Aaron Ben-Zeev
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973827 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aaron Ben-Zeev |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aaron |
| FAMILY NAME | Ben-Zeev |
| SIGNATURE | BEN-ZEEV A |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Reid and the Cartesian framework
Reid's opposition to the representational view of mind is accompanied with some other conceptual changes in the Cartesian conceptual framework. These changes, however, fail to provide a comprehensive alternative to this framework. This is especially disturbing with respect to the causal view of mind. This paper suggests the paradigm of emergent properties as an alternative to the causal paradigm. Although this paradigm is not present in Reid's wr…
Can Non-Pure Perception Be Direct
Journal Article Can Non-Pure Perception be Direct? Get access Aaron Ben Zeev Aaron Ben Zeev University of Haifa Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 152, July 1988, Pages 315–325, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220130 Published: 01 July 1988
Reid's direct approach to perception
Aristotle on Perceptual Truth and Falsity
The dualistic approach to perception
The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation—Perception Distinction
G.E. Moore and the relation between intrinsic value and human activity
J.J. Gibson and the ecological approach to perception
G.E. Moore and the relation between intrinsic value and human activity
J.J. Gibson and the ecological approach to perception
Aristotle on Perceptual Truth and Falsity
The dualistic approach to perception
The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation—Perception Distinction
Reid's direct approach to perception
Can Non-Pure Perception Be Direct
Journal Article Can Non-Pure Perception be Direct? Get access Aaron Ben Zeev Aaron Ben Zeev University of Haifa Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 152, July 1988, Pages 315–325, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220130 Published: 01 July 1988
Reid and the Cartesian framework
Reid's opposition to the representational view of mind is accompanied with some other conceptual changes in the Cartesian conceptual framework. These changes, however, fail to provide a comprehensive alternative to this framework. This is especially disturbing with respect to the causal view of mind. This paper suggests the paradigm of emergent properties as an alternative to the causal paradigm. Although this paradigm is not present in Reid's wr…
Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Perception (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works)