Elmer Sprague
Biographic Data
| ID | 3955921 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elmer Sprague |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elmer |
| FAMILY NAME | Sprague |
| SIGNATURE | SPRAGUE E |
| AFFILIATIONS | City University of New York |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1961 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Hume, Causation, and Agency
Hume inherits the spectator model of experience and knowledge, and inflates it to displace any other kind of experience-based knowledge. Thus he construes our knowledge of causation as no more than an observer’s knowledge of one thing’s following on, or attending, another. Construing causation in that way, he rules out consideration of our experience as agents and our knowledge of causation as efficacy, or making things happen. Yet if we did not …
The Honest Mind
Metaphysical Thinking
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Metaphysical Thinking. By Elmer Sprague. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. Pp. x + 162. Price $3.00, paper.) Bric Matthews Bric Matthews Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 114, January 1979, Pages 84–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219190 Published: 01 January 1979
Knowledge and Experience
Some Dilemmas of Naturalism
No prominent works on this page.
Some Dilemmas of Naturalism
Knowledge and Experience
The Honest Mind
Metaphysical Thinking
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Metaphysical Thinking. By Elmer Sprague. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. Pp. x + 162. Price $3.00, paper.) Bric Matthews Bric Matthews Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 114, January 1979, Pages 84–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219190 Published: 01 January 1979
Hume, Causation, and Agency
Hume inherits the spectator model of experience and knowledge, and inflates it to displace any other kind of experience-based knowledge. Thus he construes our knowledge of causation as no more than an observer’s knowledge of one thing’s following on, or attending, another. Construing causation in that way, he rules out consideration of our experience as agents and our knowledge of causation as efficacy, or making things happen. Yet if we did not …
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works) · General interest (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 work) · BRIC (1 work) · Causation (1 work)