on my recent article challenges my argument that there were two sterling crises in the autumn of 1964. He argues that there was one only and that the L abour government mishandled it. Oliver has, however, reached these conclusions on the basis of a partial reading of the evidence and a failure to grasp how the changing international context imposed constraints on national economic sovereignty
Political science (14 works) · Law (13 works) · History (12 works) · Politics (11 works) · Economic history (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Economics (8 works) · Citation (7 works) · History (7 works) · Political and Economic history of UK and US (7 works)