Lawrence Masek
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973768 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lawrence Masek |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lawrence |
| FAMILY NAME | Masek |
| SIGNATURE | MASEK L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ohio Dominican University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
AI robots, deadly poisons and the relevance of counterexamples
Non-consequentialist and egalitarian objections to the dead donor rule
Unlike some critics of the dead donor rule, I do not defend consequentialism or deny the personhood of any potential organ donor. Instead, I argue that the principles of ethics and action theory that support the dead donor rule also prohibit widely accepted procedures, including kidney and partial liver transplants from living donors, fetal surgeries that permanently damage the uterus, sequential or domino liver transplants and lethal palliation.…
Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect
I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so‐called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases…
Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect
I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so‐called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases…
Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect
I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so‐called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases…
Non-consequentialist and egalitarian objections to the dead donor rule
Unlike some critics of the dead donor rule, I do not defend consequentialism or deny the personhood of any potential organ donor. Instead, I argue that the principles of ethics and action theory that support the dead donor rule also prohibit widely accepted procedures, including kidney and partial liver transplants from living donors, fetal surgeries that permanently damage the uterus, sequential or domino liver transplants and lethal palliation.…
AI robots, deadly poisons and the relevance of counterexamples
Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Abortion (1 work) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Character (mathematics) (1 work) · Consequentialism (1 work) · Dead end (1 work) · Doctrine (1 work) · Donation (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work)