Jan Heylen
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973618 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jan Heylen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jan |
| FAMILY NAME | Heylen |
| SIGNATURE | HEYLEN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institute of Philosophy |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth
Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as ‘Jack exists’ is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth ‘Jack is self-identical’, and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged ‘If Jack exists, then …
The epistemic significance of numerals
Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the problem of quantifying in
Strict Conditionals
Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural‐language conditionals in a satisfactory way
Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the problem of quantifying in
Strict Conditionals
Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural‐language conditionals in a satisfactory way
Strict Conditionals
Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural‐language conditionals in a satisfactory way
Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the problem of quantifying in
The epistemic significance of numerals
Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth
Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as ‘Jack exists’ is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth ‘Jack is self-identical’, and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged ‘If Jack exists, then …
Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)