Lucian Arye Bebchuk

Biographic Data

ID3960622
NAMELucian Arye Bebchuk
GIVEN NAMESLucian Arye
FAMILY NAMEBebchuk
SIGNATUREBEBCHUK L A
AFFILIATIONSWilliam J. Friedman Professor of Law, Economics and Finance, Harvard Law School, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, both in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS78
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1984
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
H-INDEX3

  • The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power

    Open AccessLucian Arye BebchukARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2003Cited by: 2References: 1

    This paper reconsiders the basic allocation of power between boards and shareholders in publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership.U.S. corporate law has long precluded shareholders from initiating any changes in the company's basic governance arrangements.My analysis and empirical evidence indicate that shareholders' existing power to replace directors is insufficient to secure the adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements tha…

  • Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

    Open AccessLucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M FriedARTICLEThe Journal of Economic…2003Cited by: 33References: 23

    This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a "managerial power" approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expect…

  • The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C Coates et al.ARTICLEStanford Law Review2002Cited by: 2

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Dec., 2002), pp. 885-917

  • The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John Coates et al.ARTICLEStanford Law Review2002Cited by: 3

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (May, 2002), pp. 887-951

  • Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Steven ShavellARTICLEStanford Law Review1999

    In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high valuation buyers to reveal their valuation of performance, and we identified the circumstances under which such limitations on liability are and are not socially desirable. In an article forthcoming in the Stanfo…

  • A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Mark J RoeARTICLEStanford Law Review1999Cited by: 38

  • Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information

    Open AccessLucian Arye BebchukARTICLEThe RAND Journal of Economics1984

    A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead to parties' failure to settle. The model is used to identify how the likelihood of settlement and the settlement amount are shaped by various factors--the size of the amount at stake, the magnitude of the parties' litigation costs, and the nature of the par…