Derek H Brown
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973911 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Derek H Brown |
| GIVEN NAMES | Derek H |
| FAMILY NAME | Brown |
| SIGNATURE | BROWN D H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Primitive Colors
The cornerstone of Joshua Gert's philosophy of color is that colors are primitive, objective properties possessed by things in our environment. There are also two crucial qualifications. Colors are rough and not precise. This means that, for example, while there are blue things there are no pure blue things (pure blue being any shade of blue that has no reddish or greenish tinge). Second, although there are no precise colors, there are precise co…
Empiricism and Experience - Anil Gupta: Book Reviews
Journal Article Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta Get access Empiricism and Experience. Anil Gupta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 265. Price £27.00.) Derek H. Brown Derek H. Brown Brandon University, Manitoba Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 230, January 2008, Pages 180–185, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.547_4.x Published: 14 Ja…
On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory
A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose n…
On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory
A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose n…
On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory
A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose n…
Empiricism and Experience - Anil Gupta: Book Reviews
Journal Article Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta Get access Empiricism and Experience. Anil Gupta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 265. Price £27.00.) Derek H. Brown Derek H. Brown Brandon University, Manitoba Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 230, January 2008, Pages 180–185, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.547_4.x Published: 14 Ja…
Primitive Colors
The cornerstone of Joshua Gert's philosophy of color is that colors are primitive, objective properties possessed by things in our environment. There are also two crucial qualifications. Colors are rough and not precise. This means that, for example, while there are blue things there are no pure blue things (pure blue being any shade of blue that has no reddish or greenish tinge). Second, although there are no precise colors, there are precise co…
Philosophy (3 works) · Color perception and design (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Art (1 works) · Art history (1 works) · Categorization, perception, and language (1 works) · Classics (1 works) · Cognitive psychology (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Consciousness (1 works)